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INTRODUCTION
"It is inconceivable that the vjorld v/ill
be content for long ’like a blind horse, to
starve knee-deep in corn, ’ to tolerate want
with abundance all aro\md, the destruction of
food while men and women and children are
perishing for the lack of it. And, if sound
finance continues to put forward such a demand,
then at the last it will be so much the worse
for sound finance."
Are we living in an age of plenty, or is it
mere rhetoric to talk about starvation in the midst of
plenty? Is there enough to go around? And if there
is not, is modern industry capable of producing enough
to go around? Possibly we produce too much. Is over-
production the cause of all our woes? Are unemployment
and poverty the natural consequences of overproduction?
There is too much grain in the West. The boll-weevils
that were imported for the purpose of destroying the
2
cotton crops were not as efficient as they were ex-
pected to be, so we are burdened by the largest cotton
crop in history. There are excessive inventories of
cloth, shoes, and hardware in New England. Elsewhere
there are huge inventories of copper, pig iron, and
other metals. The child of the New England workman
has the rickets for want of food, while the cattleman
1 The Breakdown of honey
,
Christopher Hollis, p. STT.
2 The Role of Money, P’rederick Soddy, p. 15.
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and slieep-herder are cold for Virant to shoes and woolen
cloth. It vtfould seem reasonable to suppose that an
intelligent civilization could find a way to get the
shoes into the West and the products of the V/est into
New England in sufficient quantities to end this state
of affairs. if it were merely a question of moving the
products v/e would probably find that there is too much
transportation. In the face of poverty, insecurity,
hard work, scanty living, starvation, and disease, we
continue to empty milk into the rivers, burn wheat and
coffee as fuel, and import pests to destroy the crops.
.Ve are certainly determined to have the poor alv;ays
with us. iiS for the poor, whatever else they may lack,
they still seem to possess the inclination and capacity
to enjoy the blessing as recorded in Genesis; increase
and multiply. For thousands of years they have enjoyed
ascetic poverty; it has spiritual advantages. However,
at no previous time in history was this spiritual ad-
vantage insured by overproduction. What will the his-
torian of the future think of this type of civilization
4i
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CHAPTER I
TECHNOLOGY AND MONETARY REFORLl
The Obstruction of Productive Capacity
The simple arithmetic of the relationship
between population, production, and capacity to pro-
duce, is astounding. Inanimate energy and the mechan-
ization of industry, both in industry and agriculture,
have enomously increased the output per man. There
have been a great many studies made in recent years
designed to show that our capacity to produce is enor-
mously greater than we had supposed. Investigators
estimate the productive income of the nation at widely
varying figures, but the conclusions of reasonable and
even conservative economists are surprisingly high.
The per-family capacity of the country is placed v;ell
above ^4,000 yearly in 1929 dollars. There is unanimity
of opinion among investigators that standards of living
could be very much higher if our labor capital and nat-
ural resources were properly used. Obviously, there
are great statistical difficulties in estimating poten-
tial productive income of the United States. However,
the ambitious researches of The National Survey of
Product Capacity^ give us a reasonable figure of
1 The Chart of Plenty
,
Harold Loeb and Associates,
pp . 132 and 137.
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approximately fL 55, 000, 000, 000 yearly v/ith present
capital equipment. This survey was made by sixty
technicians, economists, and engineers, financed by
the Federal Government.
Estimates of Capacity
A similar study was made at the brookings
Institution by b. G. Nourse and others in an attempt
to estimate total productive capacity. The results
were published in 1934 in "America's Capacity to
Produce". The investigators were extremely conservr
ative in their calculations, but they still estimated
that "our productive system as a whole was operating
at about 60^ of capacity in 1929".^ There is consid-
erable debate as to the relative merits of these two
studies. The studies at the Brookings Institution are
thought by some to be too conservative. Others hold
that the conclusions of The
.
National Burvey of
Potential Product Capacity are too optimistic. IIovi/-
ever, even the more conservative estimate placed
capacity productivity at over ^15,000,000,000 more
than that attained in 1929. The economic world has
accepted the general conclusion as to our enormously
greater capacity to produce.
»
1 america’s Capacity to Produce
,
Edwin G. Nourse and
Associates, p. 416.
cffi-.r..'*';-' vX'..‘i->'v; OV ’' •.-••-
1
'iXoJa -ixc-jqfi
'
ij;.. v'i?M r.jiri’ . XA.iX<ii’0
Tjd riVv ^ aJeXj'iOfroos* ^
:
4 /tA.«j.oi::uio©
J
. voi5 Xp.I'Jii. e"*!
v^.'' ^
0
." 5 V
‘-
C- w . 1
•fli*'flXi;-Op‘r-a ’STf-t 8f>ijxa -aftw *5«XXaKiti A
ctvj::iXj:iiii fiii al ^'lel^^o X^ai3 >^aai;oVi v;X
&SLtJ?-^'y. o >•'•.].';
0
t;*v" !y ox-'X.'O-'l'^ Xiijccf e J.i-i.'^.uiTC'C.;
<fi
o J ,'^J'j; OjCivT^jO ii iicX rtl 2XdA,‘C
Tvat^BtJDo »*iew s'xc^ajgXXa avni: orfT . “’90..'i:c‘i^X
j.uia XiiJs- l!'-94rfX Js/d ^ aixoXXsIi'oIiJO -iXpriv rii
gnidiST:o<;p- a^w' ^lodR- -i s*i c^vidouLv ^<1 *jx'‘C**
•;..'
-iiX.EJfe>0.- ®-x ««ipfivj- ^.“9^‘ViX ixX Xo Suods
.
QwS .6 Aj ip «yX*tp«f o5 Bi* d^«Qsl‘ :) *.cf^-xp
.
9*1*? abix/'XXoanX saJ X.j ssJJb//'JC siii .f.:9il5i/ja
,
blorf' eyoiCXO ..wiXBv.'ioflncio poX o;s emoa
ISi '.
.CftgQJf ‘10 «/toX tttfXojtxPo '3dJ 'dijdXf
-\VOb , vtdc-isxl'J ; ^ *^T.B •cXl?a<r^O ‘i'~^
•••I 4 J' 'Xi-iivl -4 o 6Vl2.:V'fei^^iP3 o'Lrtf.i ’ iUi' -fisva t*i©V0-
'e‘ibsr :-.aif‘ t :-iUu < \A<- 1 '"; XC- i<^vo \7Xv‘lJfppi>0''ia ^XJpsq*o
y.'ii-: M-T.f.',' ol wnco^ a(£P .‘::^-Tl ai jijdd luuij
' yXsircftficn© ' 'ix/o c-i «a riOX^i-locico Xj6*i«/:.v-; ^?aj t*a
baa •Jeai/o.J'I frlv/X)Ii ^Ov/i^bQ'i- * O'! .V J-J ^ - yCfJu I. . - *« '- X
^
’ To i'*5^i«Xo'c?. ca
National Planning or Monetary Control
authorities disagree widely as to whether
money holds a merely passive role in our economy or
whether it can be so managed as to increase materi-
ally our general well-being, ijefore we proceed
further, let us reemphasize the major concept estab-
lished to this point. Recent investigation has shov/n
that our national productive capacity is enormously
greater than we had supposed, and many economists hold
that the solution of this problem of chronic underpro-
duction has to do vi/ith money. The survey made by The
National Survey of Fotentlal product Cap acity which
was mentioned previously, proved that the potential
income of the united States is about ^135,000,000,000
yearly. V/ith national production running about
$80,000,000,000 yearly below capacity we may well
examine, very soberly, the challenging claims of mone-
tary economists that the solution of this great problem
is purely one of money.
Either some form of complete and nation-wide
economic planning or a system in which the money media
are controlled with a view to more equitable distribu-
tion and a socialized use of the factors of production
must supersede the present anarchic system of individ-
ualistic capitalism and private control of exchange
1 The Chart of Plenty
,
Loeb and Associates, p. 137.
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4media. Of course, our industrialists and bankers work
together in such, admirable harmony that some might sus-
pect that we have economic planning from this course
now. Vi/hen a score of our great corporations cut their
inventories at about the same time that our bankers are
calling loans we have all the evidences of planning,
but not of a socialized character.
If we are ever to have a high standard of
living we must somehow attain nearly maximum possible
production of what the people need and desire. Maximum
physical production assumes that all employables are at
work and that the capital and resources of the nation
are being used at maximum efficiency,
proposals for national planning ignore the
fact that demand is the best director of society's pro-
ductive effort. It is not a question of deciding for
society what products should be used. The problem is
to increase the tot&l production available for society's
wants, and real wants are discoverable only by having
purchasing power in the hands of the public. The prob-
lem of using our labor supply upon our natural resources
and productive equipment fully and efficiently can be
solved only by providing adequate purchasing power
through the exchange media of money and credit. To
accomplish this, some degree of socialization of the
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exchange media must take place, for at present, however
hard our laborers v/ould like to work, or however hard
they do work, the food, shelter and clothing of the
American people depend largely, too largely, upon book-
keeping entries on the records of about 15,000 banks;
that is, upon a modern form of "wild cat" banking lia-
bilities -- deposit currency.
The Frustration of Industrial Science
The communists insist that the poor are being
exploited and it is utterly futile to deny this patent
truth, herein lies the moral appeal of communism and
every other plan of socialization. Since the very be-
ginning of the industrial revolution capitalism has
obstructed the progress of technology. From the start,
the capitalist was interested not in making goods but
in making money. Whatever advantages modern society
does possess are to be credited to scientific improve-
ments in our methods of industry resialting not from
capitalism, rather in spite of- the system. An upstart
system of laissez. faire capitalism, born with the indus-
trial revolution, pretends to have God on its side. But
since the v/orld began has tnere been a time when the
destructive and obstructive practices of the nineteenth
and twentieth century were the rule? Stuart Chase has
a photograph of a pile of oranges, excellent fruit, a
i
mile long and ten feet deep thrown away to rot. This
is not a mere meaningless illustration. It is a strik-
ing, hut typical example, of destruction which is an
inherent part of the business of insuring profits. In
1932 productive income in the United States had shrunk
to ;li)35,000,00U,00U yearly. What difference did it make
that technology had made it possible to produce an in-
come yearly of :frl35,000,000,000? Such vast production
was not consistent with the aims of twentieth century
capitalism. Such production would have permitted a
decent standard of living for every family and done
away with the scarcity from which capitalistic indi-
vidualism thrives. Technical improvements have
equipped the nation with inanimate energy equal to
forty times as much per person as was avpilable a hun-
dred years ago. However, the inanimate energy goes to
waste, the factories are closed, the workmen idle, and
the resources are needlessly destroyed by the most wan-
ton exploitation.
It is not the purpose of this paper to defend
socialism in any form, but it must be recognized at the
start that if the efforts of our industrial scientists
are deliberately frustrated by capitalistic society,
some violent form of socialization is an inevitable
certainty. The Soviet termites that are supposed to

be undermining our institutions c&n hardly be worse
than the liberalist vermin that we have inherited from
the days of Adam Smith. The devil that we know may
not be worse than the devil we don’t know, but there
is a limit to tolerance in the social body.
It is probable that we have little choice in
the matter. The inherent rottenness of capitalistic
financialism is so fundamental that it is politically
and psychologically impossible to correct its evils.
For this reason farsighted liberals are looking for
revolution-proof investments.
“Crackpots” or Bankers
Public apathy is insuring the doom of repre-
sentative constitutional government. Not that the
individual citizen is culpable. The responsibility of
citizenship is difficult in our modern complicated soci-
ety. The majority are humdrum, lacking the capacity to
understand even the simpler facts of modern economic
society. Furthermore, they are easily misled by inter-
ested pressure groups, hven those few who would assume
the responsibilities of citizenship are victims of de-
liberate deception. Their newspapers, periodicals and
radios are merely vehicles of misinformation. To edu-
cate such a public, to stir up righteous indignation,
to get action, is a Herculean task, and there is no
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modern Hercules strong enough to accomplish this against
the highly subsidized propaganda of the great interests.
The average local commerciel banker is honest, valuable
to the community, an expert, and thoroughly informed in
his own business. His business. is concerned chiefly
with the making of loans. He should and does know the
credit capacity of his customers. His business is not
that of the astute central banker. He does not deal
with monetary management. His apathy in social mone-
tary problems is quite as apparent as that of the aver-
age citizen. auch interest as he does have will not
interfere v;ith his golf and is likely not to go beyond
an occasional casual thought that follows the stereo-
typed notary Club doctrine on such matters. A brief
conversation with the Vice President of any bank will
disclose hov/ deep the ignorance lies, as Professor
Fisher says:
'•The popular notions, including those
of ordinary bankers
,
are as primitive as the
superstitions of a Russian peasant before the
War, Such notions are; 'It is a matter of
honor to keep on gold' (instead of on a stable
standard); 'Inflation is always ^^Tong' (even
to correct deflation); 'We must not tinker
with the currency' (even when it needs mending);
'Irredeemable paper is unsound' (even v/hen it is
stable); 'Money should be hard money;'”
and so on. But of the fundamental principles, if any,
behind such precepts, he is blissfully unaware.^
1 Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, Introduction, p. xx
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9The Artificial Credit Cycle
There is a carefully fostered belief that the
business depression with its immense social, moral and
material loss is unavoidable. Urises and depressions
are accepted therefore as the thorns in the rose garden
of oapitalism and are believed to be just as natural.
The various phases of the cycle are supposed to be as
Inevitable as the tides, and some innocent folk are so
naive as to suppose that its various phases follow a
well defined course such as we would habitually asso-
ciate with the movements of the celestial bodies. They
borrow from the physical sciences the idea that what goes
up must come dovin and disclaim all responsibility for its
coming down. Such ideas have misleading connotations
when used to describe the business cycle. Prosperity,
crisis, depression, and revival are not natural phenom-
ena. They are the direct result of the credit cycle, and
the credit cycle is certainly not a natural phenomenon.
It is rather an artificial device, a diabolical invention
A«hich is managed, controlled, and directed for the con-
scious purpose of thwarting civilization's attempt to
feed and clothe the underprivileged castes.
The deliberate ensnaring of the imweiry enter-
priser by astute central bankers is still a favorite
financial pastime. Large scale insolvencies are in-
duced by sudden contractions of credit. This practice.
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called a corrective remedy by the financial papers, not
only proves fatrl to individual enterprisers, but what
is much more important, it has far-reaching results --
both nationally and internationally, jioth modern de-
pressions and modern wars are traceable to this crafty
scheme -- monetary and credit mismanagement. Capital-
istic nations have watched the rise of powerful totali-
tarian states and the hectic scramble to arm with all
of the devices of destruction that ingenuity can devise.
This scramble is due to a need for economic goods to
complement their respective national economic needs.
Here we have duplicated in international markets the
same cruel and needless creation of shortages that be-
devils all honest attempts to supply the reasonable
needs of domestic desire. Hitler is going to fight to
obtain somewhere the very things that we plow imder and
the finished goods that our factories might have pro-
duced if billions of dollars of credit had not been
called, if there had not been wanton destruction of our
deposit currency.
Central Bankers Interested Parties
Mr. John Maynard Keynes expresses sympathy
for the reasonable doubts of practical men and says:
”I do not think that practical bankers are primarily
blameworthy."^ Other and more conservative economists
1 A Treatise on Money, John Maynard Keynes, p. 405
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are also reluctant to believe that bankers ,, surrounded
as they are by the trappings of respectability, can be
guilty of inducing depressions by directing deflation
with the secret objective of withholding the benefits
t
of technical progress from the v/orking classes. The
mere suggestion of such a thing is very disturbing to
these charitable souls, -and will, so they believe,
ultimately cause serious disruption in the social
order. These persons were the most surprised when
Richard Whitney, former president of the New York Stock
Exchange, recently changed his address to Sing Sing.
This incident and others of the same kind are merely
the surface indication of a monstrous moral decadence
in financial circles. Individual financiers may well
be above suspicion. However, the system is inherently
dishonest, the financier’s means of attaining his ob-
jectives is unconstitutional, and the sinister conse-
quences reported in the daily newspapers from the war
fronts of the world are positively inhuman.
I do not question the sincerity of every
banker or economist that disagrees with me on the vital
question of monetary management. Nor do I suspect every
one who does not share my conviction in regard to the
inherent dishonesty of modern banking. However, the
stakes are high. Billions are involved. And we must
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not forget that great volumes of the literature on
monetary economics have been written by interested
parties. Indeed, much of our legislation has been
written by men whose closest associates have been in
the employ of our great banks. The monetary economist
without such connections, whose opinions are therefore
less circumscribed, and whose services are not bought
and paid for by interested parties, is likely to be
nearer the unbiased and simple truth. As Senator
Robert L. Owen, co-author of the Federal Reserve Act
says :
"Knowledge of the science (of money)
has been made difficult by those v;ho have
converted these simple principles into an
enigma. They have done so v;ith ponderous
volumes written on prices and on the
processes of production, transportation,
distribution, and allied topics; weaving
into the subject matter deceptive terms so
that the public has been grossly misled by
the use of words^ which contain accepted
false premises.”
In the heated controversies of today it has
become the custom to refer to monetary and banking
authorities who are on ^"our side" as financial ex-
perts; if they do not agree with us they are "crack-
pots” or they belong to the "fringe of lunacy", or
they are merely theorists. Senator Owen, who has been
1 Foreword to Money Creators by Senator Robert L.
Owen, p. 5, Gertrude M, Coogan. .
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a consistent advocate of mandatory stabilization, will
doubtless earn for himself all of the above mentioned
compliments and more . However, it is still permissible,
with elaborate apologies, to suggest that the senator’s
appointment to the Chairmanship of the Senate Finance
Committee was backed by qualifications which should
have been satisfactory to the most smug of business men.
He has been president of a bank for ten years and a
director for forty-five years. Furthermore, he had
'’studied at first hand the Bank of England through its
Governors; the Bank of France through its Governor and
expert advisers, and the neichsbank through its
Directors
.
Leading authorities in economics and prac-
tical men of affairs in banking and in the legislatures
have for decades advocated various legislative measures
to bring about more stable money. xhe most formidable
opposition has come from central bankers. Buch opposi-
tion is, of course, to be expected, as such legislation
would of necessity limit the powers of central bankers
and regulate some of their most important activities.
However, as interested parties, officials of central
banks are not to be credited with the best judgment as
to the Vvisdom of such legislation. There is still too
1 Money Creators
,
Gertrude M. Coogan, Foreword by
ttobert L. Owen, p. iX.

much, truth in a statement credited to the founder of
the House of
credit and I
Rothchild: "Give me control of money and
care not who makes the lav/s”.
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CHiJPTER II
STABLE MONEY CONCEPTS
Conflict of Opinion
Speaking pontificslly for centre! Bankers,
the late H. Parker ’Willis dismissed the whole matter
of stahilizstion as a mirage, and holds that no sta-
bilization plan is feasible. Furthermore, he states
that other central banking services are of primary
importance and that there should be no interference
with their performance. He says:
’’The central bank has a mission to
perform as a bank, that is urgent: that
of maintaining liquidity and redeemabil-
ity in the affairs of the community, that
of protecting the basic monetary standard
of the community, whatever that may be,
and that of guaranteeing a fair and even
access to its supply of credit.”
Obviously, all three services are important,
but it is impossible to render them without stabiliza-
tion. How, for instance, could liquidity be maintained
during the period of falling prices from 1929 to 1932?
It doesn’t make sense to talk about protecting the basic
monetary standard during a period of instability such as
Germany experienced during its post-war inflation per-
iod. During any period of falling prices a central bank
1. The Theory and Practice of Central Banking, H. Parker
vailis, p. 54.
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simply cannot guarantee "a fair and even access to its
supply of credit'*. This service can be rendered to
member banks, but not to the community; and it is a
much more vital consideration that the community receive
ade quat e credit.
Dr. Willis was considered one of the leading
authorities on banking in the United States. However,
he was vd.th the minority on this question, for a very
great majority of writers on monetary problems have
stressed both the desirability and the feasibility of
stabilizing the price level. The belief is becoming
more and more firmly established that the problem of
a stable price level will soon be solved and, further-
more, that the solution, when we have it, will be simple
There is great variation in the ways and means proposed,
but few writers who do not recognize that stability is
the primary objective. The movement has been championed
by such men as Owen D. Young, who said: “You need not
try to ‘sell’ me on your proposition; for I think it
is about the most important thing in the v/orld -- econom
ically. What convinced me was my experience in Germany
on the Dawes Commission. I found that the one great
need was the stable mark."^ A great change in the pur-
chasing power of the monetary unit -- the pound, the
dollar, or any other unit — is a cplpmity vhich is also
1 Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. XVII.
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the prime cause of business depression and other
social injustices.
Senator Robert L. Ovi/en, as Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Banking, inserted in the original
Federal Reserve bill a provision requiring "that the
powers of the Reserve System be employed in the ser-
vice of commerce and to promote a STABLE price level".
The meaning of this provision, according to Senator
Owen, **was to establish and maintain the stable value
of money under mandate".^ The senator explained fur-
ther that this mandatory provision was stricken out
in the House under the leadership of Hon. Carter Class,
and that he was unable to keep the mandatory provision
in the Bill because of the secret hostilities developed
against it, the origin of which he did not fully under-
stand at that time.
Roosevelt’s Variable Policy
In the early days of President Roosevelt’s
first administration advocates of stable money got
temporary encouragement from numerous statements
stressing the need for price-level stabilization. On
July 3, 1933, the President sent a message to the
London Economic Conference which was typical of his
stand on the stable money question. It seemed honest
1 Money Creators
,
Gertrude M. Coogan, Foreword,
Robert L. Owen, p. ix.
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at the time and. unmlstekeahle as to its meaning
"So, too, old fetishes of so-called
international hankers are being replaced
by efforts to plan national currencies
with the objective of giving to those
currencies a continuing purchasing power
which does not greatly vary in terms of
commodities and the need of modern civil-
ization. Let me be frank in saying that
the United States seeks the kind of dollar
which a generation hence will have the seme
purchasing and debt-paying power as the
dollar we hope to attain in the near future.""^
The President may have been sincere, but his subse-
quent monetary program probably did incalculable harm
to the stable money movement. The deliberate deflation
and consequent business depression of 1937-38 are only
part of the case against the monetary authorities of
this administration. It is remarkable how often both
supporters and opponents of the President have been mis
taken in their interpretation of presidential statement
Consequences of Price Instability
The importance of stability cannot possibly
be overestimated. Unemployment, labor troubles, end
civil disturbances of all kinds, are a direct result
of price changes. It is probably no exaggeration to
say that even war is less Important as a cause of suf-
fering then instability, for war is usually traceable
1. The Money Muddle
,
James P. Warburg, p. 118.
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to this cause. Few revolutions have occurred for sny
other resson. The collepse of the mprk sccounts for
Hitler. The fell of the ruble peved the wey for
Bolshevism. Few people realize that the /merican
revolution probably would not have occurred but for s
drastic fall of prices immediately preceding. In two
and a half years, from October 1772 to /pril 1775, the
price level fell 21^.^ American history following the
revolution also throws light on the importance of an
unstable price level. During the critical period prior
to the signing of the Constitution prices fell from an
index number of 232 to 82. Is it any wonder that the
colonies very nearly returned to the British Empire?
Fortunately for Washington’s administration and the new
republic the price level began to rise in 1788 and con-
tinued to do so during both of his administr ations
.
The Napoleonic wars which caused a 70;^ rise in American
prices also insured Washington's popularity even to the
present time.
G-reat historical changes take place v/ith the
fluctuations of the price level. The declining prestige
of individual presidents in our day, and the fall of
dynasties in the pest, are alike traceable to falling
prices. The rise and fall of William Jennings Bryan was
due to changes in the general level of prices. The
1 Gold and Prices
,
Warren and Pearson, p. 12.
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defeat of the Republican Perty end Mr. Hoover in 1932
occurred efter 0 35 per cent decline in prices.
Roosevelt’s popularity fluctuates with the rise end
fell of commodity indexes end his public following
can be measured v/ith & graph of changing prices.
Yardstick of Value
Professor Edwin Walter Kemmerer has made an
enlightening comparison by translating the purchasing
power of the dollar into inches. Using 1913 as the
base year the purchasing power of the dollar was given
as 36 inches, the length of the yardstick. The fluc-
tuations in our measure of value from 189b to 1932 v;ere
then expressed as in the following table:
Table I -- Purchasing Power of Dollar
Expressed in Inches 1896 to 1932
(1913 -- 36 inches)^
Year Inches
1896 51
1913 36
1920 19
,
1922 23
1929 20
1932 27
a Kemmerer on Money, p. 10
A shrinkage of one ten-thousandth of an inch
in our unit of measurement is a matter of grave concern
to our Bureau of Weights end Measures. Such a change is
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adjusted after painstgking scientific investigetion.
However, our measure of vplue has not been so carefully
guarded. Yet we live in a world that is governed by
price. Hot only is every transaction measured in terms
of money, but one-half of the transaction is money.
Until recently the illusion was universal that the unit
of value . remained fixed. Through the use of index num-
bers monetary scientists now know that the idea of e
fixed unit of value was an illusion and the approximate
extent of variations in the measure of value can now be
determined.
Whet a jigsaw of confusion this world would
be if some queer power could change our various units of
measure, if inches and pounds could be made variables
without our being conscious of either the fact or the
extent of the charge! Those who enjoy gambling would
probably find it very zestful. The variable monetary
unit of value makes gamblers of us all, and the pity of
it is that the aged and the week lose in the gamble.
Fixity of Mint Price
Vi/hen the term "stabilization" was used in
connection with money in the past it referred to the
weight and fineness of the metal coins that circulated
as money. Since commodity money was used exclusively,
it is natural that early advocates of stabilization
i
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should insist upon fixity in the mint price of the
met el used for money. VVhen representetive paper money
took the piece of the coins es the circulating medium,
st ebilizstion mesnt fixity of the number of greins of
metal into which the peper wes convertible. Leter, the
liebilities of banks end governments, in the form of
benk notes end government notes, beceme the principle
circulating medium. Stability still mepnt, not reletive
stebility, but fixity in the mint price, end behind a
superstructure of peper money there wgs supposed to be
adequate metal reserves v;ith which to redeem any end ell
peper at the mint price. In the United States up to
1873 the dollar was 412.5 grains of silver 9/l0 fine,
or 25.8 grains of gold 9/l0 fine. Since that yepr, end
until the recent devaluation, the dollar wes defined in
terms of gold only, and remained fixed at 25.8 grains
of gold 9/10 fine. Now the dollar is 15 5/21 grains of
gold 9/l0 fine. Many still refuse to accept any defi-
nition but the rether narrow meaning of the term
'•stability,'* a meaning which refers to the weight end
fineness of the metal coins. Behind this backward-
looking prejudice is the notion that money is gold and
nothing else.
Every commodity has its own pressure group,
interested in the value of the thing that it controls.
The commodity, gold, is no exception. A small but
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powerful group is npturplly interested in preventing
schemes to stehilize p thousand end one commodities if
such st ehilizetion meens robbing gold of its fixity of
price. This is besicelly the repson for the reluctence
in some quprters to edmit thet stebilization, in modern
monetary economics, meens much more then mere fixity in
the mint price.
Fixed Ratios in Foreign Exchange
Stabilization, in the minds of some, is identi-
fied with the problem of maintaining fixed retlos betv/een
the various currencies in foreign exchange. It is to
them the problem of keeping the dollar, the pound, the
mark, the frpnc, etc., at fixed prices in relation to
each other. At the London Economic Conference, the
Chancellor of the British Exchequer, Neville Chamberlpin,
stptea that, in his opinion, stp.ble exchange rates were
of first importance end should therefore precede stabil-
ization of domestic price levels. His stand on this
question is typical of that of representatives of nations
enjoying a large international trade which is hampered by
the uncertainties caused by fluctuating exchange rates.
There is no doubt that stability in foreign exchange is
greatly to be desired, but not if the cost is too great.
President Roosevelt evidently thought that the price was
too great at the time of the London Economic Conference.
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In rny case his message, stressing the need for domestic
price stability, shocked the sensitive members of the
American delegation, and ended the conference. Tem-
porarily, the leading countries of the world are exper-
imenting with plans to stabilize domestic prices and
hoping that some practical plan will evolve whereby it
will be possible also to return to more stable arrange-
ments in foreign exchange. In view of present chaotic
economic and political conditions throughout the world,
stabilization of both domestic purchasing power and
foreign exchange rates is impossible.
Flexible Equilibrium
Much confusion could be avoided if there
was more agreement as to what is meant by "stability”.
In this paper "stability" means a reasonably stable,
general price level. No competent economist believes
that absolute fixation of prices is either desirable
or attainable. On the other hand, the elimination of
wide Variations in the purchasing power of the dollar
is recognized to be both necessary and a practical
possibility. Undoubtedly, moderate fluctuations of
the general level of prices will continue to occur
after we have exhausted all known devices. However,
there is no reason why the more violent fluctuations
cannot be smoothed out. A fall in the price level can
'.L 1
com;.
i
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be stopped far short of a forty per cent deflation,
ijjcperience with monetary management abroad seems to
indicate that prices can be confined within limits
of about tlrree per cent, ;^uch narrow limits might
not be practical in a large industrial country like
the United States, but if it is true, as competent
authorities believe, that prices can be raised or
lowered or stabilized at will, then the narrower the
area within which prices are allowed to fluctuate the
better. Professor Irving Fisher, a persistent advo-
cate of stable money, points out the futility of try-
ing to "peg" individual prices, and suggests that "it
is easier to control the level of a mill pond than it
is to control the ripples on the surface".
It may seem unnecessary to explain that
the problem of stabilizing the purchasing power of
the dollar has nothing to do with price fixing in
individual commodities. Attempts at price fixing in
the wheat markets and similar experiments such as the
valorization scheme in Brazil have never proved suc-
cessful, The relative importance of various commodi-
ties is measured by their price relationships.
Disparities in their various price trends disclose
.important changes that are taking place in their
several demand and supply relationships. Advocates

of stable money oppose price fixing schemes, not only
because they retard recovery but also because such
devices are basically uneconomic. Furthermore, by
confusing the issue they prevent a proper understand-
ing of what is meant by stable money. Price fixing
usually involves a tax on the rest of the community.
If a price is controlled by subsidizing a commodity
the subsidy must come out of the general tax. If the
price is maintained by destroying goods or crops the
public pays a tax through higher prices. The same is
true if there is limitation of production. A somewhat
more usual device to maintain the price of an individ-
ual commodity, and one which also involves a tax, is
the raising of a tariff barrier. If the fallacies
underlying the above practices were carried to their
logical conclusion we would have general inpoverish-
ment . The poverty problem of a relatively small pres-
sure group may be partially solved by the physical
destruction of plentifulness of a commodity which the
community in general might have enjoyed. Stable money
advocates are the farmers' best friends. However, they
cannot logically support farm relief measures designed
to raise or control the prices of individual coramoditie
-through restrictive measures.
II
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Index NiAmtoers Evaluated.
Statistical refinements in the making of
index numbers have enabled us to discover trends and
trends within trends. We can tell whether a price
trend is of a secular or cyclical nature. We know
what the retail and wholesale price series are doing.
We calculate with precision disparities between agri-
cultural and industrial prices. Vde have cost-of-living
indexes and general purpose indexes. There are sensitive
indexes and those that do not respond so quickly. While
it cannot be said that authorities have agreed upon what
index would be most suitable there is agreement among
students of stable money that stabilization tlirough the
use of any index vmuld be better 'Chan no staDilization
at all. Opponents of s baiJilization plans argue that
there is no agreement as to what should be stabilized,
and while this is true, it shoiild be realized that this
is of minor importance. Various indexes tend to move
in the same direction. The cost-of-living index usually
follows the wholesale price index, although the price
range is not so great. Oome degree of dispersion is
to be expected no matter what index we adopt as a guide.
The argument of opponents seems to be that since we have
no 100% perfect index that we should abandon all plans
to stabilize. If this were a logical position to take
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we should abandon all other economic plans as well.
Disparities betv^een the indexes would doubtless be
much less marked if any index were stabilized.
Leading authorities are more nearly agreed
upon wholesale price indexes as a guide to stabiliza-
tion, Cost-of-living indexes move too slov;ly, and
consequently have little forecasting value. Further-
more, they do not fluctuate so widely as do the whole-
sale indexes, and at times they do not fall at all
when major recessions are already under way. The cost-
of-living indexes might be of use in stabilizing the
long-term, or secular trend. However, since it would
be impractical to use two different indexes, and since
wholesale indexes anticipate movements in the cost-of-
living series, the former would seem to be of more
practical use, Vvhat is probably the correct point of
view on this question was stated in the Annual Keport
of the Federal Reserve Board for 192b:
’*Vi(hen the business outlook is inviting,
business men are apt to adventure and new
business cominitments are made in increasing
volume. But only later will these commitments
be reflected in the possible rise of prices
and an increase in the volume of credit pro-
vided by the commercial banks of the country.
The Federal Reserve Banks will not to any
considerable extent feel the impact of the
increased demand for credit until the whole
train of antecedent circumstances which has
occasioned it is well advanced on its course;

that is, until a forward movement of
business, no matter from what impulse
it is proceeding, has gained momentum.
Credit administration must be cognizant
of what is under way or in process in
the movement of business before it is
registered in the price index. The price
index records an established fact."^
Debtors and Creditors
Violent price movements not only cause great
losses in total productivity to the community as a
whole, but they also cause grave injustices to various
classes. Debtors as a class are injured by falling
prices; creditors are benefited. There is no way that
the debtor can escape the burden. if he has a debt to
pay at a time when dollars have Increased in value, he
will either have to part with more goods than he ob-
tained with the loan to raise the money, or if he is
obliged to earn the money, the amount that is obtain-
able for a day's work will be less. In other v/ords it
takes more in goods and services to pay a debt if prices
have fallen. Let us take for illustrative purposes a
purchaser of a home in 1926. Assume that the purchaser
paid §10,000 for his home, of which sum he borrowed
$6,000 on a mortgage, between 192o and 19b2 the gen-
eral level of prices, according to the index of the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, fell 40^.
1 Annual Keport of the Federal Reserve Board
,
1923,
p . 32.
\.^uoted in Money, Bank Credit, and Prices
,
Lionel
Edie, p. 458.
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Real estate fell by approximately the same amount.
If the home owner held his property, he found the
payments on the principal and interest much more
burdensome than he had anticipated. If he sold the
property to pay the mortgage he found that he had to
give the whole property, for which he had originally
paid ^10,000, to liquidate the ^;^6,000 debt. This was
not at all uncommon. In fact it was so common that
banks throughout the country found themselves in the
real estate business.
borne are both debtors and creditors. T'or
instance, the ovmer of a home on which there is a
mortgage may also be the holder of an insurance policy.
AS such he is a creditor. The burden of the mortgage
is offset by an increase in the purchasing power value
of his insirrance policy. His gain may seem theoretical.
However, during a period when there has been a 40^ de-
crease in the general price level, each dollar of an
insurance policy has increased in purchasing power to
a dollar and sixty-seven cents. During periods of
changing prices sympathy is wasted on insurance com-
panies and banks for the same reason. Their financial
position is hedged by the nature of their business.
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CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF STABLE MONEY
550 lears of Iron Money In Sparta
There is nothing new under the sun. The
ancient Spartans, 840 b.C., adopted a managed cur-
rency. It v^as, irredeemable and apparently had little
or no intrinsic value. Unlike some of our "sound"
modern systems this fiat .currency continued to work
for several hundred years. The precious metals, gold
and silver, vjere barred from the country, and the
currency, which consisted of iron disks, served the
purpose of an ideal medium of exchange. Their intrin-
sic value was controlled by the volume issued. This
is not an isolated historical curiosity. Inconvert-
ible currencies were used successfully by several
ancient states. In 350 B.C, Plato described a monetary
system in which precious metals were used in interna-
tional trade with valueless media to be used nationally.
Essentially the plan was the same as that advocated
recently by John Maynard Keynes, Modern governments
were forced to adopt such plans because the fair-
weather gold standard broke down. Most of our texts
state categorically that money must have value. Yet
the wise old Greeks knew many centuries ago that the
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ideal money must "be valueless. The iron disks used
for money were treated so that they would not be of
any use as malleable iron. The purpose was to make
them as nearly valueless in themselves as possible.
They were to be merely tokens or counters and as
such they did perform perfectly the function of a
medium of exchange.^
"Numerical^ Money Systems Del Mar Cited
Alexander Del Mar, formerly a Director of
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, mem.ber
of the United States Monetary (Jommission of 1876, has
made careful studies of ancient money systems. He
describes what he calls "numerical" money systems
which, he maintains, served the purposes of money
better than precious metals ever did. Del Mar re-
garded paper money as ideal. He has shown that the
decline of great ancient states began with the adop-
tion of currencies having intrinsic value. There
is no such thing as stability in the value of any
commodity, including gold. it is understandable,
therefore, that economic stability is impossible
while any kind of commodity is used for money. In
order to insure the continuance of a fiat money
1 Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. b.
2 History of the Precious Metals
,
Alexander Del
Mar, p. 86.

system the apartans forbade the production and
importation of both gold and silver. Any gold or
silver acquired by conquest was stored abroad. Our
monetary authorities are moving in the same direc-
tion in the nationalization of our gold and its
physical removal to Fort Knox. Unfortunately, our
financiers do not share the monetary rectitude of
the ancient Greeks in other respects. Nor do they
share their wisdom, as Norman Angell says:
"Certain it is that some of the
atnenian writers wrote more understand-
ingly on the subject than any until,
perhaps, Adam Smith. Aristotle seems to
have held clearly to the distinction be-
tween money and wealth, which it is so
difficult for the ordinary man to maintain
once he has become accustomed to the use
of money and to seeing that it can usually
be exchanged for wealth. Aristotle notes
the existence in his time of a theory that
it is a matter of comparative indifference
what material is used for money. Plato's
reference to money as a 'symbol or token*
seems to indicate that he is in sympathy
with this view; and this conclusion is
strengthened by his proposal in the Laws
that for a domestic trade a token-money
established by law should be used, gold
and silver being restricted to transactions
with foreigners."^
To the dull mind of the modern American it is hard
to comprehend that a worthless token regulated by
governmental edict can represent his claim to goods
1 The Story of Money
,
Norman angell, p. 97.
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and services, to his share of society‘s productive
effort. Yet he uses hat checks that do not equal
the value of his hat.
Rise of Commodity Money and Decline of home --
Wells Cited
Early nomans also hit upon the idea of
regulating the quantity and the value of fiat cur-
rency. Their system of legal tender money may have
been borrowed from the Greeks. It was established
about 285 b.C. and lasted for over a century,
ii-lexander Del Mar holds that the numismatic relics
which have been so long regarded by the learned
world as copper coins were essentially irredeemable
notes stamped (for lack of paper) on copper, and
devised and designed to pass, in the exchanges, for
a much greater value than that of the material of
which they were composed. xt is Del Mar’s opinion
that the Homan Republic deliberately and purposely
adopted what today w’ould be called an irredeemable
paper currency. The Roman Senate controlled and
regulated the issue and jealously guarded the priv-
ilege, a fact which the American Congress might well
copy. After Rome abandoned, almost unconsciously,
the system of irredeemable currency, the monetary
history of Rome became a long and unbroken story of
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fluctuating values, depreciation, inflation, debase-
ment, devaluation, currency manipulation, and fraud
sued as the plating of coins. Nearly all of the
evils of monetary history were experienced by Rome,
iilthough some of their difficulties were not clearly
understood, such as the difficulties incident to a
bimetallic or multimetalic system, they nevertheless
experienced these difficulties. i».s H. G. Wells puts
it, "Money floated the Romans off the firm ground."
The Romans did not share the monetary integrity of
the Gpeeks. Their attempts to use money which in
itself left them subject to all the dire consequences
of a medium which fluctuates in value by its very
nature. Currency having intrinsic value also lent
itself to the scheming manipulators who debased it
end otherwise caused its value to change artificially.
So, as H. G. Wells says again, "We who can look at the
problem with a large perspective can see that what
happened to Rome was ’money’
Money as Social Bookkeeping
There is a great deal of evidence, and many
able students of monetary history are convinced, that
ancient peoples did live under systems of managed cur-
rency. Apparently, also, these systems of managed
1. The Outline of History, p. 234; quoted in
The Story of Money
,
Norman jsngell, p. 105.
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currency served their purpose far better than the
commodity currencies which the same peoples used at
later periods. Economic life was so simple in
ancient times that managed currency did not have to
be adapted to an elaborate system of banking. It
probably seemed logical to them that the value of
money should be a matter of social bookkeeping and
that its quantity must necessarily be limited. The
quantity was apparently regulated by public authority,
and had nothing whatever to do with the material with
which it was composed.
Managed Money in China
Many ancient peoples believed that prices
could be controlled by legal enactment. It is prob-
able that most of the great dynasties of China enjoyed
managed currency systems of one kind or another at
various times. The writings of the early Chinese
philosophers show that they understood the problems
of stabilization very well. Furthermore, Chinese
rulers tested those principles at various periods.
The following principle which is credited to Kuan Tzu,
who died in o44 B.C., is typical; ”The Government
should control the ratio between money and commod-
ities by issuing and redeeming money". ^ Managed
1 Chan Huan Chang, The Economic Principle of
Confucious and His School; quoted in Stable Money ,
Irving Fisher, p. 7.
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valueless currencies were far from being isolated,
curiosities in ancient times. They were, in fact,
quite common and. were successful over long periods
of time. The classical example is of course the
Spartan system which continued, for about three hun-
dred. and fifty years.
2QQ Years of •'^Gentle Inflation", 1150-1550
From 1150 to 1350 an interesting monetary
development took place in central Eijrope. The rulers
of various states would call in the silver coins,
called bracteates, for purposes of recoinage. They
were called in as often as twice a year. The recoin-
age involved debasement as it was the custom to charge
a seignorage fee of about 25;^.^ Since these coins
were subject to a steady depreciation, holders
naturally could not profitably hoard them. In fact
it was to the holder’s interest to get rid of them
as quickly as possible. They were convenient for the
making of change. Prior to this time central Europe
had no coins in small denominations. They had other
notable advantages, but the important feature of this
curious monetary development was their velocity of
circulation. The desire to hold goods instead of
''coins proved to be very stimulating to trade. The
1 Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 9.
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riilers of that day doubtless did not understand the
effect of this velocity control. Later writers,
however
,
realized that this period of revival from
1150 to 1350 profited from the fact that at no time
during these two hundred years was there a period of
falling prices. The steady depreciation of the coins
made this a period of slov;ly rising prices. It was a
period of mild Inflation, from which there was no
reaction. One might take an altogether too narrow'
view of this development and ascribe the great revival
of the twelfth centiiry to the gentle inflation of the
time. We can at least claim that this gentle infla-
tion was a contributing cause. It was a very fortuitous
circumstance that the Kenaissance was not impeded by any
period of deflation.
Trend Toward a More Scientific Standard
During more modern times results obtained
from conscious efforts to attain a more stable price
level have been disappointing. Progress has been slow
and many mistakes have been made. Society has been
hampered by the persistent superstition that money
must have value. All history proves that money which
has intrinsic value defies all attempts to stabilize
-it. iitep by step society is moving toward a scientific
money system. under the terrific strain of modern wars
\I
and tv/entieth century business depressions, nations
have been forced to adopt monetary devices v;hich were
believed to be unsound. The world is like a great
laboratory today in which these supposedly unsound
monetary devices are subjected to scientific obser-
vation, ror instance, monetary experts are giving
careful consideration to the unbelievably successful
experiment in Sweden where a stable price level has
been maintained for several years through the use of
an irredeemable paper currency.
btep by step society is discovering the
nature of monetary difficulties and their causes.
There have been periods of inflation resulting in
chaotic conditions when even the monetary authorities
did not understand what was taking place. Now, our
concepts are clearer. Prom crude recognition of the
problem and study of remedies during the past few hun-
dred years we are gradually evolving a scientific
money theory.
The concept of an unstable monetary unit
was understood in earlier centuries, a clearer idea
of the problems involved in stabilizing the value of
money has grown steadily decade after decade. Seven-
.
teenth century writers recognized the fact that the
purchasing power of money itself fluctuates. iiir
II
j
William letty pointed out that "The value of Silver
rises and falls itself; for Men make Vessels of
coyned Silver, if they can gain by the Vv'orkmanship
enough to defray the Destruction of the Coynage,
and withal, more than they could expect by employ-
ing the same Silver in a way of Trade*'. He deplored
the fact that speculators made profits at the expense
of the ignorant public by taking advantage of price
fluctuations. Freiherr Samuel Von Puffendorf (1632-
1694) argued that the price of money must necessarily
follow the price of the metal which is traded as a
commodity in the market. He concluded that the price
of the money must- follow the scarcity or plentiful-
ness of the metal. Early in the eighteenth century
Bishop Fleetwood estimated that the value of money
during two and a half centuries had decreased in the
ratio of six to one. He arrived at this ratio by
studies of price changes in certain important commod-
ities. Later, through the use of index numbers these
great price changes were definitely traced to the
huge imports of gold and silver from America. Today
it is recognized that other things being equal, the
quantity of money and not its quality, determines the
price level. This is now recognized as a truism.
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Early Modern Concepts
In 1727 Jiishop Berkley suggested that
money itself he made a stable measure of value,
"whether the true Idea of Money, as such, be not
altogether that of a Ticket or Counter". In 1752
David Hume raised the question of public and private
banking:
"If the public provide not a bank, private
bankers will take advantage of this circum-
stance And therefore ’tis better, it
may be thought, that a public company should
enjoy the benefit of that paper credit, which
always will have place in every opulent king-
dom. But to endeavor artificially to increase
such credit, can never be to the interest of
any trading nation; but must lay under dis-
advantages, by increasing money beyond its
natural proportion to labour and commodities,
and thereby heightening their price to the
merchant and manufacturer.""^
The inadequacy of precious metals was
pointed out in 1767 by Sir James St.euart:
"No material money, let it be contrived as
it will, is exempted from vicissitudes in
its value as a metal. This is proved by
the universal risings and sinkings in the
price of commodities, in consequence of
circumstances peculiar to the coin. These
risings and sinkings of prices, I say, are
properly the risings and sinkings of the
value of the coin, and this fluctuation
again in the value of the coin, is a
lengthening and contracting of the equal
parts of the scale of value which is
attached to it. Now there is no such thing
1 Political Discourses, "Of Money", p. 44; quoted in
Stable Money, Irving P’isher, p. 15.
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as any vicissitudes in the prices OF
ALL COi'MODIi'IES with respect to hank
money.
Tabular Standard of Massachusetts, 1777
During the past few hundred years numerous
proposals have been made and many practical steps
have been taken to correct the injustice of rapidly
changing price levels, about the middle of the
eighteenth century the Colony of Massachusetts Bay
had suffered from rapidly changing prices. During
the uevolutionary Vvar period, soldiers complained
that their pay was not adequate to meet the rapidly
changing prices. In 1777 a law was passed listing
official prices of about fifty commodities. This
price-fixing experiment did not work as it did not
apply to the cost of producing the articles. Wages
rose and, as is always the case Vi/ith price-fixing
schemes, the price-fixing experiment did little good.
In order to correct the injustice to the soldiers,
Massachusetts agreed to a scheme which has since been
called the tabular standard. The soldiers’ wages were
adjusted as the prices of commodities fluctuated. If
prices rose fifty per cent the soldiers’ pay was in-
creased by that percentage, ^-it first the fifty com-
modities listea in the price-fixing law were used as
1 Political Discourses, "Of Money", p. 44; quoted
in Stable Money, Irving Fisher, p. IV.
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an index. Later fonr commodities; namely, beef,
indian corn, sheeps* wool, and sole leather were
substituted for the original fifty. The soldiers
and the officers received their pay in "Depreciation
Notes" which were payable in current money in such
amounts as would make their purchasing power equal
from month to month. The following is a quotation
from one of these notes:
"Both Principal and Interest to be paid in
the then current Money of said Btate, in a
greater or less Bum, according as Five
Bushels of Corn, sixty-eight Bounds and
four-seventh Parts of a Pound of Beef, Ten
Pounds of Sheeps Wool, and sixteen Pounds
of Sole Leather shall then cost, more or
less than One Hundred and Thirty Pounds of
Current Money, at the then current Prices
of said Articles. . .
Lack of Index Numbers
Early in the nineteenth century few people
understood the reason for the high price of gold
bullion. concepts that are widely understood today
were obscure even among bankers during Napoleonic
war days. ii.fter the exhaustive studies made by the
Bullion Committee, published in 1810, the right ex-
planation was accepted. The bank had been steadily
increasing the amount of inconvertible notes and the
Committee concluded that the change in the price of
1 <^uoted in Gold and Prices, warren & Pearson, p. 24.
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gold, bullion was due to the excess of paper currency,
jjavid nicardo led the fight to return to the gold
standard. The opposition pointed out ohat few
classes of society would oe benefited by this return
except the owners of money. it v^as understood that a
contraction of the circulation medium would increase
the value of money at the expense of society. While
hicardo advocated a constant price of gold he evidently
thought that a stable standard is impossible, he said,
"ho plan can possibly be devised v/hlch w'lll maintain
money at an absolutely uniform value, because it will
alv/ays be subject to these variations to which the
commodity itself is subject, which has been fixed upon
as a standard." Although Ricardo wrote extensively on
prices and currency, he made little or no use of index
numbers. The opinions of earlier writers doubtless
would have been very difficult had this modern device
been better understood. Ricardo believed that "v^hile
the precious metals continue to be the standard. of our
currency, money must necessarily undergo the same vari-
ations in value as those metals".^ He was certainly
ri^t about that
.
1 Proposals for an Economical and hecure Currency,
David Ricardo, p. quoted in htable Money ,
Irving Fisher, p. 25.
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Tabular Standard -- Jevons
After 1822 very definite proposals were
made designed to correct the evils of instability.
Some writers like Joseph Lowe, believing with Kicardo,
that it is impossible to stabilize the value of money,
recommended a tabular standard similar to that used
so successfully in the Massachusetts Bay Colony during
Revolutionary War days. Adjustments under this plan
were to be discretionary with the contracting parties
at first. Later, if the plan proved successful, it
was to be made compulsory. Other writers, like John
Hooke, advanced various theories in the belief that
the monetary standard itself could be stabilized by
regulating the quantity of money kept in circulation,
again the imperfection or lack of index numbers made
for confused thinking.^ A controversy arose as to
whether farm wages or commodities should be stabilized.
While it was recognized that definite dislocations in
the money system might be prevented, no scientific
method of accomplishing this end could be worked out
without commodity price indexes or v/age series.
Furthermore, few had any conception of what is now
referred to as the "money illusion". The concept of
money based on an average of the mass of commodities
1 Cited in Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 26.
1o
C -
was too obscure for the average man and still is.
Meanwhile, the Bank of England had a very profitable
private monopoly and those connected v/ith the ii5ank
were naturally more interested in private profit
than in public welfare.
W. Stanley Jevons considered the idea of
a commodity dollar but abandoned it as impractical.
He became an ardent advocate of the tabular standard.
He also urged the abandonment of gold as a standard
and argued that since gold had lost its stability all
pretense for retaining it as the standard of value
was gone. It was Jevons’ belief that money cannot
be made stable and therefore changes should be made
in the value of deferred payments.
Inconvertible Paper
With the scientific development of index
mmibers clearer concepts of what can be done have
evolved. Mr. J. Barr Robertson, before the Royal
Commission on Gold and Silver in 1886, recommended
the issuance of inconvertible paper currency based
on the use of index numbers. He believed that such
a measure would prevent falling prices and all
resulting evil consequences. The Committee dis-
missed the theory.
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Marshall An Advocate of Manag.ed
Currency, 1887 ~
In 1887 Professor Alfred Marshall, Dean
of English economists, took up the fight for a
proper standard of purchasing power. The lack of
a stable standard, he held, was the chief cause of
the survival of the monstrous fallacy that there
can be produced too much of everything.^ Marshall’s
opinion on this question is a forerunner of the
"poverty in the midst of plenty" arguments of re-
cent years. Vi/hen there is a general fall in prices
a scarcity of money makes it appear that there is
too much of everything. Instead of adjusting prices
by relieving the scarcity we destroy inventories and
limit production. It is fifty years since Marshall
championed this cause. Our progress in monetary
matters since that time is mainly theoretical. The
evils that he pointed out are now acute. Unless
they are corrected soon our type of civilization is
doomed. The head of a Kothschild rolling in Austria
is merely a foretaste of what is to come. Society
in some parts of the world has caught up with a cer-
tain type of banker.
Marshall also believed that the value of
currency could be maintained by varying the metallic
1 Kemedies for Fluctuations of General Prices in
"Contemporary Keview"
,
March, 1887, pp. 355-375;
Alfred Marshall cited in Stable Money
,
Irving
Fisher, p. 37.
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content of the standard. He also suggested, as
early as 1887, the purchase and sale of seciu’ities
by central banks as a means of increasing and de-
creasing the volume of circulation. The American
Feaeral Reserve Banks stumbled blindly upon the
practical usefulness of this device in the early
1920' s.^
Varying \,¥eight of Gold Pound -- Williams, 1892
During the last quarter of the nineteenth
century various plans and suggestions were advanced
to prevent oscillations in the purchasing power of
money. In 1892 Aneurin Williams, a member of
Parliament, proposed a paper currency convertible
into a varying amount of gold so that the currency
would buy an invariable amount of commodities. He
proposed to have the index checked every night and
his plan provided for continuous Government redemption
of notes. The price of gold bullion would hov/ever
p
change constantly with the rise and fall of prices.
1 Remedies for P'luctuations in General Prices in
"Contemporary neview", March, 1887, pp. 555-375;
Alfred Marshall cited in Btable Money
,
Irving
P’isher
, p. 37.
2 Cited in Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 41.

Manipulation of Dlscoimt Rate --
Wlcksell, 1900
Near the turn of the century the great
Swedish economist, Dr. Knut Wicksell, proposed the
manipulation of the discount rate as a device to
help maintain a stable price level. This proposal
has met little opposition in theory. Wicksell also
pointed out that stability of domestic prices is far
more important than stabilization of foreign exchange.
This latter proposal has met much opposition, partic-
ularly in countries doing a relatively large foreign
trade. It took Swedish economists forty years to
learn the lesson that Wicksell taught, but today the
financial stability of Sweden is a marvel in an other-
wise chaotic financial world.
Velocity of ulrculation -- Gesell, 1900
another original contribution to stable
money theory came about this same time from a German
business man named Silvio Gesell. He held that hot
only the quantity of money but its velocity of. cir-
culation should be controlled. Gesell further claimed
that, since goods spoil and must be offered for sale,
money should be made to deteriorate also. For a
practical device to accomplish this he recommended a
tax on money of five per cent per annum. This tax
I
plan has not made much headv/ay either in theory or
in practice, although the social credit plbjn of
Major Douglas and a somewhat similar scheme by
Cl • 3 . Holter both provide for such taxes to speed
up the velocity of circulation. The ramifications
of the tax part of these plans would seem to be a
little too complicated for practical consideration.^
Silver Controversy
The silver controversy, v;hich broke out
during the latter part of the century was basically
an attempt to s'Cabilize prices, which had been falling
since the uivil V«ar. according to an index number of
wholesale prices prepared oy „arren, Pearson and
Stokes, prices fell from a high of 223 in oanuary
18(35, to a low of bo in oune I89b, representing a
total deflation of over seventy per cent.^ rree-
silver advocates realized that the long period of
depression and falling prices were caused by a rise
in the value of gold. It was clear to them that no
single standard can perform perfectly the function
of a standard for deferred payments. They pointed
out that two commodities, gold and silver, rarely
1 stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 43.
2 v/afren, (}'. F.
,
Pearson, F. A., and Stoker, H. M.
Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932,
Cornell University Agricultural £.xperiment
Station Memoir 142, p. 6, November 1932. vVarren,
G. P'.
,
and Pearson, F. a.
,
V/holesale Prices in
the United States for 135 Years, P’arm Economics,
No. 72, pp. 158b-7, September 1931~i
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rise or fall in value at the same time and that
therefore a bimetallic standard would prevent the
more violent fluctuations. This movement came to
a head in the William Jennings Bryan campaign of
1896 and v\/ould not have ended then but for the
fortuitous discoveries of huge gold deposits in
South Africa and in the Klondike and Alaskan mines.
The Cyanide process which was perfected at that time
made it profitable to produce gold from lower grade
ores. The total annual production of gold quad-
rupled.^ The resulting effect was a change in the
secular trend of prices which continued until the
V/orld War.
An uninformed public was deceived by gold
advocates into the belief that revival was due to
confidence incident to the settlement of the silver
question. However wrong Bryan may have been in advo-
cating silver he was fundamentally right in his ad-
vocacy of stable money, at Madison square Garden in
1896, he said:
"What is the test of honest money? It
must certainly be found in the purchasing
power of the dollar. An absolutely honest
money would not vary in its purchasing power;
1 Gold Production and Prices before and after the War
Indiana University Studies, Vol. XI, March, 1928.
Lionel D. Edie cited in Stable Money , Irving Fisher
p. 57 .

it would be absolutely stable, when
measured by average prices. A dollar
which increases in purchasing power is
just as dishonest as a dollar which
decreases in purchasing power.
1
High Cost of Living, 189b to 1915
Looking back from the years preceding the
World War the public realized that something had
gone v/rong. Everyone was talking about the high
cost of living. The secular trend had been rising
for sixteen years and the man in the street was again
the victim. Again the villain was gold. Prom July,
1897, to april, 1910, the price level had risen forty-
2tliree per cent. Times were better on the whole, al-
though wages lagged. Bondholders felt the> pinch as
did others with fixed incomes. Interest in the sub-
ject during the period from 1906-10 is reflected in
the fact that the number of publications on the high
cost of living increased from thirty-five to one hun-
2,dred twenty-one. Furthermore, it v^as a world prob-
lem. The increased supply of world gold was the
underlying cause. When will the world learn that
the ever present uncertainty in the future value of
gold should prevent conservative people from using
such a substance as a monetary standard! As D. H.
Robertson writes:
1 0,'>Toted in Stable Money , Irving Fisher, p. 54.
2 Grold and Prices
,
Warren and Pearson, p. 14.
5 Stable koney, Irving Fisher, p. 58.
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"It is difficult to regard as very stable
or sacred a standard of value which is liable
to be upset by the discovery of new mines or
processes of mining, by a decision on the
part of some atate to achieve the gold stand-
ard or of some other btate to abandon it, by
a sloughing off of the hereditary taboos of
the Indian ryot or the London banker. The
value of the yellov»? metal, originally chosen
as money because it tickled the fancy of
savages, is clearly a chancy and irrelevant
thing on which to base the value of our money
and the stability of our industrial system. "1
1 Money, D. H. Robertson, p. 144; quoted in The
Story of Money, Norman Angell, p. 3o5.
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CHAPTER IV
Unstable gold
Traditional Gold Standard -- Managed
On January '6l
,
1934, Professor R. M.
Maciver, submitted the report of the Columbia
University Commission on **Economic Reconstruction"
to President Butler. The report very definitely
recommended a '‘managed currency". It says:
"The choice before us, under exist-
ing conditions, does not lie between an
automatic regulator of money and a man-
aged currency, with or without a gold
basis. vVe cannot, even if we would,
avoid the necessity of control. The
only choice concerns the form of control
we adopt and the objective we deem most
essential for the determination of its
policy.
The traditional nineteenth century gold
standard was in a very real sense a managed stand-
ard. The issue of bank notes was not only subject
to laws, but was also controlled by the banks. The
raising and lowering of the bank rate was under the
strict direction of the Bank of England. The need
for keeping the exchange rates stable certainly
called for supervision. The fixing of reserve
ratios was in itself a matter of management, as
1 Columbia University Commission, Economic
Reconstruction
,
p. 38; quoted in 8table Money ,
Irving Fisher, p. 71.
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also was the suspension of the ^ank Act. Since
the development of deposit currency there has heen
no approach to what could be called an automatic
gold standard.
Alleged advantages of Gold
Gold is an ideal international medium of
exchange. In spite of the fact that nearly every
leading country has dropped the traditional gold
standard, this metal is still the most universally
acceptable commodity. There is still unlimited
willingness to accept it everywhere, kore than that,
while private hoarding has apparently decreased,
governments are conserving their gold supplies in a
manner which amounts to government hoarding. Gold
has certain intrinsic qualities v/hich make it most
suitable for the settlement of international balances.
iNiations having a relatively large international trade
realize that the problems of international trade and
finance call for an international standard that is
the same for all of the principal countries.
There were other advantages claimed for the
pre-war gold standard, by its advocates. Currency is
exchangeable in a fixed weight of gold. J?*urthermore,
any two currencies that are on a gold standard may De
quoted in terms of each other. If one monetary unit
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contains 4.86 times more gold than another, calcu-
lations can he easily made and the par of exchange
established. Since the material behind the money
is itself an article of commerce v^/hich can be shipped
abroad, it is merely necessary to calculate the rela-
tive weights of the various currencies to determine
their relative values.
Advocates of a gold standard have always
held that one basic reason for such a standard is to
protect society from excessive changes in the supply
of the media of exchange. The world’s stock of gold
has been accumulating for centuries. It is not phys-
ically possible to increase that supply by any large
percentage in a short space of time. Furthermore,
the supply does not shrink in physical volume. There
is therefore a stability in the total quantity of
world gold. For a very long period prior to the
present decade the production of gold fluctuated
between two and four per cent of the accumulated
stock of gold. Gustav Cassel and Joseph Kitchin
made independent studies of the year to year gold
production and came to substantially the same con-
clusion;
"An annual production of three per
cent of the supply at any time is a

condition for the raaintenance of the
general price level unchanged, so far
as the gold supply is concerned."^
Equalization of Trade Balance
another alleged advantage of the gold
standard is suggested hy Mr. Gladstone’s statement
that, "The great object of care and attention is
the maintaining or restoring of its (the Bank of
pEngland’s) reserve." The practical application
of this point of view was the keeping of the ex-
change rates within the gold points. The supposed
advantage that was to flow from this very great
solicitude for stable exchange rates was inter-
national equilibrium of price levels throughout
the v/orld, particularly of goods which enter inter-
national trade, iunong gold standard countries,
gold tends to flow to the country having the lowest
price level. For example, if prices were falling
in the United States it would be cheaper to buy in
our markets. This would increase the demand for
dollar exchange, and gold would therefore flov/ in.
In time, the increasing quantities of gold would
have an inflationary effect on our price level, and
the shipments of gold to our banks wo-uld stop.
1 The Theory of Social Economy, 1923, Gustav Cassel
p. 451.
2 isiuoted in The Banks and Prosperity
,
Lionel D. Edi
p . 22 .
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Meanwhile, in the countries having the higher price
levels an opposite movement would be taking place.
In the case of the latter gold flowing out would have
a deflationary effect. Thus, there was a constant
tendency for prices to be equalized throughout the
gold-standard world. Opinions differ as to the great
desirability of a device that periodically creates a
deflation. However, gold standard advocates, unblush-
ingly and rather proudly, claim this deflationary
effect as an advantage.
Among nations on the gold standard, any
deviation from the par of exchange indicated that trade
relations were out of balance. The gold standard tended
to maintain a balance of trade in the sense of equality,
in the balance of payment. This does not mean that the
visible exports and imports were equal. It does mean
that the gold standard had an equalizing effect on the
debits end credits of foreign trade, which debits and
credits would Include invisible as well as visible
items. This was a very real advantage, and one would
be disinclined to quarrel with British financiers for
helping along this tendency. It did not work as auto-
matically as some writers think. In England and other
countries, whenever the exchange rate indicated a grow-
ing excess of imports, the bank rate was raised. This
Y’'.:
raise had a deflationary effect and reduced the tend-
ency to import, encouraged exports, and re-estahlished
the equality of trade. This was good management.
Briton* s Advantage in Sudden VJithdrawals
of Gold from Foreign Countries
/nother very great advantage from the point
of view of the leading gold standard country. Great
Britain, was that large sums of gold could he with-
drawn suddenly from the financial markets of any coun-
try in the world. This was a tremendous advantage to
the empire. It made British power and prestige prac-
tically supreme in both the political and economic
world. This particular advantage to Great Britain
was not inherent in the gold standard as she discov-
ered after the World War. England’s power in this
respect depended upon the billions of credits and
investments that she had abroad. England had spon-
sored the gold standard for over a century. English
imperialism and her world-wide trade benefited by its
acceptance by leading countries. Any attempt to raise
strange gods in the monetary world met with stern
treatment from British financiers. The fact that
deflation was caused by the quiet withdrawal of gold
made this weapon very formidable indeed. In all
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sincerity we must admire the British for this astute-
ness; for ell is fair in love and war — including
trade war. Although we may have been on the losing
end, we can still admire the cleverness of British
financial statesmanship. Her financiers have won
many a battle without using the fleet.
It is -interesting to note how tenaciously
and sincerely conservative British financiers adhere
to traditional opinions in regard to the gold stand-
ard. Governor Montagu Norman, testifying before the
Macmillan Committee in 1929, said: ”The mein consid-
eration in connection with movements of the Ba,nk Rate
is the international consideration. Commenting
upon this statement Lionel D. Edie declares: "This
philosophy has meant in practice a tendency to make
a fetish of the exchange rate as something to be de-
fended at all costs, even at the cost of a deflationary
2
collapse of the domestic economy."
Inelasticity of Gold
Conservative end radical theorists alike
agree that if money is to be stable in value it must
have the quality of elasticity. By "elasticity" they
1. Q,uoted in Dollars, Lionel D. Edie, p. 80.
2. Ibid.
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meen that the money -- gold, paper, credit, or what-
ever they chose to use for money -- must rise and
fall in quantity with the needs of trade. This means
that it must not only adapt itself to seasonal end
incidental changes in the volume of business, but
also that it should provide an adequate medium of
exchange during the various periods of the business
cycle and a quantity commensurate with the normal
growth of industry over longer periods of time. It
seems a little too much to expect that a currency
will adjust itself to the requirements of a war per-
iod. It is a purely theoretical question, but very
pertinent to consider if gold alone would be suffi-
ciently elastic as a money to meet the above require-
ments. Obviously, if judged by this test, it would be
impossible to find a poorer kind of money. Because of
the very nature of its production, gold could not re-
spond in quantity to the needs of seasonal, cyclical,
or unusual requirements. Furthermore, gold has been
responsible for troublesome long-term or secular trends
of commodity prices during the past century. Of course,
gold, like any other currency, breaks down when war is
declared.
Various kinds of paper currency and credit
have been used to supplement gold in an effort to
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overcome the difficulties arising from the inelas-
ticity of this met el. While the term "meneged cur-
rency*' may seem new, management of these supplementary
currencies is not new. One of the chief problems of
monetary science has been to provide a currency of
sufficient elasticity, and at the same time to prevent
that elasticity from creating the very instability
that it was designed to prevent. If the supply of a
currency does not adjust itself readily to changing
demands for money, whether from monetary or non-
monetary causes, to that extent it falls short of
ideal elasticity. Efforts to devise media of exchange
that would have an automatic elasticity of supply have
proved hopeless.
Passing of the Gold Standard
For a standard that had so many powerful
friends and so many advantages it is Indeed remarkable
that so many nations abandoned it. However, it is
probably true that it was not abandoned as a matter
of financial foresight, England, producing 80^ of the
world’s gold and primarily interested in maintaining
the gold standard, was forced off that standard twice
since the war. Like England, other countries did not
merely abandon the gold standard as a matter of party
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politics or political expediency. They abandoned it
because they were forced to. The old gold standard
simply did not work. And as things stand now, ”i\ll
the king’s horses end ell the king’s men can’t put
humpty-dumpty together again.” In the future the
burden of proof will certainly rest on those who
advocate going back to a standard that appears to
have been a fair-weather standard.
Insolvency of Gold Standard
The fundamental insolvency of the gold
standard and the great central banks that controlled
it is seen in the fact that even with the guarantee
of their governments, they could not meet their obli-
gations in gold. These were contractual obligations
and when the banks could not meet them they were re-
lieved of the responsibility by a kindly government.
Scores of reasons can be found as to why a supposedly
good standard did not work. Whatever conditions oY a
non-monetary nature are advanced as the reason, the
fact still remains that it did not stand up under the
conditions that prevailed. It may be claimed that
governments and banking institutions did not live up
to the rules of the game. No doubt such is the case,
but realistic, economic systems must take into consid-
eration the human element.
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Lionel D. Edie, an authority ’’prejudiced
in favor of the gold standard, ’’^advanced the follow-
ing hypothesis in 1931: ”Vi/het is transpiring under
the surface of things, is nothing less than the pass-
2ing of the gold standard.” Ricardo pointed out
that his country had ’’drifted” onto the gold stand-
ard. In other respects the gold standard appears to
he an historical accident. In the United States it
was not eloquence that saved the gold standard. It
was the discovery of the Rand mines and the Klondike
One might say that Cecil Rhodes beat Bryan and
elected William McKinley president of the United
States. The upward secular trend of prices after
189b insured the survival of the gold standard dur-
ing fair financial weather until the World War. So,
it need not surprise us that unseen forces have
started the drift in another direction. Edie feels
that something has happened to the gold standard
which has nullified and destroyed its fundamental
supply-function.
Federal Reserve Responsibility
for Passing of Cold
The Federal Reserve Act was probably the
most radical piece of banking legislation of modern
1. The Banks and Prosperity, Lionel D. Edie, p. 156
2. Ibid. 157.
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times. Whether it was the intention of the framers
of the act or not, it did permit central bankers to
usurp to themselves certain responsibilities of far-
reaching importance. Up to that time there was, due
to the working of the gold standard, still considerable
limitation upon the expansion and contraction of credit
The direct link between gold and credit was cut. Var-
ious devices were invented to insure what was called
'‘automatic elasticity of credit." Credit was certainly
elastic, but it was not automatic. Its elasticity was
subject to the discretion of the Federal Reserve author
ities, subject to any philosophy of inflation, defla-
tion, or stabilization that the particular parties in
power might subscribe to at any particular time.
Gold "Sterilized "
Senator Carter Glass and the late H. Parker
Willis, the sponsors of this really radical legisla-
tion, were the most outspoken defenders of the gold
standard! They were the High Priests of the Inner
Shrine. Both professed faith in the mystical powers
of gold. Yet with the exception of a brief period
in 1920 the management of our credit and currency
might just as well have been independent of gold.
Gold, for all practical purposes, had been ster-
ilized. English bankers looked on with mixed
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feelings of pdrairation and alarm. Foreign bankers
know what they mean by "gold standard," and it is
doubtful that very many of them thought a 3.5^ gold
reserve adequate to restrict anything. The ratio
of reserves to deposits established by congress on
June 21, 1917, was as follows:
Administrative Control of Cr.edit
Every Federal Reserve Bank was required to
maintain reserves in gold of not less than 35^ --
10^ X 35^ = 3.5^. Thus the Federal Reserve System
was permitted to expand credit on a gold base of 3.5^.
Furthermore, various devices were created which were
to make possible what was called "secondary expansion."
The Federal Reserve Banks were provided with rediscount
facilities and the power to buy and sell securities in
the open market. They were authorized to allow reserve
to fall below the legal requirement subject to a tax
graduated in amount, to revise the reserve requirements
of the country at large, or to suspend any and all re-
serve requirements completely.^ The Federal Reserve
1 . The Theory and Practice of Central Banking,
H. Parker Willis, p. 272.
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Banks were thus in e position to inflate or deflate
reserve halences st will. Since "secondary expansion"
was made independent of the gold base, the system was
thus made tremendously "elastic" and those in control
could turn on inflation and deflation at will. They
could, and did, restrict credit when badly needed by
business and they could pump huge quantities of credit
into the system in an attempt to reverse the waning
demands of business that they themselves had dis-
couraged.
Federal Reserve Notes Unimportant Relatively
Provisions were also made for elasticity
of note issue, and from the early discussions of the
Federal Reserve Act it is clear that much was expected
of the new notes. It was note elasticity and not
credit elasticity that was expected to accommodate
the seasonal needs of business and restore confidence
when panic threatened. The view was vifidely held that
this note elasticity would effectively end money pan-
ics. There v/as some criticism. The law made Federal
Reserve Notes (which are in reality the promissory
notes of private banks) the obligations of the United
States G-overnment. Bryan objected to this. Others,
-like Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr., thought that it was
unjust. "No one with an ounce of brains, unless
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filled with injustice, or & mere hireling, will
defend such s practice," he wrote. ^ These crit-
icisms were directed et the form of the note rather
then f?t its "elasticity,"
H. Parker Willis sgys; "Note issues under
the Reserve System have shown comparatively little
indication of the "elasticity" of which so much has
heen said, and which constitutes a genuine mark of
success in the management of a credit currency."^
The reason for this is doubtless the unexpected
growth of the use of "deposit currency." The note
issue is expansible and flexible, but the credit
system under the Federal Reserve /ct is more so.
Elasticity of "Deposit Currency" an Elasticity
of iPolicy
The "elasticity" of the Federal Reserve
System is an "elasticity" of policy. The flexibility
of the system permitted the widest kind of management.
While the experience with note currency under the
Federal Reserve System has proved disappointing to
the sponsors of the Act, other provisions proved,
from their point of view, to be even more satisfactory
than they had dreamed. The whole system of checks and
'' 1 . Why Is Your Country at War, Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr .
p. 61.
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deposits as it has grown in the United States is a
modern, streai?dined variety of "wild cat" banking.
There is really no fundamental difference between
"wild cat" note issue and "wild cat" creation of
"deposit currency." How well the system was managed
may be seen in the fact that there resulted the most
unstable peace-time price level of a whole century.
The total volume of credit and currency was expended
or contracted to suit the whims of povirerful monetary
authorities or those who had influence with these
authorities. The theoretically ideal elasticity of
the media of exchange that is supposed to parallel
exactly the needs of business did not work out under
such management. How well the needs of business were
met is reflected in a 40^ deflation of the price level
that took place between 1929 and 1932. There are those
who believe that the discouraging fall in the price
level reduced the demand for credit steadily, and that
this steadily decreasing demand for credit caused still
further contraction of business. Does this view hold
that the monetary authorities could do nothing to stay
the deflation? Are we to suppose that they knew of no
anti
-deflationary measures that would stop the progres-
sive drop in the volume of credit? The only tenable
view is that the great deflation of 1929-1932 was a
planned deflation.
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In any case, as Professor Edie points out,
"The historical events of the decede 1920-1930 demon-
strated that the automatic elasticity, so celled, was
in fact 8 scheme of automatic explosibility . In 1920,
in the name of elesticity the Pedersl Reserve allowed
rediscounts to run up to the tremendous Siam of
|2, 780,000,000. In the snap-hack it pruned them do^im
to $39o,000,000. In 1929-1931 the range was from
|1, 096, 000, 000 at the peak of the stretching process
to $149,000,000 at the end of the snap-hack,"^
The so-called "banker standard" has doubt-
less had a great deal to do with the passing of the
gold standard end the evolution toward some form of
managed objective standard. While the result was at
times chaotic, due to mismanagement, or due to im-
proper control, nevertheless certain devices did work
far beyond the expectation of the sponsors. Bankers
began to realize that if demand deposits could be ex-
panded on a gold base of not more than 3.5^, and time
deposits on a base of not more than 1%, they might
also expand on less. There is apparently no limit to
this sort of expansion short of zero -- so far as domes
tic currencies are concerned. It is probable that the
gold standard cannot endure in a world where bankers
have become convinced that reserve bank credits are
1. The Banks and Prosperity, Lionel D. Edie, p. 168.
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adequate reserves for credit expansion. Sponsors of
the Federal Reserve System, friends of gold, hsve
accomplished what the foes of gold failed to do.
The Dominant Dollar
Reginald McKenna, formerly Chanceller of
the British Exchequer, end afterwards Chairman of the
Midland Bank, is one of many foreign financiers who
believe that the price level in the United States is
determined by the deliberate policy of the Federal
Reserve Board. He pointed out in 1925 that this con-
trol was, in a sense, world wide. He held that "it
is not the value of gold in America which determines
the value of the dollar, but the value of the dollar
which determines the value of gold." He explained the
external influence of the Federal Reserve authorities
in this way:
"The mechanism by which the dollar governs
the external value of gold is obvious. If the
price level outside America should rise in con-
sequence of an increase in the supply of gold,
America would absorb the surplus gold; if, on
the other hand, the external price level should
fall in consequence of a shortage of gold,
America would supply the deficiency. The move-
ment of gold would continue until the price
levels inside and outside America were brought
once more into equilibrium. Although gold is
still the nominal basis of most currencies, the
real determinant of movements in the general
world level of prices is thus the purchasing
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power of the doller. The conclusion there-
fore is forced upon us that in a very real
sense the world is on a doller standard.
It is futile to try to explain the exces-
sive credit end price gyrations of the past fifteen
or twenty years by claiming that they resulted from
the World War. The flexible system that wes set up
in the United States under the Federal Reserve /ct
has so completely sterilized gold that the United
States was nearly independent of the world influ-
ences so far as the expansion and contraction of
American credit v/as concerned. The breakdown of
credit and price levels abroad, even as late as 1950
end 1931, may., with justification, be traced to the
World War, However, the contraction of Merican
domestic credit was probably a major factor contrib-
uting to European woes. Actually, then, the break-
%
down of American credit caused the breakdown abroad
rather than the commonly held belief that the break-
down abroad caused the contraction of /merican credit,
American credit was supposed to be controlled at home.
Well known devices for the expansion and contraction
of reserve bank credit were controlled, and completely
controlled, by Federal Reserve Bank authorities. Gold
could be hoarded in American bajiks without having any
1. Monetary Stability
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effect whe.tever on the volume of reserve banic credit,
end reserve bank credit was the real base of American
expansion of credit. Commenting on the "sterilization
of American gold, Professor Cassel, in his Rhodes
Memorial Lectures, said:
"i^ccording to the classical doctrine
of the automatic functioning of the Gold
Standard, such a rise of prices would have
been the immediate effect of the inflow of
gold, ahd this effect would have checked
the inflow and eventually caused a reversal
of the movement, How^ever, both in France
and the United States there was an aversion
from using the fresh gold acquired for any
such purpose, and to a large extent the gold
was simply bv'ried in the vaults of the Central
Banks. As a consequence of a restrictive
credit policy the price-levels of these coun-
tries were not only prevented from rising, but
actually lov/ered, in spite of the continued
inflow of gold Had the gold been used
in a normal way prices in Prance and the United
States would have risen above the price-level
of the outside world. This would have led to
an export of gold which would have saved the
outside world from a further fall in prices end
helped it to maintain the Gold Standard. Thus
it may truly be said that the breakdown of the
Gold Standard was the result of a flagrant mis-
management of this monetary mechanism."
Increased Efficiency of Gold
Mr. H. F. Fraser, who advocates a return to
the traditional gold standard, denies that /merica
"sterilized" her gold end advances the following
-opinion:
1, The Crisis of the World’s Monetary System, Gustav
Cassel, P. 70-71.
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'‘Great Britain was forced off the gold
standard hy the rigidity of her internal
economic structure. The external difficul-
ties were but warning symptoms of the real
underlying cause, lack of internal adjust-
ment. The Bank and the Government could
not save the gold standard because they
were not prepared to force such adjustment."
In support of his denial that /jnerica
"sterilized" her gold, Fraser pointed out that the
Federal Reserve System which was established in 1914
effected a great economy in the use of gold by cen-
tralizing, for the most part, our American gold re-
serves, with the result' that while our gold reserves
in the period from 1914 to 1929 increased by about'
$2,500,000,000, the loans and deposits of our banks
increased by the stupendous sum of $55,000,000,000.
At the end of this period our jfimericen gold reserves
were less than seven per cent of our bank credit.
According to Professor J. H. Williams, we have made
a more intensive utilization of gold than any other
country except England.^ Professor Edie has shown
that there has been a progressive economy in American
gold from 1882 to 1925, when England went back on the
gold standard:
1. Gold and Monetary Stabilization
,
Professor J. H.
Williams, p. 149, quoted in Great Britain and
the Gold Standard, H. P. Fraser, p. 72.
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T/3LE II
Stock of G-old in the United States
Expressed as b Per Cent of Individuel Deposits
of all Banks Plus Stock of currency
(1882-1925) a
Year Per Cent
1882 12.1
1913 9.8
1925 8.6
a. Money, Bank Credit and Prices, Lionel D. Edie, p. 264
If ’’sterilization” merely means ’’economy in
the njse of gold," then Fraser is right. However,
"sterilization" meant more than that. It meant that
the upper and lower limits of credit expansion and
contraction were determined, not by gold, but by cer-
tain administrative devices of the Federal Reserve
Banks ,
Deflation Necessary to the Gold Standard
Flexibility in the economic structure is
a necessity for the proper working of the gold stand-
ard. This is true both internally end externally.
Price levels can rise end fall with the loss or gain
of gold stock if there are no restrictive contractual
> V • . .
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agreements which, prevent cost adjustments. Fraser
believes that there must he periodical deflations
in a system having the kind of gold standard v»rhich
he advocates. Deflation in any country under such
a system is considered desirable if prices are above
those of other countries that are on the gold stand-
ard. That is one of the cardinal principles of the
traditional gold standard.
Inflexible Wages and Competitive Prices
However, wages are also prices and, as such,
should come down with other prices. Britons who love
the gold standard should direct their enthusiasm to
the education of labor in this matter of a lov/er wage
scale. Similar adjustments would have to be made in
other important countries and, without the help of a
dictator, reduction of v/age scales today is a hope-
less task in every important nation. The prices of
commodities that ere sold on free competitive markets
would respond immediately to an outflow of gold, and
would come down. If the price of labor that goes in-
to those commodities did not also respond immediately,
there would be unemployment, as producers could not
^continue to produce under conditions of falling prices
and fixed costs. If a laborer happens to be producing
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a product directly for the market, he tends to con-
tinue production when the price of his product falls.
There is therefore no unemployment in his case, hut
he does accept a lower money wage. If prices of
other products go down also, he is no worse off as
his real wages have not changed. There is therefore
no depression for him. However, if a producer is
dependent upon hired labor that will not accept
lower wages when prices are falling, his laborers
are in reality receiving a higher real wage than
they deserve and the producer will have to curtail
production. Between 1924 and 1931, when England was
forced off the gold standard, nominal wages had fallen
only 2
-^%, while wholesale prices had fallen 40^.
Unemployment as a result rose steadily during the
period.
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Illusion of Stability
The price of gold Is fixed by lew over
long periods of time. This fixing of e mint price
gives en Illusion of steblllty. Furthermore, the
total stock of gold In the world cennot be Increased
very quickly. vVhlle this stock Is always rising,
the year to year Increase In the total stock Is not
very great (about ’6% on the average). The fact that
the total stock of gold Is Increasing constantly has
led to the erroneous belief that the gold supply Is
adequate and that low prices at various periods had
not been caused by a gold shortage. The gold supply
Is, of course, not to be considered Independent of the
demand for gold. Various authorities, such as Kitchen,
Cassel, Edle, Hooker, Keynes and Lehfeldt, have made
studies of the relation between gold and the long-term
trend of prices. /Ithough various statistical methods
were used, the results were substantially the same.
Kitchen’s conclusion Is typical: "For more than 75
years before the war, if the world’s stocks of mone-
tary gold increased more rapidly than 3.1^ per year,
prices rose. If they increased less rapidly prices
fell."^ Studies were made in various parts of the
-world -- in the United States, France, Denmark, and
1
. .
The Supply of Gold Compared with the Prices of
Commodities, Interim Report of the Gold
Delegation of the Financial Committee of the
League of Nations
,
Document C 375, M. 161.
Quoted in Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, p. 94
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Germany -- and different commodities were included
in the indexes, but in all cases the conclusion was
the same. The reason that the quantity of gold had
to increase to sustain the price level is that there
has been a year to year increase in the physical
volume of production.
At no time during the history of the gold
standard has the secular trend remained stable.
After the gold discoveries of 1848, the year to year
trend was up until after the Civil War. Beginning
in January 1865, the long-term trend continued down-
ward until reversed again by the gold discoveries
made in the last decades of the century. The low
point was reached in June, 1896. Thereafter, under
the stimulus of the great quantities of new gold,
prices throughout the world rose. One of the fore-
most problems of the period immediately before the
World 'War was the high cost of living in 1913.
After the war inflation, and following the high peak
of prices made in May 1920, the year to year trend
turned down, and all countries, except those that
were not on a gold standard, experienced the most
cruel deflation of modern times. In the United
.States, the low point was reached in February 1933.
Prices, in terms of gold, continued to fall, but
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prices in terms of dollars rose. The defletion ended
in some countries in 1951 when inconvertible curren-
cies were adopted. The statement that the wide price
changes that occurred since the war were world-wide
must be qualified somewhat. Chine, did not experience
either the doubling of prices around 1920 or the great
collapse that follov/ed. Not until 1931 did prices
begin to fall there. The decline at that time was
due to the large withdrawals of silver.
Gold an Unstable Peace-Time Standard
The most important characteristic of any
currency is stability of value. In this respect gold
has failed miserably in comparison with other standards.
Gold has been given every advantage. It is always a
question of returning to gold only when times of dis-
turbance have passed. There is no standard that re-
quires quite such ideal conditions. Yet, during four-
teen years, from 1920 to 1933, fourteen years of peace,
the value of gold rose 2537ol^ The point of view of
some friends of the gold standard is that peace-time
stability is due to paper. The Columbia University
Commission says; ’*It is an entirely fallacious notion
that paper standards are uncontrollable. It is strange
1. Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, p. 89.
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that such statements should still he made by monetary
authorities in the light of experience with paper cur-
rencies in the past few years. During the periods
when England has been off gold, from 1797 to 1821,
from 1914 to 1925, and again since 1931, there were
no inflationary excesses.
After the gyrations of the past two decades
business men should be completely disillusioned as to
the stability of the gold standard. George F. Warren,
Professor of i'^ricultural Economics and Frank .
Pearson, Professor of Prices and Statistics, both of
Cornell University, made elaborate studies of the value
of gold in England for 152 years, showing the compara-
tive amounts of other commodities that could be bought
with an ounce of gold. They found that, in 1934, gold
had reached the highest value it had attained during
150 years. Its value was even greater than in 1896.
From 1914 to 1934, the fluctuations were more violent
than at any previous time in 150 years. Similar studie
made by Warren and Pearson indicate that changes in the
value of gold were about the same in the United States
as in England. ""Gold reached the highest value ever
known in the United States in 1934. Other periods of
1 . Economic Reconstruction
,
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very high value were in 1845 end 1896, The lowest
Value ever known was in 1920. ,?fter 1929, the value
of gold rose with greet rapidity. In fourteen years
the value of gold changed from the lowest to the
highest level known in the history of the United
States .
Trade Restriction and Automatic Price ^adjustments
There ere other inflexible elements that
would prevent adjustment in the price structure end
a proper working of the gold standard: for example,
set prices, controlled by monopolistic and quasi-
monopolistic enterprise, encouraged by governments
and defended by organized business. If prices are
practically "pegged" by any such pov/erful group,
other groups are injured whenever the general level
of prices falls, as it must at times if the gold
standard is to work as it is intended to.
There is another type of rigidity that
has to do with trade restrictions. It is just plain
honesty for a government to establish a sound equi-
librium in its balance of payments. Furthermore,
it is doubtful that any nation can avoid doing so in
the long run. Mercantilist notions of "a favorable
1. Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, p. 86.
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tiplence of trede^ in prgcticel affpirs, rob the
nations involved of the sdvantages of international
division of labor. For example, if we erect a tpriff
well against German toys, it will be only a matter of
time before sn adverse trede balance will compel
Germa.ny to stop importations from the United States .
The illustration is a little oversimplified, but the
principle is sound. Both countries lose. There are
times when we should reduce our exports and increase
our imports. It is the only rational thing to do.
We are unwilling to abandon mercantilist doctrines
in fact as well as in text books. However, if this
were politically feasible at all, it would be done,
with or wdthout the gold standard and the point that
must be stressed here is not the recognized stupidity
of tariff policies -- our own in particular
rather the futility of expecting that anything will
be done about it. It is a strange fact that the great
majority of Americans w'ould fight "tooth and toenail"
to prevent a balance of international payments. War
debts and interest payments on the war debts ere
credits to us in the balance of payments. Any govern-
ment responsible for an increase of imports which would
make these payments possible would be retired at the
next election. Ministries in other countries must
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accede to the protection demends of powerful pres-
sure groups or they will he displaced by those who
will
.
The Return to Laissez-faire Difficult
The fundamental objective of the gold
standard -- equalization of international balances --
is a just objective, and one that is highly desirable.
Gold standard advocates apparently feel that we should
do all of those things which will balance international
trade and domestic social relations, and then let the
gold standard automatically keep things in balance.
Unfortunately, the rigidity that has crept into the
world’s economic structure is something that cannot
be corrected merely because some economists think that
the gold standard would work under conditions of
laissez-faire. If we could do away with all wage
agreements, repeal the tariff lews, and trade re-
strictions, quotas, and embargoes, do away with all
monopolies, hang Hitler and Mussolini, and re-estab-
lish laissez-faire conditions in all foreign and
domestic relations, the gold standard might work.
A 100;^ ideal system of laissez-faire has
never been tried anywhere, and it has never been
-approached anyv/here except in England. It is still
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possible at a Rotary Club dinner and in some polit-
ical circles in both the United States and England
to get a cheer by denouncing the government for
meddling, but in both countries it is beyond the
bounds of practical politics to think of going back
to any system moderately resembling laissez-faire.
In England, Parliament has passed act after act regu-
lating the relations between employers and employees,
end tariffs have been Imposed with little opposition.
iPrtificlel Changes of the Secular Trend
Prices do get out of line with the secular
trend for a variety of reasons that have to do with
gold. For example, if a country goes off the gold
standard the demand for gold is lessened. The fact
that most of the countries of the world discontinued
the gold standard during and after the war accounts
for the fact that prices got out of line at that time.
The quantities of gold that were released supported
higher price levels in countries that remained on the
standard. /nother thing that has a very real effect
on the secular trend is the practice of "sterilizing"
gold. This device has already been discussed.^
It is teclinically different from other methods of
1. See p. 65.
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increasing the efficiency of gold and is more like
an actual decrease in supply. Devaluation affects
the secular trend in two ways: first, by the increase
in the number of monetary units, such as dollars,
pounds, etc.; secondly, by the increased quantity
of gold produced under the stimulus of a higher mint
price. Thus, a 40^ increase in the price of gold not
only increased the number of dollars by that percent-
age, but it also started production at what were pre-
viously sub-marginal mines. The year to year increase
is greater in weight, and worth more in dollars. But
what is much more important is that the world’s stock
of gold is increased by a percentage which is greater
than the yearly average of 3^. In 1935 the increase
of the world’s total stock amounted to the phenom-
ina.lly high figure of 5^.^ Since that time the ex-
pansive movement has continued and the end is not yet
in sight. According to the Midland Bank Review the
world’ s output of new gold in 1937 is estimated at a
higher figure than ever, both in quantity and in value:
In weight it showed a rise of more than
five per cent as compared with 1936, and was
two-thirds as large again as in 1930, before
the break-up of the international monetary
system then operating.'^
1 . Trends in Gold Production and Monetary Stocks
,
vValter B. Kahn, Foreign Affairs
,
July 1936, p.702.
2. Midland Bank Review, May- June 1938, p. 1.
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Effect of Devaluation -- Warren-
end Peerson Cited
Professor Werren, who advised President
Roosevelt in the matter of doller devaluation, ex-
pected en immediate effect on the price level from
an increased number of gold units. He wrote;
"When a country changes the price of
gold, the effect on prices of most basic
commodities is practically instantaneous.
In fact, the anticipation of a change in
the price of gold may cause commodity prices
to change in advance of the fact. J'.n in-
crease in the price of gold gradually affects
all prices. It either relieves prices from
declining or actually Increases them."-^
In magazine articles and elsewhere the claim was made
that basic commodity prices actually did move approx-
imately in proportion to the advance in the price of
gold. The period used as proof of this contention
was from February 1933 to i:ugust 1934. The price of
gold was compared with the Journal of Commerce index
of prices of thirty commodities. The Journal of
Commerce index rose ^1%, The price of gold rose 69^.
While this writer is still skeptical, these figures
show an amazing mathematical correspondence to say
2the least.
1. Gold and Prices
,
Warren end Pearson, p. 191.
2. Ibid.
,
p. 193.
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Increeaing Ratio of Credit per Poller
of Gold
The emount of credit for eech dollar of
gold has on the average increased steadily since
1880. Warren and Pearson estimate that bank de-
posits per dollar of gold have increased at the rate
of 1,68^ per year. This is the average rate of in-
crease for a period of fifty-two years. During the
period from 1880 there was a decrease in the use of
monetary circulation which partially offset the in-
crease in the use of credit. The net increase of
both money and credit per dollar of gold was found
by the same authorities to be 1.06^ per year.
Studies of the period since the establishment of the
Federal Reserve System show that there is no indica-
tion that the system stimulated this increase. In
fact the reverse is the case. From 1923 to 1927,
the average amount of monetary circulation plus bank
deposits per dollar of gold was |llo56, an amount
which, when compared with pre-war periods, showed
a less than average increase. Curiously the increase
in the use of credit and the consequent increase in
the efficiency of gold does not appear to have al-
tered the increasing need for gold to support the
price level. While the efficiency in the use of
'I'".
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gold has been increasing gradually other offsetting
factors pertaining to the standard of living have
also been increasing. It is a fact that it still
takes an increase in world gold of about per year
to sustain the price level in spite of the increased
efficiency of gold.^
Gold Seriously Deflationary
That there is a close connection between
gold and the long-term drift of commodity prices is
well established. Economists agree on this. The
harm done by this long-term downward drift is in-
calculable. Not only does it have a deadly effect
on business enterprise, but there is also great in-
justice resulting from the shift in values that
seriously affects debtors and creditors. Further-
more, the persistent slide in prices in a period
such as that from 18b5 to 189b has an importa.nt
effect on the business cycle. During such a period
the depression phase of the cycle lasts longer.
Business is depressed nearly three quarters of the
time. Depressions, like that of 1873 and of 1930,
do not occur when the secular trend is not downward.
Both of these depressions lasted about six years.
1. Gold and Prices, Warren end Pearson, p. 137.
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Doubtless, business would run its course through
revivel, prosperity, crises, end depressions, if
there were no seculer trend. However, greater
violence and liquidation would not occur if there
were no underlying downward trend aggravating the
cyclical decline.
Gold can and does cause deflation in three
different ways that have been mentioned in this chap-
ter: a developing shortage of world gold, an outflow
of gold to another country, and an artificial short-
age caused by ’’sterilization" or hoarding. In spite
of these three major defects of the gold standard,
three defects which no one disputes, there was in-
sistence everywhere on the continent and in the
British Isles, that governments return to gold after
the war. This insistence was certainly based upon
the illusion that gold would bring stability. The
public believed that it would. Those who convinced
the public of this knew that it wouldn’t. For this
reason a monetary controversy takes on all of the
fervor of a religious war. Ps soon as a monetary
economist, who happens also to be a public-spirited
citizen, becomes aware of this gigantic and deliberate
.^deception, he rises in wrath. He may be a very poor
orator, in which case his wrath will not shake the
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nation. However, if he happens to he a William
Jennings Bryan, his impassioned oratory will be
repeated for a generation.
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CHAPTER V
ENGL/ND ON /ND OFF GOLD
England* s Return to Gold In 1925
In January 1918, a committee was appointed
by the English Government, headed by Lord Cunliffe,
to consider the various problems which will
arise in connection v/ith currency and the foreign
exchanges during the period of reconstruction and
report upon the steps required to bring about the
restoration of normal conditions in due course."^
In an Interim Report, made in August 1918,
the Committee recommended a return to the gold stand-
ard after the war, without delay:
"In our opinion it is imperative that,
after the war, the conditions necessary to
the maintenance of an effective gold standard
should be restored without delay. Unless the
machinery which long experience has shown to
be the only effective remedy for an adverse
balance of trade and an undue growth of credit
is once more brought into play, there v«fill be
grave danger of a progressive credit expansion
which will result in a foreign drain of gold,
menacing the convertibility of our note issue
end so jeopardizing the international trade
position of the country,"^
Such was the recommendation of a group made
up almost exclusively of the foremost English bankers.
1. Quoted from Stable Money, Irving Fisher, p. 277.
2. Ibid.
,
p. 27b.
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From the subsequent dismal failure of the Cunliffe
recommendations, in England’s return to the gold
standard one might conclude that these bankers had
made a mistake. Hov^ever, there are writers who
explain the failure in another way. Mr. Kitsen
feels that their advice was favorable to bankers,
but not to British trade and world trade and industry.
He said:
•‘In no other business or profession --
save that of banking -- would the Government
of any civilized country so brazenly offend
the public sense of justice in that particular
business, to determine the legal privileges
which such a business should enjoy.
’*What would the public say if the
Government of this country were to appoint a
committee drawn exclusively from the Brewers
of Whiskey Distillers Association to determine
the character of our licensing laws; or a
committee composed exclusively of criminals to
determine the criminal laws?*’^
Keynes’ Uncanny Foresight
Mr. John Maynard Keynes is probably the
most brilliant living economist. His prestige among
monetary scientists has grown, not so much as a result
of the towering scholarship of his treatises, but
rather from the almost uncanny foresight and accuracy
with which he warned England of the inevitable conse-
quences of a return to the gold standard. He pleaded
1. The Bankers’ Conspiracy , Arthur Kitsen, p. 38;
Quoted in Stable Money, Irving Fisher, p. 279.
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with dignity against such a return, but to no avail.
On April 28, 1925, the fatal step was taken, a step
more grave than a declaration of war: Mr, Churchill
announced the return to gold. On May 15, the Cold
Standard Act of 1925 was passed. Keynes had pointed
out that the pound was overvalued externally by about
10%, He forecast deflation of prices, deflation of
wages, deflation of profits, social disturbances, and
an abnormally high degree of unemployment.^ It is
one thing to ’#rite learned books on the theory of
banking. It is quite another to submit a "blueprint"
of the future consequences of an important act. The
world knows what happened. For the first time since
the war started in 1914, the Bank considered the for-
eign rate in determining the rate of discount. The
rate was raised to b%. England got "sound money", but
the rules of the game hurt. Foreign exchange require-
ments called for deflation at home. Exporters had to
lower their prices. Foreign buyers were not so eager
to buy expensive pounds. A higher rate of discount
reduced the demand for credit as it was expected to
do: a successful result from the point of view of the
monetary authorities. Prices fell steadily for six
years: another successful result. Labor could not
be made to understand its part in the program. The
1. Greet Britain and the Gold Standard, H. F. Fraser,
p7"47.
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rules of the geme called for a reduction of money-
wages, Lsbor's faith in the inherent stability of
the gold standard may have been too greet. Gold
standard advocates had promised stability and labor
certainly got it in the form of money wages that
dropped only 2-%% in six years. Meanwhile the whole-
sale price level dropped 4:0%.
"Early in 1929 it became evident that
there was difficulty in reconciling the
national and international factors in mon-
etary policy. Greet Britain had returned
to gold parity under conditions which
necessitated a fall in domestic price
levels. In fact, however, certain groups
of prices end wages in Great Britain proved
to be particularly rigid, so that, as com-
modity prices slowly declined in world mar-
kets, the export trade fell off and unem-
ployment increased unless Interest
rates kept low abroad there was always the
possibility of a drain of gold depleting
the comp E'.r at ively small gold reserves of the
Bank of England."^
England’s Gamble on Price Rise in /jnerica
The monetary authorities had gambled on
the prospect of a rise in iimerican prices. However,
at that time, i^merican monetary authorities were
following a policy of stabilization. From 1921 to
1929 the price level in the United States was not
permitted to rise or fall very far before corrective
1 , Report of the League of Nations Gold
Delegations
, ^ 15.
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action was taken through the ’’open market” operations
end the discount rate. The English authorities were
disappointed. Prices in the United States did not
rise; in 1929 the price index was still at the 1922
level. If jimerican and other prices had risen, the
over-valuation of the pound would have been corrected.
In other words, Inflation abroad would have obviated
the necessity of deflation at home for the British.
Unfortunately for the speciilations of British monetary
authorities, we had our own deflationists in J^raerica.
The average price level for 1925 according to the in-
dex of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
was 151. It has never been that high since. Speculat-
ing on a further rise, British monetary experts picked
the top of a bull market in jSmericen commodities as the
time to return to gold. It proved to be a costly blun-
der, both from the point of view of the friends of the
traditional gold standard and for the welfare of all
England during the years from 1925 to 1951. However,
this great blunder may have obviated the danger of
England’s return to the pre-war gold standard.
England Forced off Gold in 1951
If English monetary authorities had not been
so hasty in returning to the gold standard, or if they
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had devalued the pound by the amount of its apparent
over-valuation, the gold standard might have weathered
the storm that broke in the early summer of 1951.^
There had been serious financial difficulties devel-
oping on the continent. Unemployment was excessive in
both Jiustria and Germany. As the industrial situation
became worse, taxes fell, causing financial difficulties
for both governments. The rise of Hitler and his radical
proposals in regard to the cancellation of foreign debts
added to the uncertainty. The world’s balance of pay-
ments had been maintained by the renewal of short-term
loans for a nuraber of years preceding. !\ lack of con-
fidence might at any time have resulted in large with-
drawals of these short-term credits. There was over
2two billion dollars of American money in Germany alone.
American and British banks became nervous over the
situation and a run began on Germany. To prevent de-
fault, Mr. Hoover declared a moratorium. This dramatic
gesture restored confidence temporarily. Uncertainty
increased because of France's delay in accepting the
proposals. The runs on the German banks continued and
spread to other countries. Exchanges were closed and
conditions in general became chaotic in the various
financial markets. A "standstill" arrangement was
1. Great Britain and the Gold Standard, H. F. Fraser,
p. 105.
2. The Money Muddle, James P. Warburg, p. 59.
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agreed to in London, under which some of G-ermsny’s
creditors agreed to renew loans until the end of
February 1952. This agreement had a serious effect
in London, dreat Britain's short-term obligations
had to be met. Her claims on Germany were then
"frozen." Vi/hile Great Britain was still solvent
her realizable short-term assets were not as large
as her short-term liabilities. She had been borrow-
ing at short-term and lending at long-term. Mean-
while, for reasons mentioned earlier in this chapter,^
her share of world trade had been going steadily down.
The budget was threatened by the mounting costs of
Various kinds of social legislation. Ji steady run on
London increased in spite of the assurance given by
huge loans from Prance and the United States. With
the exiiaustion of these huge foreign credits, borrowed
to meet the emergency, London gave up the struggle and
2
abandoned the gold standard on September 21, 1931.
The Abandonment of Gold and Recovery
Vi/hen England abandoned gold, deflation ended
and a steady recovery began. The same thing happened
in other countries, as one after another abandoned
gold. The deflation continued in countries like the
1 .
2. Recovery, The Second Effort
,
Sir Arthur Salter,
K.C.B.
,
pp. 49-53.
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United States end France where the desperate attempt
to cling to "sound money" made recovery impossible
and nearly brought on universal bankruptcy. During
the eighteen months that followed 1931 the various
paper currencies in the "sterling area" remained
remarkably stable, while the gold currencies con-
tinued to fall disastrously, demoralizing business
and creating serious political unrest. The index of
wholesale commodity prices of the United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics dropped 17^ during the eighteen
months preceding /merica’ s abandonment of the gold
standard. During these same months, the general aver-
age of commodity prices in the "sterling group** re-
mained approximately at the level of September 1931.
Mr. Reginald McKenna, one of England’s foremost bank-
ers, wrote in 1933, "There can be no doubt that our
departure from gold has paid us already a handsome
dividend.
Keynes’ Penetrating j>nalysis
In 1930 Keynes made the following penetrat-
ing analysis of the difficulties involved in one phase
of Great Britain’s return to the gold standard:
1. Midland Bank Review
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In the course of the six months which
preceded and the six months which followed
Great Britain’s return to the gold standard
in May 1925, it was necessary to raise the
gold value of sterling by about 10;^ at a
time when gold itself was not depreciating
in Value. This meant that the flow of
money-incomes per unit of output; i.e., of
rates of earnings generally, had to be
diminished by 10^ -- except insofar as a
depreciation in the value of gold Itself
might come to the assistance of the transi-
tion. In other words, there had to be an
Income Deflation in the strict sense of the
word.
Equilibri-om required that the flow of
money-incomes and the rate of money-earnings
per unit of output should be appropriately
reduced. But in the first instance the fall
of prices reduced, not costs and rate of
earnings, but profits. The entrepreneur
bore the brunt, and the only means by which
the Bank of England’s policy could restore
equilibrium was to make him smart so severely
that he could pass on the pressure to the
proper quarters. The entrepreneur, faced
with prices falling faster than costs, had
three alternatives open to him -- to put up
with his losses as best he could; to withdraw
from his less profitable activities, thus re-
ducing output and employment; to embark on a
struggle with his employees to reduce their
money-earnings per unit of output -- of which
only the last was capable of restoring real
equilibrium from the national point of view.
In the long run, however these alternatives
might be compatible, if efficiency could be
sufficiently increased, with a maintenance of
money-earnings per unit of the factors of
production.
The entrepreneur tried all three. To a
surprising extent and for a surprising length
of time, he submitted to the first; namely,
the cutting dov/n, or cutting off, of his
profits. The leading industries -- the old
textile industries, the heavy industries
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working coal, iron end. steel, the railv/ays
and the farmers -- just took their losses
and went on taking them, not merely for
months but for years. The usual profits
of these industries were diminished by
tens of millions of pounds. The joint-
stock form of organization, by which the
control has largely passed to salaried
people, probably prolonged the period of
inertia, longer then if the whole of the
losses had fallen on the actual managers.
It follows that the full development
of unemployment was also longer postponed
than mi gilt have been expected. But the
entrepreneus availed himself from the out-
set of the second expedient as well -- the
expedient of curtailing his less profitable
activities. Five years after the consumma-
tion of the return to gold the cujrtallment
of employment was still in operation in an
unabated degree.
There remains the third expedient --
of reducing the rates of money-earnings per
unit of output. It may be that in earlier
periods the pressure of sub-normal profits
and the unemployment of factors of produc-
tion may have operated more rapidly than
they do now to achieve the objective of an
Income Deflation.
I believe that the resistances to a severe
Income Deflation, which is not merely a reaction from
a recent Inflation, have always been very great. But
in the modern world of organized Trade Unions and a
proletarian electorate they are overwhelmingly strong.
The attempt by the entrepreneurs to bring this exped-
ient into operation culminated in the General Strike
of 192b. But political and social considerations stood
in the way of allowing the advantages won by the defeat
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of the strike to be pushed home. Wsge rates in
perticular industries have fsllen he&vily, but Dr.
Bowlej’s genersl index of weekly wage rates was
practically as high in 1930 as in 1924. Thus one
could OFily hope for an increase in efficiency by
which lower money-earnings per unit of output might
be compatible with unchanged money- ei^rnings per ijinit
of the factors of production. pt long last, perhaps,
this will be the way of escape.
Meanwhile the loss of national wealth en-
tailed by the attempt to bring about an Income
Deflation by means of the weapons appropriate to a
Profit Deflation was enormous. If we assume that
only half the unemployment was abnormal, the loss of
national output may be estimatea at more than
100,000,000 pounds per annum -- a loss which per-
sisted several years.
Fair 7/eather Standard
During the pest hundred years no government
has ever intended to stay on the gold standard. If
the principal nations of the world were to return to
the gold standard, every last one of them would expect
to go off gold In case of a general war. It would be
mere gambling to ass'ime that there is not going to be
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such a war. What is the meaning of a contract that
everyone expects to he broken? The committment of
a government to pay in gold works only so long as
the gold is not wanted. Let any very serious crisis
occur and the agreement is off. Gold standard advo-
cates never tire of pointing out that the war and
not the gold standard was the cause of the disturbances
of the past twenty-five years. There is a great deal
of truth in this. It is pure deception, however, to
pretend that paper currencies were the cause of the
evils of inflation and deflation that followed the war.
No kind of currency could have prevented inflation
during the World War, and no kind of currency can
prevent inflation during the next war. Great wars
come with sufficient frequency to suppose that any
return to the gold standard will be a short-lived
affair. It is a gigantic fraud for any government
to pretend that it intends to maintain redeemability
in gold. It simply can'
t
be done and everyone who
understands the subject knows it. No standard will
work in a bankrupt country, but the gold standard
breaks down even when there is a high degree of
solvency .
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CK/PTER VI
INFLATION
It is not s-urprising thst mi sunders tend-
ings end controversies have arisen over inflation.
The term itself is used vaguely in several popular
senses. Not only is the average man and reader
confused as to the true meaning of this technical
term; most popular writers as well differ in their
interpretations, and even serious students of the
subject do not agree among themselves as to just
whet is meant by "inflation." "Definitions cannot
be more than tentative until bankers, financiers
and economists have much clearer conceptions of the
meanings of the terms they use."^
Popular Concepts
In the popular sense, inflation has thir-
teen or fourteen very common meanings. It may mean
an increase in the "amount of paper money"; that is,
legal tender government notes, or "wild cat" bank
notes. It is used to signify an increase in the
volume of credit, "devaluation", abandonment of the
gold standard, a rise in the prices of stocks, bonds,
coxnmodities
,
or real estate, an addition of silver
1. The Money Revolution
,
Sir Charles Morgan, V/ebb,
p . 15 .
IV
.'A ;•
vf5raaiaw6wKi® Sni ^o« kx »I
•'•
.
.noiaBncii 1OV0, xisetia sVBJi aeistavoiinoo
fcn,v as«i
-:<?Xmic.xt Xb-isvse fix
^ liseSi »‘iad sii'I
-JW4 «8« 08»^«» -«Mii» Bl tioo *««
Isoiitiisaif sijitf gairisssi ?uaa «ii3
oi aa fcesixtnoo
axsrfi ai asllXfi XXow Sa at®%X-ff
•laXaqoq tsom innai
(,m Xo 3i«aj3£'-aa aaoX-tss haw'-bn-ft
.afloXlaJe'iq'iaaaX
aEj-i. ca aa ea’XissMda a«qi-«
Joat^tfa
4oni«s anciXlrii'tea" >• . iiol4« XlaXC
a-ifioasBil ,ei9*»d XXXxuf ^autt etoa
ad
etii lo Baci,x<i3snoo •i^«io//ioo»‘ev*rt
B'Seimonoos txui
.e&M B£sri&^ s>iivj lo
: \
''
, a ^ c: ft OiioO .*xbIxjcio*^
-tJtdcf 8«xl ^©3'iS®'&
^®Xyqoq axicf nl •
riBaifl n •eErTtoei- aomsfo^ a©6^*ii/o'i
10 nseJ
«xe(|aq na
bliw^Vio- ,ae4'Oa iBsei
£X-^ ©siBe^onl rt« beex/ al
.aa^oii
Sil4 lo XnsiSOTOfenadiv ."wcXSauXavsb'’
.aibei® 'io SiwXov
ei)«cd ,B3io<54s asolKi srfif nX sail a ,bisX)na43
BXog
16VXX8 1<5 noiWibB •« .ed-aJee Xsai lo'^'.aaXdXioffir.oo
,dd*v; .fiOSipM aaXiBuO -xX2 xPoXXpX^H.J^hoH^^^
-X
to the monetary bese, sn expsnsion of broker's loans,
the adoption of a managed currency; in fact, it may
mean anything that the speaker or writer may have in
mind at the time of speaking or writing. With popu-
lar writers especially, failure to define the term in
the sense intended is the rule rather than the excep-
tion. As a result, readers of popular economic lit-
erature on inflation attain no understanding of the
subject. It is, of course, only natural for writers
to disagree as to the meaning of the term. However,
intelligent discussion ends when one party to a dis-
cussion does not know what another party means by an
important term. For which reason the banker and the
social reformer find it difficult to act in harmony
on inflation. To each, the other’s meaning of the
term is utterly incomprehensible. The "average man",
who has an important stake in a number of things that
are materially af*fected by inflation, m^st have a clear
understanding of the term if he is to realize the effect
of the process on him.
Authoritative Definitions
Serious students of the subject have given
a great deal of care to defining the term "inflation";
still there is no agreement as to meaning, H. Parker
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Willis held that ’'inflation is a problem not, as
commonly supposed, of money and credit, but of pro-
duction and distribution in the economic sense of
those terms. This concept of the term is different
from that of most economists who usually Include in
their definitions the idea of a rise in prices, with
or without an increase in the volume of money. Some
very able authorities are willing, for the sake of
simplicity, to consider any rise in prices as infla-
tion, and any fall in prices as deflation. This is
2
the view held by Lionel D. Edie. Foster and
Catchings suggest that the term ’’inflation’* be used
"to denote any increase in the volume of money that
is accompanied by a rise in the general price level."'-'
Still other definitions imply that inflation is an
increase of the media of exchange, without any cor-
responding increase in the quantity of goods produced,
and a consequent increase in the general price level.
This view is expressed in the careful definition of
Keynes
;
"When a further increase in the quantity
of effective demand produces not further
increase in output and entirely spends it-
self on an increase in the cost unit fully
1. The Economics of Inflation
,
Willis and Chapmen.
2. Money, Bank Credit and Prices
,
p. 186.
3. Money
,
p. 55
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proportionete to the increase in effective
demand, we have reached a condition which
might be appropriately designated as one
of true inflation.^
Kemmerer seems to agree with Keynes in substance,
although he has expressed the idea in a somewhat
different way:
Inflation exists in a country whenever
the supply of money and of bank deposits
circulating through checks, so-called
"deposit currency", increases relatively
to the demand for media of exchange in such
a way as to bring about a rise in the gen-
eral price level.
^
Some of the above definitions ere somewhat narrow
in that they exclude a rise in prices from non-
monetary Causes. shortage of goods with no de-
crease in the media of exchange may result in a rise
in prices. Such a condition also constitutes infla-
tion.
Fiat Money Not Inflation
An issue of any medium of exchange -- gold,
silver, government paper, bank notes, or deposit
currency -- is not, of itself, inflation, if such
issue is not followed by a rise in prices. Too often
1 . The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money
,
John Maynard Keynes, p. 305 .
, Kemmerer on Money, Edwin Walter Kemmerer, p. 45.2
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popular opinion identifies inflation v»rith the issue
of fiat currency. Thus, other forms of inflgtion msy
occur unnoticed. To he strictly eccurate, fiat cur-
rency is not of itself inflationary. However, if it
is issued in excess of the amount necessary to sup-
port the existing price level, it does result in
inflation. The layman can hardly be expected to
understand that if an equivalent amount of solid gold
were issued under similar circumstances that the result
would be the same -- inflation. Fortunately, monetary
authorities are aware that disastrous inflations occur
when there is a complete absence of fiat currency.
This was true in 1920 and in 1929 in the United States.
It appears also that in the fantastic inflation that
occurred in G-ermany after the war, marks were backed,
mark for mark, with German government bonds. ^ The
notes of the Germain central bank, the Reichsbank, were
handed over to the Government for German bonds; theo-
retically, a very "sound” procedure. These notes were
not fiat currency, but this supposedly conservative
procedure set an all time high for inflations. Fiat
currency has accompanied some of the most spectacular
periods of inflation, as well as some of the most stable
1. Kemraerer on Money, Edwin Walter Kemmerer, p. 76.
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periods. It is, therefore, merely incidental. It
is neither a characteristic of inflation, nor one
of the usual causes; and the widespread assumption
that it is both leaves us politically unprepared
to prevent the more subtle forms of this monetary
disease
.
Managed Currency Not Inflation
Another misconception which arises from
failure to define "inflation" carefully, is the
notion that managed currency and inflation are iden-
tical. Of course, no competent economist holds any
such view. This is, however, a popular misconception.
If governments or banks were to use the power of man-
agement only for the purpose of expainding the media
of exchange, the result would certainly be inflation.
Of course, this has not been the case. Management
implies contraction as well as expa^nsion. In recent
years, under systems of managed currency, prices have
actually fallen in a number of important cases. This
was true in England and Sweden, over considerable
periods of time. The confusion of thinking in which
managed currency is identified with inflation is
largely due to the belief, not entirely unfounded,
that politicians are reluctant to take any steps that
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will heve e contrs.cting effect. Furthermore, the
edvocstes of s managed currency are frequently also
those who, during a, period of severe deflation want
"reflation." It is natural, therefore, that at such
times, the public would identify currency management
with inflation. In spite of the fact that there is
nothing at all automatic about modern currency systems,
there is still a lingering belief that such systems are
and should be automatic. VJith those who hold such
viev/s, any artificial tampering with purchasing power,
such as would be the case with a managed currency, is
inflation.
Depreciation of Foreign Exchange Not Inflation
Sometimes inflation is accompanied by de-
preciation of currency in terms of a foreign exchange.
However, inflation can and does take place when there
is a complete absence of such depreciation. A defi-
nition which assumes that the depreciation of one
currency in terms of another is inflation, is incor-
rect. Internal prices may fall or they may be stabil-
ized in terms of a depreciated currency. After England
abandoned the gold standard in 1931, prices in England
fell slightly at times and were generally stabilized,
although, in terms of the American dollar, the pound
arii .s-iomertl'xu'i .^oe’ns
c-X*- ^XJn9cp9-il 9’iii •«ons.'fiuo 09S^w« s to
esi^oovbs
Jfi jw ncii!'!i1»& 9'*evea. lo botin ^ Bixtiov ,oaw esorfo
done ie ..s-ie'leaorfj ,t:.-ixa^a aX
» .aolJsIlsi”
in9mf»g,sri(*
aiXctiq eriX ,?.em-l .
?,X aiarf? iaitJ Joa" e*XJ 'to
oiiqa <Jl .noittsllnj; riltw
.eir.iXs\a vona™o aiabort iaocid oiaoiaoXw
XXa a« s«Xriacn
a'« 8tf,e38T8 done Jaiii l9Xia<l' §iifi9SrfiX .?
XXXXo ol oisds
doise bZoA oiiB ®EOria diXa , .'.laMwtfus ad
XX-troris hnn
.lewoq gulatrfs'toXf ‘laXw gatloqiasa
XaiotlXata .^»oiV
cl ,^oriPT;t'o fi9Sxo»ra I! iiax» »8*o
9^^ cXoow B.i rioas
-'
•
.
.noi^^rinl
C'.Qlin .^-fv T' :toM s;?->n5-jlox^ t~t8
-tsh’ X^ s;i
ii©jr;i:
.a8aa,florle;tti;Xo‘trt,,a lo eeqsJ al .%oao%'mo lo
noXdaXos'ri
9i8Ma rtatfw aOi^Xq.sJfqX moX to rta^ ^oXiaXtoi .lavtoH
-itpfy A .ftoJde>o®-tqsfc /Coi's Xo
ooiteecfs sJaXqraoo b aX
ano Xa fsaiiaXoaiirefc XstiX aaiiv
aoEcsEa dqXriw noX3j.r:
-•tconX eX .noXXoX'ltxJ. aX 'isdioiifl lo enfloX
uX -icoe-iiito
-IXdaJe ed -^aK Xial aao.Xiq. Xao^ainl
.Xoei
bnsXsna tei'm .noae'Wtio X>aX»Xo9tqafi, a Xo
emaS nX bssX
bnaXsoa nX aeoxaft. .XSeX «1 totoxa feXog 9i«
baitctoda
.basXXXdaXe 'iXXBianas 9d-®"
\'X3n2iXa XXaX
Jimfoq,, ati# ', 1 'XXoi m>olt»tA a,« Xo, araiaX,
nX .nguoriXia
had depreciated. Furthermore, even under the tradi-
tional gold standard, world-wide inTlation occurred
while the exchanges remained undisturbed. Deprecia-
tion of a currency may or may not be accompanied by
inflation, and inflation may or may not cause depre-
ciation in terms of foreign exchange. The by no
means insignificant inflation in the United States
in 1929 was not accompanied by depreciation of the
dollar. Those who held the idea that the flow of
international gold vtfould regulate the level of world
prices, assumed that a depreciating exchange rate was
synonymous with inflation. As a matter of fact, the
inflation, even under the traditional gold standard,
must come first; otherwise, imports do not tend to
increase, gold does not flow out, and the bank rate
does not fall. Depreciation of exchange is merely an
occasional result or symptom and not to be considered
an essential characteristic of inflation.
Various Quantitative Increases
Not Inflation
vVhile some might still insist that an in-
crease in the quantity of currency which does not
result in a rise in prices is inflation, that is
hardly a practical consideration as no harm is done
by this increase. There could hardly be condemnation
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of an increased quantity of money to take care of
increased needs of trade. If there were no price
increases due to increases in the quantity of money,
it is sef'e to say that there would be no contro-
versies about it. Therefore, it is practical and
correct to define "inflation" in terms of rising
prices .
Inflation is neither fiat currency, nor
managed currency, nor depreciated exchange rate;
rather a rise in the price level due to a change
in the relationship of the media of exchange to the
quantity of goods. The same may be said of depre-
ciation in terms of gold. Furthermore, since neither
gold nor foreign exchange are stable or fixed in
Value, it is impossible to use either as a measure
of the degree of inflation that takes place in any
currency.
War Inflation
An examination of any price series extend-
ing over the past 150 years will disclose the fact
that the great periods of inflation have been during
war times and shortly thereafter. The three great
inflations in the United States during the past 150
years occurred during the Napoleonic Wars, during the
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Civil Wsr, end during and after the World Wer.
Prices also rose rapidly during Washington’s admin-
istration because of the French Revolution. Accord-
ing to a table prepared by Warren and Pearson, prices
reached a peak of 193 on the index in January 1815.^
A post-war inflation, such as accompanied the period
following the World War, did not take place after the
Napoleonic Wars; on the other hand, prices suffered
an immediate sharp decline. By March of 1821, the
index stood at 98, indicating a price decline of
nearly 50;;^. The price increases that occurred in
the United States during the Napoleonic Wars and
during the Civil War were practically the same in
extent as the price rise during the V/orld War, Civil
War prices reached a peek of 223 according to the
Warren and Pearson index in January 1865, end, as
was the case after the Napoleonic Wars, a rapid de-
cline followed. At the close of the World War in
November, 1918, the price index had reached 199.
During the three months following the signing of
the armistice, prices receded slightly. In February
1919, the index had dropped to 190. However, the
drastic, immediate, and consistent drop in prices
that had followed the other two great war periods
1. Gold and Prices, p. 12-14
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did not take piece in 1919. Insteed, there occixrred
a further sharp rise which reached e peek, in Mey
1920, of 244.^
All wars are not accompanied hy inflation.
During the Crimean War there was actually a slight
drop in prices. Hov/ever, all greet wers inevitably
lead to inflation which, furthermore, tends to spread
and to become nearly universal. During the French
Revolution prices in the United States rose 70^ on
a metal basis. Prom 1913 to the time that the United
States entered the World War the price level had risen
62^. By 1918, even neutral countries had experienced
a great inflation. In Denmark the average was 304;
in Norway, 345; in the Netherlands, 373.^
Non-Monetary Basis
A period of war in which changes take place
rapidly is an opportunity to study both the monetary
and the non-monetary characteristics of inflation.
To begin with there is an immediate and urgent need
for goods. The demand for munitions and equipment
is insistent at a time when the nation's ability to
produce more goods is limited by withdrawal of young
1. Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, pp . 12-14.
2. Ibid ., p. lb.
3. Money, Bank Credit and Prices
,
Lionel D. Edie,
p. 282.
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men from productive activity. Women, youngsters,
pnd the aged ere called upon to make up the lebor
shortage, and the land and capital resources of the
country are worked with feverish activity. Marginal
agricultural lands are brought under cultivation,
and new industrial plants constructed. Nevertheless,
it seems impossible to fill the :^pparently limitless
requirements. Meanwhile the nation must eat, and
while forced sacrifices are made, the usual consump-
tion requirements of a very active people are high.
War Exigencies
No scheme for stabilization could possibly
overcome the exigencies of a greet war. Under the
stress of future great wars, nations will resort to
inflation, as they have done in the past. While
stable money is an important consideration, when the
existence of the nation is at stake, the injustices
of inflation become of secondary Importance. A
large part of the productive output of the nation
must be appropriated for war purposes. Theoretically,
this appropriation could be paid for by taxes, in
which case there would be no inflation. However, a
war might prove unpopular, and the morale of the pub-
lic would undoubtedly fall if the aetrUal cost of the
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war were known. In 1917-1918 both England and
Germany were spending about 50^ of the national
income.^ No nation could take such a large pro-
portion of the national income in taxation. It
is always necessary to resort to other expedients
to raise money, and these expedients are inflationary.
If wages were kept at the same level and all revenue
were raised by texiation, real wages would drop sub-
stantially. If prices are allowed to rise, through
some inflationary means, and money wages do not rise
as fast as prices, real wages fall. Nevertheless,
the public is not aware of this drop in real wages,
as there is an illusion of increased wages. There
are more dollars in the pay envelope. Because of
the insurmountable political difficulties that would
be involved in lowering money wages, or of taxing
wages heavily, governments always let prices rise.
The day of reckoning comes later.
Under war conditions governments cannot
wait for goods, as the need is immediate. If this
urgent demand were paid for by money raised through
taxation, or by borrowing out of savings, there would
be a necessary decrease in the purchasing power of
those taxed, or of those whose savings had been de-
creased. However, governments cannot afford to be so
1. Money, Bank Credit and Prices
,
Lionel D. Edie, p.509.
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virtuous in fiscal matters during war times. Loans
are made directly from banks, or payments are made
in legal tender notes. In either case the media of
exchange are increased in volume, and since the
limited physical industrial capacity of the country
makes a corresponding increase in goods impossible,
prices rise.
The combination of competitive bidding by
the government and plenty of nev/ money in circulation
leads to a psychology of confidence similar to that
during a cyclical business boom. Manufacturers and
speculators bid against each other and a curamulative
spiral of rising prices, more money, and further
bidding by both government end business men develops.
With both government credit and bank deposits expand-
ing, and no apparent limit to war requirements, the
inflation feeds upon itself until the end of the war
or later.
Inflation in Neutral Countries
There are differences of opinion as to what
causes inflation in neutral countries during a great
war. Why did prices rise in the United States
between 1913 and 1917? The United States was not at
that time involved in war financing. There was cer-
tainly nothing unorthodox in American banking practice
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during those years, except that the new Federal
Reserve Act had been inaugurated. Some author-
ities hold that the great demand for goods is the
answer. There was a heavy demand, not only from
the warring countries, but also from neutral coim-
tries that were shut off from making purchases in
Europe. The favorable export balance of the United
States grew steadily during pre-vi/ar years. Since
the United States was about the only great indus-
trial area remaining from which Europe could draw
war materials, farm products and munitions were
shipped to the full extent of available tonnage.
A seller's market prevailed everywhere and almost
any price could be obtained for some products.
Meanwhile financial changes of great importance
were taking place. Gold and securities were flow-
ing into the United States in payment of the large
excess balance of exports. Monetary gold stocks
increased from $1,853,000,000 in August 1914, to
$3,105,000,000 in March 1917.^ The new Federal
Reserve System used this gold very efficiently.
Using the gold as a basis, the Federal Reserve
system rapidly expanded deposits end notes. By
March 1917, demand deposits had grovm to
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$7,537,000,000, end monetary circuletion to
$4,173,000,000.^ Now, whet caused prices to rise?
Willis end Chepmen hold that ”it is not et all neces-
sary to fall back upon the statistics of gold produc-
tion or importation or upon those of bank credit for
the years in question, in order to explain the ad-
pVance of commodity valuations." They would explain
the inflation entirely in terms of the unusual demand
for commodities. Warren and Pearson, on the other
hand, look for the expla.nation in the fact that "the
reduced demand for gold, because of the substitution
of paper currencies.... reduced the value of gold end
caused inflation in countries that continued on a gold
a
basis."'' Warren and Pearson also pointed out that be-
tween 1914 and 1917 monetary gold stocks in the United
States increased 70^. These authorities admit that it
was a mere coincidence that the increase in monetary
gold stocks in the United States so nearly approached
the percentage of increase in prices -- 62^. Doubt-
less the view expressed by Professor Edie is the con-
clusion more nearly correct:
1. The Economics of Inflation, Willis and Chapman,
p. 81.
2. Ibid
. ,
p. 84.
3. Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, p. 298.
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"The rise in prices was made possible
by this new purchasing power, after the way
had been prepared by the remarkable export
prosperity of the country."-*-
War Financing
1/Vhen the United States entered the World
War, the price level had already risen subst antially
.
The War requirements of the United States added tre-
mendously to the excessive demands that were already
being made on industry. The new supplies of gold and
plentifulness of lawful money in the reserves made
possible a great credit expansion. Price-fixing
measures were adopted in numerous essential products,
end these measures did, for a time, prevent prices
from soaring. The United States Treasury was prac-
tically empty at the beginning of the war in 1917.
Loans were placed immediately and the Federal Reserve
Banks helped materially in carrying these loans. When
a government borrows directly from a bank and the se-
curities are not sold to the public for savings, the
credit that is created is similar to the issuing of
legal tender notes. The method is different, but the
result is equally inflationary, except for certain
psychological factors. During the war, the public
debt was increased to approximately twenty-seven bil-
lion dollars. Billions of dollars of this government
1. Money, Bank Credit and Prices, Lionel D. Edie,
p. 314.
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debt were held by the banks, either in their own
account or as security for loans. Demand deposits
increesed to ^21,225,715,000.^ In addition to this
great expansion in purchasing power, the Federal
Reserve Banks issued about three billion dollars’
worth of Federal Reserve notes. Inflation in the
United States, therefore, seems to have depended
ultimately upon the expansible mechanism of the
Federal Reserve System.
The war inflations that G-ermeny, England,
and France experienced were fundamentally similar,
although the immediate financial causes were dif-
ferent owing to various money and banking customs.
Although Treasury Notes were increased by about
300.000. 000 pounds end Bank of England Notes by
120.000. 000 pounds, these notes did not cause the
inflation in England. It was rather the large sum
of deposit currency. The English system is not un-
like the American in this respect. France, on the
other hand, experienced a substantial inflation,
resulting almost entirely from a note issue. Paper
francs are the principle supply of money in France.
These were bank notes and not government notes, as
the Bank of France, like the Federal Reserve Banks,
was a private bank.
1. The Economics of Inflation, V^illis and Chapman,
p.""BT.
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Debt Burden ft Cessation of Hostilities
The cost of the war has been vpriously
estimated. One of the more conservative estimates,
which includes merely the outlays of governments,
comes to a figure of $275,000,000,000.^ We are so
accustomed to reading astronomical figures since the
war that they do not carry their full significance.
However, this staggering debt finally ViO?ecked the
monetary systems of every important country in the
world.
For a few months after the war it looked as
though history were going to be repeated. /s prices
in a number of countries fell slightly, it seemed that
the usual great deflation that followed the cessation
of hostilities after other wars was again going to
take place. In the United States, vt/holesale prices
receded about b%. But presently, governments began
to feel the pressure fi-om debt and from the heavy out-
lays necessitated by the return to peace. These out-
lays caused the further large-scale unbalancing of
budgets, the creation of more credit, end conseouently
peace-time inflation.
The relative amount of inflation in the
various countries during the war was mild compared
with the orgies of inflation that took place in
1 . A primer of Money
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Vi^oodward and Rose, p. 198.
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Centrsl Europe after the war. During the months fol-
lowing the signing of the Armistice in November 1918,
the flood of war expenditures subsided. However,
there were new and large financial burdens incident
to demobilization and the reconstruction of the devas-
tated areas of the continent. For obvious reasons,
the United States and England were spared some of these
heavy burdens. Germany end her allies were saddled
with an enormous reparations debt under the Treaty of
Versailles, and every country involved, felt the burden
of interest on debts accumulated during the war. After
other great wars of the past century, nations were able
to balance their budgets after the ending of hostilities,
but the unprecedented expenditures and destruction of
the World War made such a balt^ncing impossible.
At the close of the war price levels had al-
ready risen substantially:
TABLE IV
Price Levels of Five Countries
at Close of World War (a)
(1915-100)
Countries
Index
November
1918
Great Britain 229
United States 203
France 358
Italy 437
Germany 234
(a) Money, Bank Credit, and Prices
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Price Disparities, November, 1918
Not only had. the price level risen in the
various countries, hut there were also great price
disparities among the various price groups. Whole-
sale prices rose more sharply than other prices,
while rents and wages tended to lag. The cost of
living rose in about the same proportion as the gen-
eral average. Farm prices rose to great heights.
Inflation in particular products created a badly
unbalanced condition in the whole price system at
the close of the war.
Post-war Inflation -- France
In France, after a setback similar to that
in the United States in 1920-1921, a real business
recovery began. The volume of industrial output
doubled in three years. There were all of the ear-
marks of a business boom. During the years from 1922
to 192d wholesale prices in France rose from around
an index of 500 to about 800. Except for a brief
fall in prices in 1924, there was little or no break
in the steady rise. From 1921 to 1924 gold exchange
rates doubled. This post-war inflation in France was
probably caused by a combination of two factors. The
amounts of money in circulation increased steadily.
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and £3 industrial production ppproached capacity, the
volume of industrial output could not be increased
rapidly enough to offset the increases in the volume
of money. The budget continued unbalanced and the
government failed to raise by taxation sufficient sums
to cover expenditures.
For a few years following the war France
expected to collect large sums from Germany.
The Expectation of Reparations
France therefore had, in addition to an
ordinary budget, a separate budget of "Expenses
Recoverable under the Peace Treaties." Every specu-
lator in francs knew that the French budget depended
on Germany. Late in 1921 it began to appear that the
reparations payments were impossible. M. Briand’s
Government modified the terms of payment, but M.
Poincare, in the following year, took a less concil-
iatory attitude, and Germany's request for a morator-
ium in July 1922 was refused. The mark collapsed, and
in January 1923, the P’rench occupied the Ruhr coal
fields. J^s 8 result of this collapse of the mark, the
franc fell sharply, and by the end of 1923 it had
fallen to a value of only five cents. However France
did move steadily toward a balanced budget. How far
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France went in the matter of fiscel deficits may be
seen from the following table;
T /hLE V
Per Cent of Revenues of
France Obtained by Borrowing
'Year Per Cent
1919 79
1920 65
1921 55
1922 51
1923 48
1924 36
is) Money, Bank Credit and Prices , Lionel D. Edie,
p . 301 .
Balanced Budget, 1927
In 192b a Coalition Government, under
M. Poincare, imposed drastic new taxes which were
sufficient to balance the budget and to provide a
sinking fund. As f’rance moved toward a balanced bud-
get, the tax burden had to be increased. By 1927,
about 30^ of the national income was being collected
in taxes. If the burden of taxation had not been
increased, the franc would have collapsed as several
other European currencies had in earlier years. On
one day, during July 1926, the franc had fallen to a
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little etiove two cents in value. Early in 1927 the
gold exchange rate was stabilized, end the franc was
revalued at about one-fifth of its former value.
There was another element in the final
spectacular rise of prices in France that enters
into all such exceptional currency depreciation.
There was an element of fear. The ’’flight from
currency” was not so marked as in the case of Oermany
but a real seller’s market did develop, end as the
Value of the money shrunk steadily, buyers hastened
to get rid of it before prices rose still higher.
pfter the franc was stabilized in 1927, production
in France continued to still higher levels until 1930
France showed a great deal of financial
virtue in stabilizing at any level, in view of the
heavy costs of the reconstruction of her war-damaged
areas
.
Capacity Production and Unbalanced Budget
The fact that the supply of goods was lim-
ited was another contributing factor to inflation in
France. As France approached capacity production
after 1921 prices began to rise rapidly. The unbal-
anced budget alone would not have caused inflation if
it were possible to increase production step by step
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with increases in the media of exchange. The more
spectacular advances of commodity prices sometimes
come during the boom phase of the business cycle.
The strains of a boom period prevent e greet in-
crease in production, but do not prevent increases
in the relative qu^^ntity of the media of exchange.
There is doubt es to whether the restrictions on
production ere due to lack of physical capacity.
Estimates of capacity in recent years indicate that
booms have come long before the nation has reached
capacity. It is probable, therefore, that rigidity
in the industrial system and restriction on produc-
tion come from other sources. It is altogether
probable that monopolistic control of prices may
have something to do with the lack of flexibility
in production end the relative shortage in the sup-
ply of goods .
Germany
The monetary history of Germany between
1914 and 1924 affords us not only an example of the
horrors of inflation but also an exceptional oppor-
tunity to study, in enlarged form, the characteristic
phases of this price phenomena. In this particular
example the cause and effect relationships stand out
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more clearly thaxi is the ca^e in less violent price
upheavals. It is possible to trace each departure
from orthodox monetary practice, and its effect from
the time the war started until the vicious spiral of
rising prices finally carried the price index to
126,160,000,000,000 in December 1922.^
Vest Wealth Redistribution
One great advantage of the inflation was
that all internal debts, both public and private,
were wiped out. Prom the point of view of a patriot
who had lent the Government his life's savings this
was not an unmixed blessing. Insurance policies and
savings deposits became worthless. Government bonds
end the bonds of other public and private institutions
fell with the mark. Practically all members of the
middle class were ruined. According to the report
of the Second Committee of Experts under the Dawes
Commission, between seven and eight billions of gold
marks were acquired by the sale of paper marks to
2foreigners. But foreigners were not always on the
losing side. Many came into Germany with "hard"
money during the course of the inflation, end taking
advantage of the situation acquired huge amounts of
1. Money, Bank Credit and Prices
,
Lionel D. Edie,
p . 288.
2. Ibid., p. 347.
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real estate and other tangible property. The dis-
proportionate holdings of property by certain classes
is one of the excuses given for the unreasoned attacks
on nonrJ?ryen people in Germany since the rise of Hitler.
A few skillful manipulators became fabulously rich,
while great classes of the most substantial people of
Germany were literally robbed of their savings.
i^t the end of 1923 there were several kinds
of currency in circulation, but the authorized circu-
lation alone amounted to 518,000,000,000,000,000,000 --
518 billions of billions of marks. ^ The extent of the
currency depreciation has been illustrated by numerous
statistical statements. One will serve to show how
fantastic the changes in money value were. The total
mortgage debt of all Germany before the war amounted
to 40,000,000,000 marks. At the end of the inflation,
all of this debt could have been paid with one i^merican
cent . ^
Four Stages of German Inflation
For convenience the inflation in Germany may
be divided into four periods: first, from July 1914, to
November 1918, during which time the price level had a
little more than doubled; second, the interval from
1, A Primer of Money, Woodward and Rose, p. 159.
2. Ibid., p. 160.
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November 1918, to April 1921, when the Reparations
Commission fixed Germany's debt to the Allies at
132,000,000,000 marks. ^ The index of prices at
that time was a little under 1400. It had fallen
from a little above 1500 early in 1920.^ The third
period extended from April 1921 to January 1925,
when France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr coal
fields. In this period prices soared to an index
of 278,500. Finally, the period of complete collapse
between January 1923 and December 1923. A tabulation
of dates and index numbers shov/s graphically the
acceleration of the price spiral in each of the dif-
ferent stages;
TABLE VI
Index Numbers of Wholesale , x
Commodity Prices in Germany 1914-1923'®'
(1913-100
>
Date Index
November 1918 234
January 1921 1,440
January 1923 278,500
December 1923 128,160,000 ,000,000
(a) Money, Bank Credit and Prices, Lionel D. Edie
,
pp. 280, 300.
1. Kemmerer on Money
,
Edwin Walter Kemmerer, p. 77.
2. Inflation, Leonard P. Ayres, p. 17.
nOi'iv XiTO;A o/\6ieX 'isdmevoM
bi" ^cfsib b ' bsxX’i. noXfisX/nnioO
'
.
‘ r
5 ii >j©o i'*iq iO xft£)/tl edT . e^Ircii'^ COO < 000 < 000\ S’5X
ae'XXcdi Onn' .GOi^I ‘io.b.ojL; ©XJd'iX '.i ©xnlcf c^srii
MXfId ^>d*r fiX ooex '3VCCf.j aXJXXI a^’xTXO'i'i
,'^OGX OJ X29I Xl'iqA iiio-il bobxidJxs bol'ieq
X-'?oo irii/H erfJ jbelqL-oob tnuigiyS bna &onaiU neriw
xobrtX riB oh b©‘iaoa ee&X'iq boI*i©Q aldX nl ..ableil
©BqtiXXoo ©^©I'Tctoo to 3dX ^^iXanl^ .OOdtSVS iO
/tcIJsXjl^J.'^X a .SS9X 'I©bii3?>0^a DHii ";sex ^'xswnaO rtssw^ed
©db" ^XX'^bia'qs'i.V/ ^''^ode B^eciirojjii x©X>nI brtfi. aeXab lo
-qxb sda lo doa© nl I:^'iXqe ooX'iq anct lo noX-cJ'a'isXeooa
. 9
:3©3f:^8 qUQ'Xd'l
IV: 3aaa.T
. olasaXoifVi’ lo e/iS'iaio'U xebnl
'’^^SSieX-i‘X9I dX aeoi'i'l
(O0X-5X<jX)
^6Hi - © XeQ
xJiS 8X6X idJoisvoH
laeX ijiavA^^T,
oootavs
•
’ ' Sti^OX
oco /aco , oCx: , 03 X , 0 X ^Sex isbrnyoea
, eibCi .0 lafsoXJ ^e^oX'!'? bm Jlbe-iO xrt>^g (b)
_
^ ;SoS‘ roS'O Tqq
.
T?
. q ,»ie'X0£CiiiQ7{ 'teJ X-^'^' nXv-'bi , v^enoM ao *10igimeH . i.
.VI
.q ^Q&TlS .H biaho&d
Relatively Mild War Inflation (1914-1918)
At the outbreak of the war Germany did not
Impose new taxes. It was confidently expected that
the war would be short and that the enemy would pay
the bill. She therefore followed the policy that was
so popular with other warring powers, of obtaining
revenue through borrowing. When the opposition proved
more formidable than was expected and the war was pro-
longed, taxes were raised somewhat. But heavy borrow-
ing continued, and during the four years of w&r the
national debt Increased sixfold. Throughout the war
advances to the Government by the Relchsbank Increased
steadily. Loans from the Relchsbank were obtained
chiefly by the discounting of treasury bills. Paper
money Increased from about three billion marks to
twenty-nine billion at the end of November 1918. De-
mand deposits of the Relchsbank rose from 858,000,000
marks to 10,700,000,000 marks. ^ By the date of the
Armistice, bills held by the Relchsbank exceeded
2twenty billion marks.
Early Post-war Depreciation (1918-1921 )
This method of financing the v/sr In Germany
was, of course. Inflationary, but no more so than that
of France and Italy. In fact, price levels were higher
1. Kemmerer on Money
,
Edwin Walter Keramerer, p. 76.
2. Currency and Credit, R. G. Hawtry, p. 405.
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at the end of the war in both France and Italy than they
were in Germany. However, shortly after the ^armistice
was signed, an acute budgetary crisis developed in
Germany. The shock of defeat, and the social discon-
tent of the returning soldiers, made it difficult, even
impossible, to raise much revenue by taxation. There
was already fear of inflation and those who could buy
bonds would not do so. Therefore, there was really no
alternative to further borrowing, and the balancing of
the budget was postponed until the revolutionary atti-
tude of the public could be modified. Considering the
fact that there was a depression in Germany in 1919,
it is amazing that the extent of the inflation was as
great as it was. It is probable that in spite of the
increase of purchasing power, the Industrial machine
could not be adjusted quickly enough to peace require-
ments. There must have been shortages, probably n\mi-
erous "bottle necks," which prevented the speeding up
of production to meet the increased demand. This sit-
uation was reflected in the demand for foreign goods.
When the blockade was lifted, nine months after the
close of the war, Germans began to import frantically
to fill shortages of foreign goods of all sorts.
Leonard ^jres believes that the existence of enlarged
io bne
U1 .n^iid' -c-U-iX dJc6 nl
oo..Me:;ri^ edJ ,'ieve^oH .TraorieO ai. ©'iijw
nl l)fiqol6v^'.ib aicX'Xo e*XL''Oi5 .beri;^ie sew
~acDSi*5 I:i3^ooe b«B'^vd6'i©D iC- .Titfcjitri^-L
ne>v;A ,ll0»mib Jl ,s»tetfoi03 strrlnwjs'T ad.t lo
‘ai/navs-'j: a&iiE'i. o- ^^xdj.deo’qjal
'^0d blroc c£lM ^^^crii3 liriE lo ‘ieal
on v;XX.E:3n ;s^iedct’ .oe ob ^crr blno^' onncd
7.0 ^nZon^Igd sxl:i bm:^ ,gal:wcn'rod isrijn,n'i ccr ^jvi.U^n’recrla
“Xsj^s Y'^anoX^iJlotrtd't' g'il'.^ li.d'rri- fooncqitaoQ, esw Jggbo'O &il7
e'K.t r.uil’iabIgno'D .baXlibcffi ed bXnca oXIdnq an? to abn?
,
0/.^/ iib ' .nl .rroie«e':q5?b b aa^ o'lad-t ?Bd? ?nal
BB B£iW nol^anm ad? lo ?na?xa enct ?Bfi? shIsbisib ei Ji
8xij Ic &:?7qA nl ©Idebonq al ?I .sb%'- ?! ea nsans
©nidOBxn lai'idanbni ©d? ./rawoq snls.'^do'n/q Ic ©eaenonl
-an.lu'pa'i ao>f,ag. o;t i%nons •^I5i0lnp beS'^Mlb^ sci jon bluoo
-lisjui ’i?;Xv3Bdo*r:i .ga5,3dicrig naecf svBrt a'isri'i’ .adnsrfi
qn 5nlfcr^.«^qg ' beJnev-Q^iq dol.dw , gjrfoen aXddod"” sncn©
-die sliiT *-b.dECtab •baBao'ion'l an? ?©Of!i o? fiol^onbo'xq 7c
, gboog oj,Ie*ro7 'lol .bfiamab add- nl baloalla*'! sb%- nci?/^n
Oil? *Ta?la &ji*q.o:n ©xiln ab^iioold axl>^ naxi¥«
YXXBal?rtB*x7 7'^ioqxsil c? ciBgad .anarsi'ial) ,*XB5i’' ad? io as<. Io
.8?iOB XI :3 Ic aboog 'io so^adncna 1X17 c?
b6,i^,^i3 Xno 7o 6ons?Blxa ©ill dBd? aa'volX-Ad bo‘I'^4 bn^fioad
stocks of money need not result in serious and pro-
gressive price advances if depression prevails.^ If
;?yres' opinion is sound, it must have been the dis-
organized condition of German industry that permitted
the coincidence of a "business depression and inflation
at the Same time.
Reparations Commission (1921-1925)
Between the spring of 1920 end the spring of
1921, conditions in Germany improved. Production in-
creased rapidly and the mark experienced period of
repose. In fact, prices receded for about a year.
The recession was largely the result of renewed confi-
dence in the maj?k. The tax reforms of 1920 were be-
ginning to bear fruit. The public began to buy treas-
ury bills and the "flight from the currency" ceased.
In /pril 1921, the Reparations Commissions fixed the
debt to the /Hies. The first large cash payment of
a billion gold marks had to be paid before September
of that year. Neither the small reserves in the hands
of the Government nor the current tax receipts were
adequate to meet the payment. Germany had either to
raise the money on short term credits or to sell paper
marks in the foreign exchange markets. It is a debat-
able question as to whether Germany should have, or
1. Inflation, p. 21.
-orcq >C:inj£4 fcuo,JLT:oe ni itIus&T ;fon hf^en
.^Xi: . «Xi«.v§»^q. aoJt&Pie'Xc^^b li .'2.^oijovb‘5 QOl'tq, '^vt He&z^
-'eXb ii&ed eviiii Jeuuf :fl tbiujos al^nolniqc .’e9'i*{fe
\;T.rBijr/ni rrom^isO lo nolcribnoo' besifia^'ic
noIJ'^XXji.f bfiB noicae'iqob Geen^ax/cf ^ 16 eonobionloo
• erais? esi'^.a edJ’ 'J(i
i^S^d-LX L) rpoleelcmoO eitoi'trt^Y.^^q^fl
lo ^srr/'iq':. ?^.dcf bng 029X 16 ^ni/ira aril ne&iribd'
-fil -'lolloifJbo^l U'-oiro'tciMl: aao'lllbaoo .iI2QI
lo bobwq ^ b&on»l^&qx^ '-3£^i>^m ndf YXbiq'i's jbeaGf*"io
iirocf^s 'tol b6b6oei 3^‘olnq ^qo'^‘^ al •saoqb'i
".tinea fc6?^GneT: lo ^Isjr.s^i edl saw itolaeao©*! ©dX
~od ©a©?/ 02$I lo p.i'tnc'lo'x' X'c3 j &dV ,>i'£iim ©dl til .©oneJb
<^'1' nt?.|5od' olldtjq y'dT .iix 'il *ts66 61 gninnls'
• beat’so' <:6fT©-i'ii/D © ii rroil lfl;glll'‘ 6x11 b ns? alild" ^lu
©dJ &9X11 cfTple* .tlTf.xn bnolTrs'i^q©]^^' -lot • XilqA, nl
16' I ddf .aelXlA sal Oo Id©!)
siolati blxjq sd ol bad a::^'i.3iir'^JbIo§ noillld b
HbnBii eriJ jiX aevneeSd IlaciS -^U iBdl lo
©nsW; sdqXeoQ'i xnu laa-x'ixro f)do lort lassrinnevoi) ed^ lo
c'J ^’isdile B^rl ljn/^x!rxsx) ©ai 4©&m oJ sd^apabt?.
'roqr<q IXsQ cd no- abXUa'ia '«rxod ildbda no d^eno/n ari^ s«le*i
-1-^cfoL' a- eX d"! .eJe^tnxiWte^aaaoXs 'ag'Xtfnol Srlcr al aain^nt
no tSv^d blobii'a Yda/n'isO 'lexfXedw od bb noidEai/p ©IdB
;
.
'
.
'
.12, .q ,aClJi'.IlnX .1
could hgve reised, more money from trxes. Prom 1921
to th.e final collepse of the mark in December 1923,
by yearly borrowing Germany increased the per cent
of revenue obtained.^ In the latter part of 1923,
99.9% of its revenue was raised by borrowing, Hawtry
says that Germany did not comply with the primary con-
2dition that she should budget for her liabilities.
In this connection Lionel Edie cited Seligman to show
that taxes in Germany were lower than those in the
United Kingdom during the entire period from 1918 to
1924. In 1921-1922 the estimated percentage per cap-
ita taxes of per capita income in Germany was 23^,
while in the United Kingdom it was Z0%.^ Since the
deficit in 1921-22 was b
,
bOO, 000, 000 gold marks, it
is very probable that adequate additional taxes could
not possibly have been levied. In any case, if Germany
paid the huge sums that were required in reparations
payments, it would have been necessary for Germany to
create enormous export surpluses. Considering the
tariff history of the past twenty-five years it would
have become increasingly difficult to raise surplus.
Furthermore, the great deflation of prices in the
1. Money, bank Credit and Prices, Lionel D. Edie, p, 298
2. Currency and Credit
,
G. Kawtry, p. 42b.
3. Money, Bank Credit end Prices
,
Lionel D. Edie, p. 299
4. Ibid
.
,
p. 299, John Parker Young cited.
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Unitea States in 1920 had increased the gold value
of the dollar. The growth of the value of the dollar
made it more difficult for all countries to sell in
the United States; all international debts conse-
quently became more burdensome.
Occupation of Ruhr and Final Collapse
In July 1922, Germany asked for a morator-
ium, but Prance refused; the following January, France
end Belgium occupied the Riihr coal fields in a desper-
ate attempt to make Germany pay. This move set off
the most spectacular stage of the inflation. The speed
and the proportions of the price rise in 1923 exceeded
anything that the vi/orld had ever seen. The term
"velocity" is correctly and appropriately used to des-
cribe what happened. A sort of "hyperinflation" pre-
vailed, a situation in which the percentage of price
advances exceeded the proportional increase in the
quantity of money issued. No one wanted money and
no one wanted anyone else to owe him money. There
was literally a buyers’ panic. Prices were marked
up hourly and the "flight from money" was so great,
that goods were bought regardless of their utility
to the purchaser and merely to get rid of the money
before it depreciated further. Foreign holders of
marks dumped them on the market to save something
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out of a bad speculation. Late in 1923 interest
rates rose to 20% per diem. Finally, the Government
redeemed the paper marks at the rate of one rentenmrrk
to 1,000,000,000,000 paper marks. Warren and Pearson
point out one more interesting fact in connection with
this extraordinary series of events. Germany did not
deflate I While she did experience all of the worst
evils of a greet inflation, she was spared the agony
of a deflation. The stabilization took place at the
fantastic price level attained at the end of the
inflation.^ Vi/het goes up, must come down? apparently
not .
1. Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, p. 293.
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CHAPTER VII
peace-time inflation
Inflation 1920
"Although the United Ststes was on the gold
standard during the v»rhole of the World Wer, the in-
flation was greeter than that which occurred during
the Civil War when the greenbacks were issued.”^
Prices had risen to an index of 199 in November 1918.
After the signing of the Armistice there was an imme-
diate halt in the inflationary movement, which would
have come to an abrupt end at that time but for the
financial policies of the Treasury Department and the
Federal Reserve. The Treasury advanced loans aggre-
gating $2,500,000,000 to various foreign countries.^
At the same time there were shortages of goods in all
parts of the world, including the United States, wher
a number of industries had been neglected because of
the war. The huge loans to foreign countries, there-
fore, added to the scarcity of goods in the United
States as the loans really took the form of exported
goods. If these goods had represented exportable sur
pluses no inflation would have occurred. As things
1. Cold and Prices
,
Warren end Pearson, p. 298.
2. The Economics of Inflation
,
Willis end Chapmen,
p. 86.
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stood, however, these shortages ceused s typicel boom
with all of the symptoms of reel infletion. While
wages were high end rising, people complained of the
high cost of living, end wages did not keep up with
rising prices. There was continuetion of war-time
profiteering and great speculation, particularly in
commodities .
•^Easy Money" Policy, 1919
The rise in the price level was supported
by the relatively easy money policy of the Federal
Reserve banks. While long end short-term interest
rates were high, the Federal Reserve kept the redis-
count rates down to 4 end 4-^^. Reserve balances rose
from |;l, 520,000,000 in November 1918, to $1,820,000,000
in December 1919. During the same period demand depos-
its rose from $12,724,000,000 to $15,994,000,000, rep-
resenting an increase of more than $4,000,000,000.
Prices rose from an index of 190 in February 1919 to a
high peak of 244 in May 1920.^
Irresponsible Government Inflation
It Wes not without warning that the Federal
Reserve banks followed a policy of easy money during
1919. Many of the officials of the System had grave
1. The Economics of Inflation
,
Willis and Chapman,
p . 85 .
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misgivings. At verious tixnes during 1919 proposals
were made to raise the discount rate, but there was
strong opposition from the Treasury Department. The
Secretary of the Treasury wanted a low interest rate
to facilitate the floating of the Liberty Loen.^ A
higher discount rate would have depressed the bond
market before the bonds could be sold to the public.
At the request of the Treasury Department, therefore,
the Federal Reserve postponed raising the rate until
January 1920. Twelve million patriots oversubscribed
the issue at 4^^. Twelve million patriots were
cheated, deliberately cheated, by the cooperation of
the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve banks.
Interest rates were held down with the intention of
raising them when the Liberty Loan issue was sold.
Because of the developing deflation, many of those
who bought government bonds at par were forced to
sell them a few months later below 80 -- involving
a loss of 20^ within a few months’ time.
The conniving of government financiers in
rigging the Liberty Loan market was reprehensible in
itself, and the consequences to the subscribers were
serious. However, the ultimate losses to the nation
were far greater than these losses to the subscribers
1. Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 217.
2. Money, Bank Credit and Prices, Lionel D. Edie, p.
504.
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of the loen. Federal Reserve authorities knew that
the easy money rates were contributing to a serious
inflation which was primarily caused by the great de-
mands for goods in both domestic and foreign markets,
demands which exceeded the capacity of industry.
Capacity would have been greater at that time, but
for the development of numerous "bottlenecks" in the
form of special shortages, which held up production
in other lines. Long before 1920, there was grave
need for contraction. A relatively mild contraction
would have been enough to stabilize prices on a lower
level. The unbalanced condition of American industry
would have corrected itself and the "bottlenecks"
would have been eliminated. Production could then
have been speeded up to a higher level without reach-
ing capacity so soon. Instead of following a more
timely policy of contraction, and one that Federal
Reserve officials clearly recognized as imperative,
the Board postponed action until January 1920, at
which time discount rates were raised from 4-f^ to 6%
in five of the twelve reserve districts. Two weeks
later rates were raised to 6% in ell districts. Ex-
cept for a few agricultural commodities, prices con-
tinued to rise until May.
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Untimely Deflation
Most students of the subject agree that
some deflation was urgently needed and that the defla-
tionary measures should have been taken at a much
earlier date, but the blood-letting operation that
was subsequently performed was hardly necessary. The
Inflation was largely economic and not financial,
caused by a shortage of goods and only incidentally
by an over supply of money. By May 1920, reserves of
the Federal Reserve banks had fallen to about 42^
Uow that the Treasury Department no longer objected
to a higher interest rate and other deflationary
devices the fear of the gold coverage seems to have
been a most powerful factor in determining Federal
Reserve policy. Officials became hysterical. There
was fear for the convertibility of bank obligations.
The gold coverage seems to have been more important
to the Board than was the welfare of the country.
Coercion of Member Banks
At a meeting of the Federal /dvisory Council
and the Class "j\" Directors of the Federal Reserve
Board, held on May 18, 1920, a resolution was passed
declaring for contraction of money end credit. Mr.
John Skelton Williams, Comptroller of the Currency,
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explained to the l^te John Simpson his efforts to
prevent the drawing of the resolution. He said:
”I told the other members of the
board, 'Do you know that this will break
lots of little country banks?’
"They cold-bloodedly answered me;
'They ought to break -- there are too
many of them.
'
"I then told them, 'Don't you know
it's going to ruin lots of farmers?' and
they cold-bloodedly replied to me; 'They
ought to be ruined -- they are getting
too prosperous; they v/ill not work.'" ^
The above-mentioned meeting was held in
secret and was concealed from the public for over
tvjo years. W.P.G. Harding, who presided, warned the
bankers present to hold the proceedings of the meet-
2ing in sacred secrecy. Governor Harding called for
"sacrifices" on the part of the public, "to bring
about normal and healthy liquidation." Under orders
from the Federal Reserve Board, a veritable mania for
deflation developed throughout the coimtry. On June 1
the discount rate was raised to Banks were dis-
couraged from making loans and switched to a policy
of unloading government obligations. Member banks
were urged to create a stringency of credit. Anyone
1. Congressional Record
,
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75rd Congress 1st “Session
, p. 2740.
2. Ibid . , Congressional Board .
3. i«iuoted in Stable Money, Irving Fisher, p. 218.
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v;ho has a shedow of doubt as to the ability of the
Federal Reserve Board to create a "healthy deflation"
should reed the literature of the twelve months follow-
ing June 1920. Few had realized the power of the Board.
In a surprisingly short time they had created a rigorous
deflation, had put the dollar on a "sound" gold basis,
and had ruined millions of ismerican citizens.
Thoroughgoing Deflation
According to Willis and Chapman, "the panic
of 1920 was nipped in the bud through well considered
action by the banking authorities."^ This is surely
a classic masterpiece of understatement. A young and
virile Federal Reserve System had its first deflation
job to do and had to demonstrate to "old timers" that
a good job could be done. Even the most ardent of
gold-standard deflationists abroad agreed that it was
a most thoroughgoing deflation. The United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics index of wholesale commod-
ity prices fell in thirteen months from 244 to 156.
The Board must have been hypnotized by the idea of
maintaining the gold coverage. There were still war
shortages everywhere and yet production had to be
curtailed for over a year to protect the gold cover-
age. The 7^ rate and other restrictions were
1. The Economics of Inflation
,
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maintained long after prices had fallen well below
a desirable level. Such measures were no longer
anti-inflationary. Disastrous deflation had set in.
The 1% rate was maintained until May 1921. It was
then cautiously reduced to
Refusals of Loans to Farmers
Any policy adopted by the Federal Reserve
Board and followed by thousands of the leading banks
of the country is bound to be effective. In 1920-1921
hundreds of thousands of farmers lost their farms and
millions of workers lost their jobs because, according
to Congressman Swing, of California, bankers were being
ordered by the Federal Reserve to stop dlscoun.ting
paper. ^ Deputy Governor W. A. Day, of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Fransisco, told the bankers of
Southern California, assembled at El Centro, that they
were not to loan to any, farmer any money for the pur-
pose of enabling the farmer to hold any of his crops
beyond harvest tirae. If they did, he said, the
Federal Reserve bank would refuse to rediscount a
single piece of paper on such transactions. He
declared that all the farmers should sell all their
crops at harvest time unless they had money of their
own to finance them, as the Federal Reserve bank would
1. Congressional Record
,
May 23, 1922, Vol. 12, Part 7,
6Vth Congress, 2d Session, p. 7517.
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do nothing toward helping farmers hold back any part
of their crop, no matter what the condition of the
market . ^
Congressman Swing, who was present at the
meeting, was vividly impressed by this direct appli-
cation of '‘moral suasion." Commenting before the
House of Representatives on May 23, 1922, he said;
"No one could be in doubt for one
minute as to what the natural, logical,
and necessary consequences of such pol-
icy would be. If the entire crop of the
country is thrown on the market at the
time of harvest, of course the market
would be depressed. You can ’bear’ the
market, or you can ’bull’ the market.
The Federal Reserve Bank deliberately set
out to ’bear’ the market. They succeeded
so well that they broke the market -- not
only broke the market, but broke the
farmer as well."^
If the powers of the Federal Reserve Board
could be used to injure the nation by causing the
price level to rise and to whipsaw the same price
level down into a cruel deflation, we need no further
proof that these powers were adequate to stabilize the
price level. Clearly the System could raise or lower
the price level at will. Whether or not they should
be trusted to do this in the public interest without
mandatory rules is another matter.
1. Congressional Record
,
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Part 7, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 7517.
2. Ibid.
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Mind Reeders gnd the Federal Reserve
Speculators in stocks end coramodities today
complain that they must be mind readers in order to
trade successfully. They must know what the president
intends to do next. There is nothing novel about the
plight of the poor speculator. Not only speculators,
but also business men of all kinds -- retailers, whole-
salers, manufacturers, farmers -- since 1913, have had
to gamble on the next move of the Federal Reserve
authorities. Some years ago Bradstreet’s published a
list of reasons for business failures. The list should
be revised with at least honorable -mention given to the
Federal Reserve Board.
The writer, who was in business in 1920,
knew nothing about the tremendous pov/er over the price
level possessed by the Federal Reserve System. Need-
less to say, after taking heavy inventory losses during
that year in an otherwise very successful retail busi-
ness, the writer got out of business, still unaware
that the opinions of Governor Harding of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston had anything to do with the
business depression.
Reconstruction and Disequilibrium
To understand properly the disillusionment
of the years following 1928, it is well to review the
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progress mede during the preceding decade. In 1919,
the outlook wes dark. Millions of workers had been
either killed or disabled. There were shortages of
food and raw materials. There were still revolutions
taking place in several of the countries that had been
at war. liVhat seemed irreparable losses of physical
property existed in the areas where the war had been
fought and elsev/here staggering debts for reparations
end war loans had to be paid. There was work to be
done, but industry was disorganized and chaotic con-
ditions prevailed in the financial and exchange mar-
kets, There were many who looked for the decline of
vVestern civilization.
However, universal bankruptcy did not take
place, and the gloomy forecasts made in 1919 were not
fulfilled. Within a few years most of the physical
damage had been repaired. By 1925, the yearly total
of production exceeded that of 1913 by 18^. This in-
crease in production was 12^ greater than the increase
in population, so the standard of living of necessity
rose automatically. Even in Europe, the average man
was again enjoying the standard of living that he had
enjoyed in 1913.^ Industrial progress from 1925 to
1929 was even more remarkable. New construction in
the United States between 1925 and 1928 amounted to
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$38,000,000,000, an average of $800,000,000 a month
for forty-eight months.^ Unfortunately, progress was
somewhat retarded by the fact that several nations
had returned to the gold standard. The United States
during this period merely ’’pretended" to maintain a gold
standard,'^ It was not clearly recognized at first that
progress was being made abroad in spite of the gold
standard. The almost phenomenal increase in produc-
tion, due mostly to technical progress and to adequate
credit obtainable in the United States, was to some ex-
tent credited to the gold standard. By 1929, the stand-
ard of living in Europe as well as in the Western world
was very much higher than in 1913.
Agricultural Inflation
From 1916 to 1920 farm prices rose very rap-
idly. During the greater part of the wa-.r farmers en-
joyed an unprecedented prosperity. In comparison with
the general price level, farm products were very high.
During this inflation of farm prices, land values in
the farming areas also rose. Many business men, as
well as farmers, thought that the higher prices of
farm land were j as t ifled, and that high prices for
farm goods would be permanent. Had high prices for
farm goods continued, it would have more than justified
1. Unemployment as a World-Problem
,
John Maynard Keynes,
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2. Monetary Reform
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John Maynard Keynes, p. 215.
f, ',K>thor»
•> 'io ,C-0,<?-.O.OOC,S5^
.•^a^Uncm ‘lol
\:cf X©i5'u? JJ6i
sb^^iaa- ©e^inTXvM^ Moj, od' i;^iX
I'<;£t5s rii ,. C'tf ‘X^©Xa6^0*iQ”
Snl^X
rj%
:i&xi4.:^mri US l36;5.X4*?i^'0©’i ^I'X^i&lo 5o«- ©«w «il
'•.b'xato^fs
bli^'^i t^ s.nie rri^Mo'X'ti^ . giilstl «s^w e-ecr^ci^i
-os.fa€’'‘X<i .nl « ®E
^
'ii«'OS«tsi' ©£i’^'
pxi. *xrt ,r£c ‘a
•Uba'xo
•tos:© a?ier ;-,tSr:- Mo|j. ox£^. fcatir^s-io uxiei
•XX^ow ep .XsX' ;?<|oajjS' bX aixXvlI to b%»
'’
.
nl ix.'Xct ^'Xw'v e«w
irS"' >.. .
.»
-
•
*.'‘*iV ’ V
‘
'
-^--
.
•
. ''7T'
~rml saO^i tiiyoXt^X. ,*•
noljaXlal Ia/x;j-tXuoI_«^
^-
'
c;t dl^X rxcj‘i^
-rta e'laa-fxs^t ‘law /'Xo^^
-gnl^t^a .tJXjx
/lilw rtoal’X^awoi -^xI .
fi0 b^xol
•
tXavsi
,
aoX'xq Xfl'ienaa oxl^
nX &aul^v X,mX t ''t<5
.?‘©:0^ fesXj?;- a^e'ia, ^bIxh'ik ^
’•'
'
' .'•••.*,'•
^ A •
• i •
'
'
.
. f.
•to Baoi-iq, 'xwisM ita E'*
'lol sBoi'iq, ngirf j'aild %‘n'i . ..tentiiaat eiew ijn-»X
i.:”i--! i
^lot aeoltq' 4^4d-^ . 00 feXxrow aXooa ^^-it
X)s:mxsxr| Bi=4iu- »qo^ ft V^ii; l)Xixo^, X . bcd «x>ooa rrmt
seati'X i-ifttifl^ot:
^
.ai£- .0 ,a©iT?©K
‘
151
the rise in ferm land velues v/hich, in 1920, averaged
ehout 10% higher then pre-war levels. Some fermers
were fortunete in selling their lend et the higher
levels, but during the ere of speculation in lend,
meny of them borrowed heavily in order to extend their
ferming operations. This speculetive movement wes
supported by lerger end larger mortgages from the
benks upon the advice of the bankers.
Agricultursl Deflation
During the wer period, v;ages end other costs
of living rose with the increase of lend values. In
1920, an index of prices received for ferm products
had risen to 205; whereas, a similar index for wages
paid to hired farm labor, had risen to 239.^ Taxes,
freight rates, and other costs also rose, but during
the period of higher prices, farmers were imusuelly
prosperous. .Vhen prices fell during 1920 end later,
other costs fell less rapidly. The price of ferm
machinery and supplies and the other items mentioned
declined, but did not reach such proportionately low
levels as did farm products. Prices received for ferm
products fell 53^ by 1927, idiile prices paid by farmers
for commodities bought declined only 34:'^.^ As prices
1. The Economics of Inflation
,
Willis and Chapman
,
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2. Ibid., p. 167.
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fell it became prectically impossible to sell farm
lands and the large mortgage indebtedness on land
purchased at high prices, ruined hundreds of thou-
sands of farmers. Some used the large profits of
the war period to retire indebtedness, but they were
a small minority. Perm land finally sank to 27^ be-
low pre-war values.^ There were times when farm
products could not be sold for the costs of produc-
tion. In some cases, the prices obtained in the
markets were lower than marketing costs. If this
condition had continued, farm lands would ultimately
have been valueless.
The whipsawing of farm prices during the
war and post-war periods was due to forces entirely
.
beyond the control of the farmers. /s a group they
might have been more cautious about speculation in
land, but like others during the seme period, they
failed to recognize that the then prevailing condi-
tions would be short-lived. Other forces were also
beyond the control of the farmer. Mechanization was
advancing in grain production as well as in other
branches of industry. By mechanization the output
per man increased enormously, but the market did not
broaden correspondingly. The demand for food is
1. Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, p. 383.
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inelastic. While technical improvements in the manu-
facture of motor cars, accompanied "by lower prices,
will increase the number of units sold rapidly, the
same degree of improvements and felling prices do not
increase the demand for food correspondingly. The
point of satiety is reached very quickly with neces-
sities. Men’s appetite for food does not make for
indefinite increases in demand. It is interesting to
note, for example, that the per capita annual consump-
tion of wheat flour in the United States has not been
increasing. In fact, since 1889 it has fallen steadily
from ki24 pounds to 175 pounds in 1929.^
The depression in grain-producing areas has
been world-wide. The main cause was the world’s much
greater capacity to produce agricultural products.
After 1925 there was another important influence on
the prices of agricultural products that entered the
world markets. Agricultural economists have claimed
that the price of American wheat, cotton, and other
farm products was determined in Liverpool. The con-
tinuing deterioration of the economic structure in
the agricultural sections was supposed to be due to
the fact that price levels for farm products were
artificially kept below the cost of production.
1. Recovery, the Second Effort, Sir /rthiu? Salter,
p. 58.
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Vtoile there is some basis for the point of view, it
is incorrect to essiome that the price of any world
product is determined in Liverpool. Naturally, the
supply of wheat in the provincial markets has a
great deal to do with the world price of wheat. If
the supply of wheat offered in Winnipeg or in Chicago
increases, there is an immediate effect on all of the
great grain markets of the world. Prices are adjusted
by matched selling and buying orders as quickly as tele-
graphic orders can be communicated. These arbitraging
transactions keep the various markets for world products
at about the same level. It is more accurate to say
that the grain-producing areas determine the price of
wheat in Liverpool than to assume that the price is
fixed by some diabolical scheme in the Liverpool mar-
ket -- an assumption freouently implied.
)iVhen countries were on the traditional gold
standard, and gold was allowed to flow freely between
countries, price levels throughout the world tended
to be equalized. What the agricultural economists
probably wanted was devaluation in terms of other
currencies, a practice which would undoubtedly have
led to competitive devaluation.
When various countries returned to the gold
standard, and followed a restrictive money policy
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thereafter, foreign price levels fell. This did have
an important effect on the prices of itoerican commod-
ities, such as cotton and wheat, that sold in a world
market .
Reparations and Borrowed Funds
There v;ere causes of disequilibrium other
than the fall of agricultural prices. Orthodox finan-
ciers, who thought that the reparations end war debt
questions were settled, proved to be very badly mis-
taken. The real situation was somewhat disguised by
the unusual prosperity in the United States. The
prosperity after 1924 in Central Europe was due to
huge loans from ismerica. It was a very real prosper-
ity and production did rise. However, it was dependent
upon continuous and very large streams of jfimerican cap-
ital. The flow of Capital from America could not go on
forever and when, because of lack of confidence, or be-
cause of capital demands elsewhere, the flow was cut
down, it became apparent that conditions were not as
sound as the experts had supposed. By 1928, it was
apparent that it was going to be difficult for Germany
to get the foreign exchange necessary for reparation
payments. The net import of foreign capital into
Germany from 1925 to 1928 amounted to the unbelievably
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large sum of 15,000,000,000 gold marks. This sura
exceeds the total amount paid in reparations right
up to the Moratorium in 1951.^
Inflation 1929
The period between 1927 end 1929 proved
to be 8 critical period. It is probable that the
vsrious maladjustments could have been corrected had
it not been for the stupid financial juggling of the
period. Europe was struggling under the weight of the
gold standard. The United States, until 1927, was not
so burdened. Not only was there plenty of gold, but
it made no difference that there was. The gold had
been sterilized by the action of the Federal Reserve
banks. Governor Strong, of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, had dominated the policy of the Federal
Reserve banks and his policy was one of stabilization.
In Europe, on the other hand, there was reaction.
Money flowed to the United States. In order to re-
verse the flow, the discount rates in various coun-
tries were raised. In fact, what amounted to compet-
itive bidding in this matter of increased discount
rates took place all over Europe. Each country was
Interested in protecting its gold. The higher bank
1. Recovery, the Second Effort
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rates naturally had e depressing effect on business
everywhere on the Continent end in England. A higher
bank rate end consequent felling prices was always a
sure recipe for a business depression, the price that
countries had to pay to stay on the gold stendprd.
Federal Reserve’s "Easy Money*' Policy, 1927
In the spring of 1927, Montagu Norman, end
other officials of European Central banks, visited
the United States. They apparently persuaded Federal
Reserve officials to follow an easy money policy.
Such a policy was inflationary. This was supposed
to help European countries to stay on the gold stand-
ard. It would have the effect of encouraging imports
into the United States, thus encouraging trade abroad.
A number of Jmerican financiers, including Sprague,
had favored a lower discount rate for other reasons.
There had been a decline in v/holesele prices since
the summer of 1926. In /ugust 1927, discount rates
were lowered and, as early as May, the System had
resumed open market purchases: 220,000,000 dollars'
worth of securities were purchased in the open mar-
ket between May end November. Open market purchases
are made with credit which is directly created for the
purpose, thus increasing the total supply of money or
credit. This creation of new funds invariably has
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had sn inflationary or anti-defIstion^ry effect.
The purchsses m&de in 1927 were no exception, hut
from thft time until 1929 the increased quantity
of credit unfortunpt ely encouraged pn inflationery
move of extraordinary proportion in the stock mprket.
The Federal Reserve hanks found it necessary to re-
verse the open market policy to curb the speculative
outburst of early 1928: 400,000,000 dollars’ worth of
securities were sold in the open market. Discount
rates were raised from 3-g-^ to 4%, Later in 1928 the
rate was again raised to 4^^, These anti-inflationary
steps were taken without regard for business and indus-
try. The earlier policy of stabilizing the commodity
price level was being abandoned in an attempt to sta-
bilize the manipulated activities of the stock exchange.
Contradictory Objectives
There were too many contradictory objectives
entering into the policy of the Federal Reserve Board.
The original purpose of the Federal Reserve let, to
accommodate business, was being set aside. Further-
more, when action was taken, it was usually taken too
late and sometimes carried too far. Sprague felt that
the defects of the System were not so much a matter of
positive errors as they were a matter of hesitant action.
1. Stabilization Hearings on H.R. 11806 (1928), cited
in Stable Money , Irving Fisher, p. 252.
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Attempt to Curb Speculation
^Vlifit the System should, do was warmly dis-
puted in 1929. Commodity prices were falling, but
the main preoccupation of the Federal Reserve was the
stock market. The most sensational securities boom
in history was taking place. By ell indexes, there
should have been a reaction long before. Stock prices
were, however, being carefully manipulated and the pub-
lic was being encouraged to buy at fantastically high
prices. Five per cent could have been obtained on
safe bonds, but the public was coaxed to buy stocks
on borrowed money. Some of the stocks were yielding
less than 2^ in dividends and money rates were at times
above 10;^. The common stock of Radio Corporation sold
as high as -$540.00 a share. Later it fell to $2.50.
At the height of the speculative mania call rates had
risen to 12^. Higher rates in the American money mar-
kets attracted money from Europe to take advantage of
the exceptional return. Each country tried to protect
its funds by raising its own discount rates. This had
the effect of further depressing industrial conditions
in Europe .
In spite of the excesses that were taking
place in the stock market, there were many bankers and
economists who felt that it was of no concern to the
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Federal Reserve. It was feared that to curb specula-
tion by raising rates and by taking other deflationary
measures would produce a decline in commodity prices
and bring on a business depression, p business depres-
sion is a high price to pay to correct a speculative
boom in the security markets. Mong those who objected
to meddling by the Federal Reserve were Carl Snyder and
Gustav Cassel. Carl Snyder, heed of the Statistical
Department of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, thought
that the speculation in the stock market was no concern
of the Federal Reserve Bank. Mr. Gustav Cassel felt
that raising the rediscount rates would deflate commodity
prices and create unemployment.^ Senator Glass seems to
have been on the right side for once. He also objected.
He said: "Why do you apply the rediscount rate to a
condition of the sort and penalize the legitimate com-
merce in order to control something you say you have no
O
right to control?" Other leading monetary economists
and financiers warned that an attempt on the part of
the Federal Reserve Banks to regulate stock prices
would have an adverse effect on the commodity price
level. However, such deflationists as Dr. Miller,
Governor Harding, and others, were determined to de-
flate at any cost. These men conceded that commodity
1. Cassel and Snyder cited in Stable Money
,
Irving
Fisher, p. 254.
2. Senator Glass quoted in Stable Money
,
Irving
Fisher, p. 258.
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prices would fall. They recognized that business
recession would follow. They went so far ©s to. point
out that business recession would of necessity bring
about deflation of the security prices. This defla-
tion is what they desired at ell costs. Their open
sponsorship of a major deflation did not end in 1929.
Dr. Miller wes still advocating deflation in 19321
V/eys should have been found to regulate speculation
in stocks without ruining business. Furthermore, it
is probable that the extraordinary technical weakness
of the market would have corrected itself. In fact
those responsible for the manipulation of the stock
prices would have seen to it that they came down in
due time.
Some Federal Reserve officials felt a re-
sponsibility for the funds that were flowing into the
stock market. It vi/as argued that it was the credit
that was being created by the Federal Reserve that
WPS supporting the boom. In defending a policy of
curtailment, Governor Harding of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston said, '•Continued high rates will even-
tually bring about a slowing down in business and
industry."^ Governor Harding seems to have, been in
favor of creating a business depression in order to
curb the market. This wgs vicious muddleheadedness .
i. Quoted in Stable Money, Irving Fisher, p. 259.
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If business continued to prosper, stocks would have
been worth high prices, oind although they were probably
too high, it is doubtful that they were as exaggerated
as we think today. Values would have been very dif-
ferent if the Federal Reserve had not discovered the
taint of inflation in conditions that prevailed in
1928 and 1929.
Reasonable Business /ctivlty, 1929
Business was above normal, but there was
still 2,000,000 unemployed in 1929. There were still
poverty and misery in the agricultural areas, l^either
the wheat nor the cotton section had recovered from
the deflation of 1920. The most reliable estimates
indicate that production was $40,000,000,000 below
capacity in 1929.^ Commodity prices had been falling
during most of, the year and were falling somewhat
more rapidly toward the end. Outside of the stock
market, on the other hand, there was no inflation in
1929. Production was fairly well sustained and there
is no reason except a monetary reason why there should
have been a slump. The Federal Reserve certainly can-
not stabilize everything, and it is not their business
to do so. It is enough to expect them to stabilize
commodity prices, employment, and business, without
1 . The Chart of Plenty, Loeu and associates,
Foreword by Stuart Chase, p. XIII.
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going efield to stabilize Continental exchanges and
the stock market.
The Crash
At exactly eleven o'clock in the forenoon
of October 24
, 1929, on the floor of the Stock Exchange,
there were suddenly offered, "at the market," hundreds
of thousands of shares of various kinds of stocks.
This offering was not ^public flocking." It was the
initial signal for the most spectacular raid that the
Stock Exchange had ever seen. The market had been
"sold out" to the public and it is part of the business
of stock marketing technique to "bear" the market after
stocks have been distributed. The purpose of this
’^bearing" of the market is to afford an opportunity
to reaccumulate stocks at lower levels when the "lambs'"
get discouraged or are forced to sell their stocks
back because of herd times or margin calls. It was
not important that stock prices Vt/ere too high. The
important thing to consider, and every trader knows
it, is whether the public owns too much of the stock.
Bootblacks or Bankers
The part that the banks had in the secur-
ities inflation is very clearly explained in a supple-
mentary essay to Willis and Chapman's book The Economics
11
I
i
I
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of Inflation . The benks not only lent billions
secured by stocks and bonds but thejr also added
to their own holdings by seversl billions during
the years preceding 1929. Total security loans to
customers rose from |4, 862,000, 000 in 1924 to
$8,304,000,000 in 1929. On June 30, 1930, accord-
ing to the jC.nnual Report of the Comptroller of the
Currency, total loans and investments amounted to
$47,298,000,000.^ Evidently the events which pre-
ceded those of 1929 were not entirely public fool-
istmess. The banks seem to have been arch-specu-
lators. The business of a commercial bank is to
lend money to worthy creuitors. Willis and Chapman,
commenting on the extent to which the slower and less
liquid forms of bank holdings had invaded the port-
folios of the different institutions during the ten
years preceding 1929, concluded that reduction of
liquidity amounted to about 40^ before 1929. Un-
fortunately the recommendations of banks before the
crash were uniformly ’’bullish.” ^fter the crash,
one v^ould suppose that bootblacks and typists, not
to mention the widows and orphans, had been responsi-
ble for the insanity.
1. Cited in Inflation in Securities
,
/ . Wilfred May; p.296;
Supp1 ernentary Essay to the Economics of Inflation
,
Willis and Chapman.
The Economics of Inflation, p. 127.2.
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Defletion Not a Result of Inflption
Most writers essuiue thst whenever there is
infletion it must, inevitably and as a matter of nat-
ural law, be followed by deflation. This assumption
is surely unfounded. Prices in France were stabilized
at a level about 400^ above pre-war levels. Even
after the fantastic inflation in Germany, prices did
not drop. The inflation in the latter case v^as cer-
tainly not justifiable, but it does prove the theo-
retical point that prices do not have to fall as a
matter of natural law. It is usually a matter of
administration as to whether prices will be put down
after an inflation. If those who think that they should
come down are in a position of financial power, strong
enough to make them come down, then prices fall. If
there is a group powerful enough to insist that prices
be maintained on the inflated level, prices will be
stabilized on that level. Financial power was on the
side of deflation in the United States in 1920 end 1929;
in these years we got deflation. The degree of deflation
attained during the past two decades seems to have caused
a revolution of thinking as to the desirability of such a
"correction." Now, almost any dilettant monetary pro-
posal calculated to have an inflationary effect can get
a hearing in Washington.
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There is one thing thet we seem to hpve
leerned end. learned well. We know how to end cyclical
booms. pll that is necessary to end such a boom is to
create a more or less permanent depression. On a beau-
tiful spring day in 1933, the American people had a
holiday -- a bank holiday -- an opportunity to reflect
upon the tremendous efficiency of our Federal Reserve
System. This remedy for a boom, however, was no pallia-
tive. It Wes the kind of a remedy that cures the head-
ache by removing the head.
Governor Strong and Stabilization (1921-1927 )
It is hard to be dispassionate in discussing
this question when one realizes that the methods of
monetary and credit control were well understood and
employed effectively in the United States prior to
1928, and that little or nothing was done between 1929
end 1932 to prevent or stay a 4:0% deflation of the com-
modity price level with consequent enormous shrinkage
of the national wealth and national income. From 1929
to 1932 the Reserve A.dministration bought ^217,000,000
of securities and liquidated $211,000,000 of acceptances.
This amounted to a virtual abandonment of open-market
control at' a time when such control was most urgently
needed.
1, Recent Monetary Experiments and Their Effect upon
the Theory of Money and Priced Willford I. King
,
Journal of the American Statistical Association,
p. 39b.
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The opinions of Governor Strong pnd the
earlier effective policy of the Federel Reserve
System were certainly not a secret. The whole finan-
cial world knew that the Feheral Reserve banks had
prevented inflation in 1923, and that in 1924 a
threatened deflation was prevented by reversing the
policy. Again in 1925, and early in 1926, action was
taken to curb inflationary tendencies. In May 1927
the Federal Reserve banks resumed the purchases of
government securities and again curbed a declining
price level. Professor Fisher credits Governor Strong
with having discovered the open-market powers of the
Federal Reserve System. Governor Strong, in 1926,
said that because the System held the country's gold
end could control the reserves of many banks, it could
influence the volume of credit; that is, by means of
rediscount rates and open-market operations.
Deflationists in the Saddle
After Governor Strong's death the System seems
to have come under the influence of deflationists like
Governor Harding, of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
who, in the spring of 1929, advocated high interest rates
which he believed would "eventually bring about a slowing
down in business end industry." This deflation of
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gniwola *4 diiori« affX*iri YiXls-jddaovs” blnow hovelled eri riodri^'
lo rioXd«?Xt©b sixiT ” .•^'idsjjjbnX riria ©eenlaxic; nl n^xri
business, he believed, would effect security values
adversely.^ In 1930 the Federal Reserve Boar’d was
still in control of the monetary policy. But, whet
sinister power was in control of the Federal Reserve
Board? Wny did Dr. Miller, in 1930, 1931, and as
late as 1932, oppose every move toward stabilization
of the price level? By the summer of 1930 a serious
deflation of commodity prices was well under way. In
the face of a veritable avalanche of demands for
action the Federal Reserve Board adhered sternly to a
policy of deflation. In July 1930 one notable pro-
test appeared in the Bulletin of the Royal Bank of
Canada: ’’immediate and decisive action on the part
of the Federal Reserve banks in putting new funds
into the market in large volume is whet is necessary
to arrest the present serious and protracted decline.
However, the deflationists had their way. Dr. Miller
and his friends were very successful. By permitting
a deflation of bank credit of about f9, 000, 000, 000
they succeeded in accomplishing a deflation of
2American property values of over J|212,000,000,000.
1. Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 259.
2 . The Debt-deflation Theory of Oreat Depressions
,
Irving Fisher, p. 354. (Reprint from
Econometrica)
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No Coimnodl ty Inflstlon, 1929
There w^s no deflation of commodity prices
in 1929, e fact which makes the deflation policy of
the Federal Reserve Board even more difficult to
understand. Late in 1929 commodity prices began to
decline. That should have been a warning to the
Board. What was taking place in the stock market
was no concern of the Federal Reserve Board, at least
so far as their money policy was concerned. It was
vifell understood that any attempt to deflate the stock
market through credit contraction by the Federal
Reserve banks would have the effect of deflating
business and industry. Those members of the Federal
Reserve Board who advocated deflation in 1929 indicated
clearly that they believed that business had to be de-
pressed in order to end the stock market boom. The
stock market had gone too far, or perhaps the distri-
bution into the hands of the public hpd been too suc-
cessful. "In the case of the investment houses, which
be-fore the war had been engaged in financing new indus-
tries at their inception, in the period under discussion
they operated to enable the owners of these identical
industrial businesses to sell out their enterprises to
the public and otherwise to manipulate their capital-
izations for their own profit."^
1. Inflation in Securities , /. Wilfred May,
Supplementary Essay to Economics of Inflation,
Willis and Chapman, p. 303.
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Planned Depression
Governor Harding and others were determined
to deflate at any cost. These men conceded that com-
modity prices would fall. They recognized that busi-
ness recession would follow. They went so far as to
point out that business recession vrould of necessity
bring about deflation of security prices. This defla-
tion they desired at all costs. Their open sponsorship
of a major deflation did not end in 1929. Dr. Miller
was still advocating deflation in 19321
The National Survey of Potential Product
Capacity found that in the United States, the sum of
monetary and imputed income for 1929 was |92, 515,000,000.
There was a shrinkage of over 50)^ of this income during
the years 1929-1932. The deflation cost jsmericans a
2decrease in yearly income of over |;40,000,000,000.
Dr, Miller probably thought that the stock
market was defying physical laws and that it was his
business to help nature restore order. The belief that
what goes up must come down, and that therefore deflation
must always follow a rise in prices, is pure nonsense.
Transferring physical lews to another science with no
logical reason for doing so, and acting upon the idea,
1. The Chart of Plenty, Harold Loeb and Associates,
p. 132.
2. The Debt-deflation Theory of Great Depressions
,
Irving Fisher, p. 335.
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is costly. During past centuries higher prices have
been attained and maintained for long periods. But
then, nothing was knovm of Roger Bahson’s brain-throb
about laws of action and reaction and their applica-
tion to economics.
Stabilization and Re-inflation, 1952
During the last year of Hoover’s adminis-
tration, in the spring and summer of 1932, the Reserve
banks steadily bought government securities for a per-
iod approximating twelve weeks, and averaging about
|100,000,000 per week. According to H. Parker Willis,
these purchases were ’’paid for by Reserve banks throu^
the creation of their own obligations.”^ The purchase
of ^1,100,000,000 of securities seems to have had the
effect of staying a deflation, which, up to that time,
had been gaining momentum. During May, June, and early
July of 1932, all the great markets, including those of
stocks, bonds, and commodities, quietly moved sidewise.
Furthermore, during July, August, and early September
of that same year, there was a substantial rally in all
of these markets. The period from May to July 1932 was
the first since 1929 in which all four of the above-
mentioned markets were stabilized at the seme time.
1 . The Theory and Practice of Central Banking ,
Henry Parker Willis, pp. 197-198 .
a i%n Jne o ^ •'^i* q 1 ®
cl
'•x<j1 m.ftliidni^flx bivi berti'.uJ^ /ieecJ
^ fxwofjii ?nid3 Of- ,nof-4
f i G -X- Jb -£»»rij sn.. fTOiaosei &M colJos 'tc
ew,X Juode
. Eo tncfsoo® 03 ncH
2SeX . fio 1 ?3 X - s H
- aX-nlffliw a’-isveoH 1o •xaaT- »'<“ sn-t'"'''^
»vi5C»*fl ^4 .SSet lo -wiww ia# 8«iW .noll^-w
-i*q a -iou eeiSiwsaa aAsanlsvog Jiisuod
^XlisaJe a^iiwd
Xx,<oe:« gais<,tsv.> &® avXewi gr.XdadtXxoaqqi.
boX
,alXXX« -a oi n^lb'ioosx
.xe®w -sea 000.000, OOXj
%;.'0-vri3 a>X«.!d evrrsaeH lo'l &XBq‘'
»n»i» B.Bi.rfa'U.q seeiiJ
sBc fc-u^q sta ‘".E/ioXiBgXXdc a»o iXeiia
lo iioXiB«io sriJ
ecii t»d s'vad o3 aase-s asiX^X-iuofts lo
000,000,OCX,X| to
,e,aXJ 3arfJ 03 nw .aoXiaXtsb s S«Xxa3a
-^Xi.« M-3 ,anu-
.mo3cisaoa gn-J^iss J’ssd fc<iri
to 85043. SnXbuXoltX .eXwXiBffi Xw-IS
-SSSi to
.8uX5?s5ia XX30XWP ,e«iJXbofflmoo bna
.afcnod ,8>fooJ8
ie4ii»3q«8 tX’JJ'O bits ,4ewso4 .X-tw^SOt'u* ,
a -ora i-,xi3 x,. !
XX i ttx -iXXsi XBXtr^ieCijBO a r6.aw owrft
,jaei£ ora.ja 3 b<13 to
w'iMi tii'i. o3 \*.SS ow'it BoX-ssq atit .aiaJtiBH
aaeria to
-8BoS a43 to -Xbot XXb ifcXrf*>i eaex aacXe xaxXt eriX
'^\^iXi:'85«E ®ri4 ?X! fcoisX atsw
a08X.xam fe.no23nsa
., „ ,,
_
ir^a to
• -*-
There had been liquidation in at least one of them
at all times since 1929.^ In other words, for four
years there had been no time in which there had been
no liquidation in one or another of the important
markets. The significant point is that inflation
ended v;ith the resumption of open-market purchases.
jnt i-defletionary Measures Necessary
In 1935 there were over $2,300,000,000
excess reserves in the Federal Reserve banks. Com-
menting on this, Leonard /yres argued that it is the
demand for credit and not supply that is important.
Mr. /yres, expressing the point of view of a banker,
omits the important fact that bankers absolutely con-
trol the supply. Money always flows right back into
banks. It flows out only when bankers permit the flow
In trying to prove a very bad case bankers have pre-
sented figures showing large discrepancies between
requests for credit and the total recorded ‘'lines of
credit." In this, bankers have been guilty of the
most obvious kind of deception. The largest and
richest corporations have "lines of credit" greatly
in excess of requirements. Most of them have, in
recent years, financed working capital requirements
1. This has been carefully checked by the daily and
weekly Dow Jones averages of industrial and rail-
road stock prices, with the Annalist wholesale
commodity price index, and v;ith the trend of bond
prices in Barron's Weekly from 1929 to 1933.
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with, large cash hslances that were originally raised
through stock or bond issues for that purpose. They
ere not compelled to borrow large suras for short per-
iods. The banks are aware of this situation and the
publication of figures showing large unused "lines of
credit" is deception.
However j insofar as there was a grain of
truth in such statements as the above, it should be
pointed out that an ent i-defl etionery policy in 1935
could not be as effective as a similar policy in 1930.
It IS not possible to lift a hundred-pound weight with
a ten-pound lever. Furthermore, the fact that there
were large excess reserves was not as important as the
fact that the deflation had been stayed and an encourag
ing amount of re-inflation accomplished. More timely
action is essential if the ordinary means of control
are to prove effective. However, the financial history
of 1932 proves that even tardy action is tremendously
effective. In 1932 it was necessary, not only to bring
about a re- inflation in the various markets, but it was
also necessary to stay the force of a deflationary
movement which, up to that time, had been gaining mo-
mentum. The open-market purchase of $1,100,000,000
worth of securities in the spring of that year was
amazingly successful and, I believe, one of the most
convincing proofs of the effectiveness of open-market
control
.
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Money -- Supply end Demend
The price level is not, ps some text books
imply, the result of the demend and supply r el pt ion-
ship of goods. It is rpther the result of four fac-
tors; namely, the demand for money, the supply of money,
the demand for goods, and the supply of goods. In a
barter economy, the demand end supply relptionship of
goods does determine the value of each particulpr kind
of goods in terms of other kinds of goods, but in a
money economy, or in a credit economy, one -half of
every exchange is either money or some kind of a credit
instrument. If the wheat that is exchanged for dollars
increases in supply, the value of the wheat is affected.
Its value drops. The same is true of the dollars. If
the supply of the media of exchange increases, their
value decreases.
Other things being equal, the price level
rises with an increase in the quantity or velocity of
either money or credit. Of course, other things very
seldom remain equal. If goods increase step by step
with increases of money or credit, the price level re-
mains the same. Inflation sets in with a too plentiful
increase in the supply of money or credit. Conversely,
deflation follows a more than adequate restriction in
the supply of either. There is no implication in the
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ftbove stetement thet price levels are not influenced
by non-monetary causes. They are so influenced. P
fall in price levels may be due to increasing indus-
trial efficiency, and such a decline may be adjusted
by a controlled increase in the quantity of the media
of exchange.
It is not an increase of money which alone
causes inflation, but rather, a too plentiful supply.
In practice, what constitutes a too plentiful supply
is a tangled problem. The great sources are the nat-
ural supplies of gold and silver and the created sup-
plies, which are the obligations of banks end govern-
ments, The total quantity of money may include various
combinations of metal or certificates representative of
metals, such as gold and silver certificates. Also, as
a part of the total supply, there are government notes,
bank notes and bank deposits.
Met el Inflation
The price level may be inflated by any kind
of known money or substitute for money. Gold and sil-
ver have both caused inflation at various times for
countries that were exclusively on one or both. In
the Union of South Africa early in 1920, the exporta-
tion of gold Was rigidly restricted. Since South
Africa is a gold-producing country, the gold
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accumulated and the value of gold covereigns in South
Africa was less than in other countries. A lower value
of gold means a higher price level. The higher price
level in South Africa, due to the quantity of gold,
was inflation -- gold inflation.^
Silver has also caused inflation on a number
of occasions, notably after the discovery of huge silver
supplies in America about 1500. The great quantities of
silver that were found in the New World, were first
taken to Spain, and Spain first felt the inflationary
effect. Prices began to rise immediately. Between 1501
and 1502 prices rose about 10^. From then on, prices
rose continuously until 1601. Index mmibers of commod-
ity prices in Spain covering the 16th century show that
the price level rose from an index of 33 in 1501 to 144
2in 1601. Prices rose even more rapidly in Andalusia,
where the imports of silver centered. It should be
noted that during the century, the amount of inflation
due to silver imports was about 450^.
Monetary inflation through metals may also
be caused artificially. During the Renaissance the
constant debasement of the coins caused a gentle
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infletion during the whole two hundred yei?rs. Infls-
tion may also be caused artificially through devalua-
tion. In this way the present administration reduced
the gold content by about 40^ and thereby increased
the number of gold monetary units. This devaluation
appears to have caused some inflation. It may be many
years before a reasonably accurate estimate can be made
of the extent of the inflation.
Government Note Inflation
Contrary to popular opinion, inflation through
government notes is relatively infreouent. The great
inflation in Germany was not accomplished by this means.
There have been few such inflations in recent years. The
Continental currency of Revolutionary War days was an
example. An interesting sidelight on this historical
example is the story that Lord Howe brought over a boat-
load of counterfeit money and distributed it in the
Colonies in order to depreciate the currency. Apparently,
inconvertible government notes are not inflationary in
themselves. They do not depreciate rapidly unless they
are issued in too plentiful quantity. In this they fol-
low the same lew that hard money follows. It is also
true that if the country issuing them is threatened with
bankruptcy as a result of war reversals, there will be a
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flight from such a currency which speeds its fall.
This was clearly brought out during the Civil War.
The rise and fall of Northern and Southern currency
coincided with the winning or losing of great battles.
After the Battle of G-ettysburg, the Confederate cur-
rency fell steadily. Later the bankrupt Confederacy
could not redeem them. So far as the North is con-
cerned, it is not exactly correct to refer to the
Civil War inflation as an inflation of government
notes. The Northern greenbacks were not issued in
very great quantities. The great increase in the is-
sues of notes were bank notes issued by the state
banks. The combined volume, modified by the fortunes
of war helped to cause the price level to rise. It is
interesting to note that, in spite of the large issues
of state and federal notes, the price level did not
rise so far dui’ing the Civil War as it did in 1920,
when the United States was very securely on gold.
Bank Note Inflation
Inflation through bank notes has been a
somewhat more usual occurrence. The assignats issued
in Prance during the French Revolution were bank notes
It seems that these also were counterfeited on a vast
scale. "It has been reliably chronicled that seven-
teen printing presses and 400 men were employed in
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England at that time to manufacture pnd c&rry on the
traffic in this counterfeit money. No currency,
whether bank notes or eny other kind of money, can
retpin its velue if it is issued by the bale. There
is ppparently nothing intrinsically inflptionpry in
any kind of currency. The pssignats were bpcked by
lands of substantipl value — lends that hp.d been
confiscated by the government. However, it makes
little difference what the security behind en issue
of notes is. The important thing is the total quan-
tity of currency issued.
The English pound has been p fiat bank
note since 1931. The seme is true of the bank notes
of every country that followed England’s lead in 1931,
all of the countries in the so-called "sterlingprea.
"
The experience of every one of these countries proves
that paper currencies are not inflationary . The value
of bank notes in the "sterlingprea" was maintained by
the simple method of limiting their quantity. There
is a great temptation to issue a too plentiful supply
of fiat notes such as these, since they do have a stim-
ulpting effect on business and politicians can, in this
way, avoid the unpleasantness of levying taxes. During
peace times, financing by fiat currency vjorks very v/ell
1, Money Creators, Gertrude M. Coogpn, p. 122.
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during war times it is usually politically impossible
not to issue a. too plentiful supply.
Bank Deposit Inflation
Tile word, "deposit," according to V/ebster,
means the placing of something for safe-keeping. al-
though Webster did not include the idea of borrowing
from a bank in the definition of the term, one of its
most important current meanings is just that. If the
customer of a bank leaves flOjOOO in a bank for safe-
keeping, the banker records a $10,000 deposit. If the
customer makes a loan of $10,000 at the same bank, the
banker also calls that a deposit. How loans become
deposits and how bankers’ debts become our principal
currency, are somewhat of a mystery to the average lay-
man. Because banks create deposits by making bookkeep-
ing entries, they ere sometimes called "manufacturies
of credit." The entry that is made to create a deposit
is a debit. to "Loans and Discounts," end a credit to
"Deposits." The liability assumed by the creation of
this deposit circulates in the form of checks.
There is another simple way of creating de-
posits. Whenever officials of the Federal Reserve
System feel that there is need for credit inflation,
securities are purchased in the open market, with
checks drawn on nothing. In a single week checks may
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be drawn for hundreds of millions of dollers for this
purpose, thus creating lerge quantities of Federfl
Reserve bsnk credit. These checks pre drawn in frvor
of those from whom the securities pre purchpsed in the
open market. In the regular course of business they
are deposited in member banks. They are then turned
beck to the Federal Reserve banks, where they ere
credited to the member banks. These credits may then
be used by the member banks for the expansion of their
own deposit liabilities. There is a story told about -
en old lady who, when told that her eccount had been
overdrawn at the bank, sat dov/n and drew a check to
replenish it. It is not so amusing when a central
bank or a member tank does the same thing. In fact,
it is the usual method of creating bankers' balances.
The creation of a currency medium through
the making of a loan, and calling that lot^n a deposit'
is a refinement of modern bariking. It is regrettable
that this practice has no name of its own. It. has be-
come legitimate. It is now considered respectable,
although a somewhat similar type of banking in medieval
Venice was celled "embezzlement."
Revaluation of Currency through
Changes in Credit Volume
Not only in this creation and recording of
fictitious loans dishonest accounting, but it also
tf
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tskes the control of the tot el vol-ume of the medium
of exchenge out of the hands of the government end
transfers it to the banking system. Mr. R. G. Hsv^try,
Director of Financial Studies in the British Treasury,
probably the greatest living authority on prices, seys:
"’/Vhoever has control over credit does in fact determine
the fluctuations of prices, and the magnitude and fre-
quency of the alternations of inflation and depression."
Creation of demand deposits offsets every other monetary
device. In the United States and Great Britain, bank
deposits have become the principal medium of exchange.
In the United States they account for over 90^ of ell
2tr ens actions . Credit has become so important that
arbitrary changes in the total volume have the effect
of revaluing the currency. Contraction of the vol-ume
of credit with a consequent decline in the price level
increases the purchasing power of the dollar.
Flexibility on 5.5 Per Cent Gold Base
Individual bankers are not culpable. Most
of them are unaware of the swindling involved in the
creation and destruction of bank credit and the con-
sequent effects on the price level. Many bankers and
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even some economists prgue that banks do not create
deposits. There are elaborate arguments to prove
this. However, the fact still remains that total
demand deposits exceed by many times the total amount
of cash in the country. /.s early as June 30, 1925,
the monetary stock of gold coin and bullion in the
United States amounted to only $4,386,000,000; whereas,
demand deposits^ subject to check, were estimated at
$27,189,000,000.^ Vi/hile some argue that technically
the individual bank does not create deposits, everyone
admits that the system as a whole does create such de-
posits, and that is the important point.
The power to create substitutes for money on
such a vast scale by both the central banks and the
member banks should certainly be limited in the public
welfare. The creation of loans which entail no sacri-
fice on the part of those who create them is very dif-
ferent from the making of loans by those who paj?t with
their savings. Ordinarily, for each dollar of credit
created, the bank 'must have a credit of only 10 cents
on deposit at a Federal Reserve bank. Since only 35/^
of this ten-cent credit must be in gold, the banks are
actually creating credit on a gold base of 3.5^. A
X . Money, Bank Credit and Prices, Lionel D. Edie, p. 1.
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large part of the reserves required for benk deposits
is neither currency nor gold, but credit. '^Building
of benk credit on e foundation of bank credit is the
result of a deliberate plan of those who framed our
Federal Reserve /ct. The purpose was to create a
banking system that was ’flexible.’"^ The system
proved to be remarkably flexible. If the banks could
be trusted no special regulation would be necessary.
If credit had been honestly managed in the public in-
terest, the extremely sensitive structure of deposit
credit would have been the most effective instrument
of stabilization. Governor Strong, former Governor
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, succeeded in
stabilizing prices from 1921 to 1927 through credit
control. At other times, however, when it suited the
sinister purposes of Federal Reserve authorities, to
raise or lower the price level, powerful v/eapons of
restraint were thrown aside. The commodity inflation
of 1919, and the period of stock market insanity in
1928 end 1929, were both caused by bank credit expan-
sion. The speculative credit upon which these booms
grew Was fiat credit, created at the discretion -- or
indiscretion -- of the Federal Reserve banks. It
proved to be even more dangerous than a similar amount
of fiat notes.
!• Managing the People’s Money
,
Joseph Ernest Goodbar,
p . 15.
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CHAPTER VIII
STABILIZATION
Flexible Equilibrium
There is no such thing as stsbility either
in the physical world or in the realm of the econo-
mist. The most usus>l characteristic of prices is
fluctuetion. The economic system may be likened to
a great ship which swpys eround a point of equilibrium,
but which never remains constant for pny spprecirble
length of time. If the ship swpys too far to one side,
it founders. There are periods of comparative price
stability or calm. The years from 1921 to 1927 v^ere
relatively free from price gyrations. The price level
rose and fell, the degree of inflation and deflation
being so slight as not to endanger the economic system.
In discussions of this kind this is the greatest degree
of stability that can be attained. It Is obviously im-
possible to accomplish absolute fixity. Avoidance of
the excessive swaying away from equilibrium which took
place on one side in 1920, and on the other in 1930-
1952, is the objective of all legitimate stabilization
proposals. Stabilization, in this paper, means stabil-
ity of Value. Stabilization, in the sense of fixation
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of the weight of gold in the monetery \init, is no
stabilization at all. It is, in fact, one of the
greatest causes of instability. Such so-called
“stabilization" under the traditional gold standard,
with its periodic deflations to protect the gold base,
is a fraud. It is responsible for the worst kind of
instability, the kind that causes the economic boat
to capsize.
"Modernized Gold Standard," Warburg
Jtjnes P. Warburg stands out among backward-
looking bankers for his advocacy of a form of gold
standard which is, if anything, more vicious than
the traditional gold standard. He refers to it as a
"modernized gold stc^ndard."^ The changes that Warburg
would make in this streamlined variety of the gold
standard are few. Bullion, which would be exclusively
in the possession of the banks of issue and central
banks, would be obtainable for export only. In other
words, the banks ere to be given a private monopoly of
gold. To insure the effectiveness of this monopoly, Mr.
Warburg proposes that cover for note issues be reduced
25^, a change which would merely increase the sensi-
tiveness of economic stability to gold manipulation.
There would obviously be a wider range of expansion end
1. The Money Muddle
,
James P. Warburg, p. 237.
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contraction s.t the discretion of the banks. Gold
moveitient s would have more serious conseauences —
bigger end better crashes.
Inflationists^ Kemmerer
No economist can argue for the traditional
gold standard without at times also advocating defla-
for periodic deflation is a necessary part of
gold standard practice.' Kemmerer, for instance, has
on various occasions advocated deflation, and at other
times he has strenuously opposed reflation. He appar-
ently believes that an undue rise in prices must be
corrected, but that a comparably serious deviation
from normal on the down side should not be corrected.
Kemmerer admits the great injustice of deflation, but
holds that at times it "is absolutely necessary.”^
One of the reasons that he gave for his advocacy of
deflation in 1920 was "the existing gold
base was altogether inadequate safely to support ..
.
paper money and deposit currency."^ The deflation that
Kemmerer aJid others advocated meant not only a fall in
prices, but world-wide depression and political dis-
turbances. No well-informed advocate of the traditional
gold standard, like Kemmerer, has ever denied that
High Prices and Deflation
,
E. W. Kemmerer, p. 81.
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2. Ibid.
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periodic deflation and depression is a necessary
consequence of strict adherence to the gold standard.
It Cannot be repeated too frequently, nor brought to
the public attention too strongly, that these gentle-
men mean occasional, artificially controlled, and
rather severe business depressions, when they refer
to their peculiar type of stabilization. No intel-
ligent student of monetary science dares to denji" that
stabilization, in the very strange sense of fixation
of the price of gold, could not possibly be accom-
plished without manipulation of money and credit in
such a way as to periodically limit production by vast
amounts .
Stabilization or Reflation
At the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa
in 193ii there was surprising unanimity of opinion among
the delegates from various parts of the Empire in favor
of both reflation and stabilization. These delegates
were not merely economists. They were the responsible
representatives of the important nations of the British
Empire. Mr. R. B. Bennett, Prime Minister of Canada,
was Chairmen of the conference and among the delegates
were a number of very distinguished men. Among them,
end representing the United Kingdom, was Mr. Neville
Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer.
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There was no general agreement at the
Conference as to the method of attaining both refla-
tion and stabilization. Mr, Chamberlain made it clear
that England did not intend to return to the gold
standard in the near future. He spoke in favor of
”an ample supply of short-term credit at low rates"
as a means of raising commodity prices, and said that
the government was doing its utmost to prevent fluc-
tuations in the value of sterling. It viras the chan-
cellor’ s opinion, as v/ell as that of the other delegates
that international action and cooperation were urgently
necessary.
^
A statement made at the conference by Mr. N . C
Havenga, Minister of Finance of the Union of South
iUTrica, is particularly interesting because of the fact
that he was the representative of the greatest gold-
producing country in the world:
".... while the world has reached a
marvelous degree of perfection in its indus-
trial processes, it has not yet, in the
sphere of the measurement of material values,
emerged beyond the somewhat primitive stage
of employing a measuring rod which expands
and contracts under the influence of the com-
modities which it measures. "2
1. Imperial Economic Conference 1922, Report of the
Conference
,
Ottc».ws, pp . 50-22.
2. Ibid., p. 145.
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Not only was there agreement at the Ottev;a
Conference on the two important objectives of refla-
tion and stabilization, but the resolutions of the
Conference were indorsed a year later in the "Imperial
Declaration" which was signed at the close of the
London 1/Vorld Economic Conference.^
At the London Economic Conference there were
two essentially different viewpoints. The delegates
from countries in the "gold block" end the "sterlingaria
wanted temporary stabilization of exchange rates, which
was to be followed by reflation through international
agreement. On the other hand, the United States, al-
though our delegates did not went to understand this,
insisted on reflation first and on agreements in regard
to stabilization of exchange rates later. Neville
Chamberlain insisted that stabilization of exchange
rates should come first. On July 3, 1933, President
Roosevelt sent a message to the conference. It was
amusingly undiplomatic, but there could be no possible
mistake as to its meaning. It was clear, and had a
ring of finality, that every member of the conference
understood without the apologetic explanation of Mr.
Warburg. It meant that we were not going to compromise
on our reflation-stabilization policy, that stability
1. Stable Money, Irving Fisher, p. 313.
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of domestic price levels w©s to come first. Comment-
ing on the President’s message, Keynes s©id; "He is
magnificently right in forcing s decision between
two widely divergent policies."^ It w©s Warburg’s
job to interpret the President’s message to the other
delegetions; yet, he described himself as "being com-
pletely unable to do so” and resigned.
In his letter of resignation to Secretary
Hull, Warburg said: "I think that I see certain ideas
forming in his (the President’s) mind."^ The implica-
tion was that the President had not as yet a clearly
defined policy. A little later such a criticism might
v/ell have been directed at the President. However, in
the summer of 1953, whether the President viss right or
wrong, his policy was definite and unmistakable. If
Roosevelt had been as wise in his choice of delegates
as he was in the reflation-stabilization policy fol-
lowed in the summer of 1933, the London Economic
Conference would not have been a "fiasco.” Mr.
Reginald McKenna pointed out that the one valuable
result of the conference was "monetary clarification."
1, New York Pier aid Tribune, July 4, 1933; quoted in
Stable Money
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Manipulation of G-old, Warren and Pegrson, Fisher
i? proposal which, was widely discussed during
the early days of the Roosevelt administration and one
which had a great deal of influence upon the monetary
policy of the administration is the ” commodity dollar”
theory of Dr. George F. Warren and his associate,
Dr. Frank A. Pearson, This '‘commodity dollar” theory
is one of a number of "managed currency” theories which
emphasize control through gold. Warren wanted the cur-
rency managed in accordance with a price index by chang-
ing the gold content upwards end downwards. His various
books, pexticularly the 1935 edition of Gold end Prices
,
contain a vast amount of statistical data and dharts
designed to prove that the price of commodities goes
up and down' with the price of gold. Not only was Warren
prepared to present formidable proof of his theories,
but his plan also had the advantage of being a relatively
simple one. According to Warren (and the President agreed
with him) it v;as only necessary to raise the price of gold,
and commodities would rise accordingly.
Many economists, even among those who advocate
a managed currency, doubt that changes in the price of
gold would have the immediate effect on prices that
Warren sincerely believed they v;ould. Those who still
advocated the traditional gold standard attacked the
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plpn as 8 monstrous monetgry policy. The public v;ps
pretty thoroughly scared with talk of rubber dollars,
and people who have no idea of what a monetary unit
is were convinced that disaster would be the inevitable
conseouence of the Warren gold policy. The opposition
presented many inconsistent arguments, but the public
did not know enough about it to realize that the claims
v;ere inconsistent. One of the leaders in this persistent
and vicious campaign of fear, Mr. James P. Warburg, told
the President that "if he would do what Warren suggested
.... the domestic price of gold would not influence any-
thing except the position of the domestic gold miners."^
On September 20, a fev/ months later, discussing the
Warren plan, which had been partially adopted, the
same Mr. Warburg told the public that inflation could
2
not be forestalled a moment longer. A plan which
could not affect "anything but gold miners" was now
about to cause drastic inflation. One need not be
surprised at Mr. Warburg' s inconsistency, or his wild
and inaccurate forecasts. He admits that he is "not
even a monetary economist." Similar irrational exag-
gerations were very common, and entirely uncalled for.
1. The Money Muddle
,
James P. Warburg, p. 128.
2. ibid
.
, p . 146
.
5. Ibid., p. 238.
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The ” commodity doller'* plan was not adopted
in the manner Warren wished. Revaluation in a single
drastic move to correct an intolerable situation does
not provide for the continuing stability that 1/Varren
desired. However, the gold price of the dollar was
changed and doubtless the change had an important re-
flationary effect. It did affect many things other
than miners and it did not cause drastic inflation.
In fact the plan of changing the price of gold was
later criticized on the grounds that it did not cause
prices to rise as much as its advocates claimed that
it would. The opposition criticized the plan; first,
because it was inflationary and second, because it
was not.
Although the gold standard is a fairly recent
institution in v/orld history, there have been numerous
changes in the v/eight of various monetary units. In
1834, long before the United States went on the- gold
standard, the weight of the gold dollar was reduced.
The price of gold was raised from $19.39 an ounce to
$20.69. In 1837, the price of an ounce of gold was
again changed to $20.67.^ Many changes have been made
in the pound sterling. Originally, it was a pound of
silver. As Vi/arren and Pearson point out, although
1. Sold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, p. 292.
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'•the npme is still retained it is not a pound, not
sterling, and not silver."^ ^t th.e present time it
is not gold. It is a fiat pound, and under very try-
ing circumstances, is working better than any metal
pound every worked. There is hardly a gold currency
in the world the v^eight of which has not been changed
repeatedly. Chaos has not followed such changes.
In fact more orderly business and stability have been
the rule after revaluation. France avoided the depres-
sion of 1920 by allowing the franc to find its own
level. It was later revalued and the new franc con-
tained about one-filth the amount of gold that the old
franc contained. France thus avoided a great deal of
deflation and business depression.
The Vvarren plan was similar in essence to
that of Irving Fisher’s famous ^compensated dollar"
proposal which was advanced in 1911.*^ Originally, the
plan involved the abolition of gold coins and the con-
version of gold certificates into "gold bullion dollar
certificates" which the holder could exchange for gold
• The weight of gold obtainable w'ould be the
amount “"officially declared to constitute a dollar on
that date." Instead of "free coinage" end "free
melting" at a fixed price, the government would buy
1* Grold and Prices
,
Warren and Pearson, p. 292.
2. iSiabilizing tile' Dollar
,
Irving Fisher, p. 104. '
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OP sell gold, bullion pt pplces that would, vppy with,
fluctustions of an accepted price index consisting
of a representative assortment of commodities. The
weight of the dollar would be adjusted at stated
intervals as the index deviated from a. previously
determined level. A small ^"brassage" fee would be
imposed to prevent gold speculation.
Many writers seem unaware that Fisher’s
views changed as to the most desirable means of
accomplishing stabilization. While he is still sub-
stantially in' agreement with the Warren school, his
present personal views include, not only adjustments
in the gold content of the dollar ("as few and slight,
as possible"), but also a number of devices designed
to control credit volume. He recognizes the great
importance of the total volume of checking deposits
and would require that these be backed by 100>^ re-
serves. This requirement would effectively prevent
the banks from creating and destroying the circulating
medium. He would also rely upon the usual methods of
open-market operations end control of the rediscount
t
rates. Government debts would be reduced and non-
interest-bearing government notes would be substituted
for interest-bearing bonds up to the point needed to
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mslntein s sttble price level, Fisher is not partial
to the inclusion of silver in the monetary system, but
v;ould make any compromise that is politically feasible
with those who want to retain silver.^
Inconvertibility, Keynes
In 1925, a few years before England end other
countries returned to the gold standard, John Maynard
Keynes outlined an elaborate program of monetary re-
form. Keynes is creaited v/ith having coined the phrase
’’managed currency." His views on the subject have
doubtless had a profound influence upon the monetary
policies of governments since England was forced off
the gold standard in 1931. Business revival in vari-
ous countries began with the adoption of some of Keynes*
proposals. It is Keynes' belief that "the outstanding
fruits of the economic society in which we live are its
failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary
and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes.”^
His monetary proposals are designed to help correct
these faults through sta.bilization of the internal price
level .
Keynes has been a convincing advocate of an
inconvertible currency for a number of years. He pro-
poses the complete separation of gold from domestic
1. Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, Pp. 39o-397.
2. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money
,
John' Maynard Keynes
, p . 372.
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currency. The use of gold as an exchange medium
would toe limited to the settlement of intemotional
toslances. Since it would not toe employed in circula-
tion, nor as reserves for note issues and credit, its
mein function would toe as a store of value to be held
"as 8 war-chest agginst emergencies." The authorities
should correct temporary changes in the foreign ex-
change retes resulting from adverse toalances of inter-
national payments toy purchasing foreign exchange with
gold. The more permanent changes in exchange rates
would toe adjusted toy regulating the price of gold.
One of the otojectives of the Keynes plan would be to
retain the stabilizing advantage of gold in foreign
exchange and at the same time to avoid domestic price
disturbances that are caused toy great changes in the
value of gold itself.
Internal price stability is to toe attained
mainly through control of credit toy the central banks.
The banks would be required to make use of open-market
operations and changes in the discount rate to so con-
trol the volume of credit as to bring about a relatively
stable price level. G-overnment notes or bank notes
would toe of secondary importance and would toe issued
merely for convenience and to supply the banks with
reserves to support their deposit liabilities at a level
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which would be adequate to maintain the desired price
level. .Although actual price movements would be the
most important guide, Keynes feels that «it is not
the pest rise but the future rise that has to be
counteracted.” Therefore the monetary authorities
should be guided by a. number of other factors such as
"the state of employment, the volume of production,
the effective demand for credit .... the rate of in-
terest on investments of various types, the volume of
new issues, the flow of cash into circulation, the
statistics of foreign trade and the level of the ex-
changes.”^
For an official price index, Keynes proposed
that the authorities adopt a. '^composite commodity as
their standard of value." The proposal of such an
index makes the idea appear, on the sut’face, like
Fisher’s commodity dollar” plan. It is, however,
very different. Under the Keynes plan, both note
issues end credit are completely divorced from. gold.
Furthermore, changing the gold content of the monetary
unit as fluctuations in the purchasing power of the
dollar occur, as Fisher proposed, is very different
from changing the price of gold because of disturb-
ances in the price of foreign exchange. In Keynes'
plan, credit is controlled without regard to gold
Monetary Reform
,
John Maynard Keynes, p. 204.

reserves; while under Fisher’s original plan, the
hanks would he required to maintain gold reserves
just as they do at present. In the first case, sta-
bilization is accomplished through the discretionary
control of credit hy the hanks; in the latter, a
stable price level depends partly upon mandatory
changes in the mint price of gold.^
Consumers'’ Credit, Foster and Patchings
There is another group of monetary reform-
ers, including Messrs, Foster and Patchings, J. p.
Hobson, and others, who advocate the creation of
"consumers’ credits" of various kinds. The basic
idea underlying these proposals is that purcha-aing
power in the hands of consumers is not adequate to
buy the total productive output. The shortage of
purchasing power is attributed to the fact that in-
dustry withholds money from consumers, or that con-
signers themselves save too large a part of their
earnings. These writers hold that production and
consumption should be kept in proper balance by an
even flow of money "from producer to consumer and
from consumer to producer." Many such proposals in-
clude something in the nature of a bonus for every-
body. These economists have made a very real contri-
bution to the stable money movement and their views
X . Monetary Reform, Jolin Maynard Keynes, pp . 203-204.
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have been sccepted, in pent, by economists who belong
to other schools of thought. There is much truth in
Foster end Catchings’ basic theory. The peaks end
velleys of the business cycle could be considerebly
smoothed if there were "sufficient control over fluc-
tuetions in the emount of money available for use in
consumption."^
1 A criticism of Foster end Cetchings’ theory
of the "circuit flow of money," which in no wey de-
tracts from the velue of the concept, is directed at
the idea that savings cannot be effected without dimin-
ishing the aggregate sum of money which flows to pro-
ducers. Goodbar observes that the flaw in this reason-
ing is the assumption that "productive activity is con-
fined to producing consumption goods." Savings are
not usually hoarded, but are rather used very quickly
to produce more durable goods. Savings are thus quickly
returned to the productive process.
Keynes, who has a good word to say for these
"over-saving or under-consumption" theories, neverthe-
less concludes that '"it is a large volume of saving
which does not lead to a correspondingly large volume
of investment (not one which does ) which is the root
1. Money
,
Foster and Catchings, p. 231.
2. Managing the People’s Honey, Joseph Ernest Goodbar,
p. 21,
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of the trouble."^ The ergument upon which Keynes
bases this conclusion is a little involved, but
logical. Simply stated, in terms familiar to
jCmericans, it meeJis that earnings are divided into
two parts, current consumption and savings, and
that the savings of the individual consumer may or
may not be invested by a borrowing entrepreneur.
If savings are invested in producers* goods, the
investment is, in a sense, consumption -- productive
consumption. If savings are not invested, current
consumption plus productive consumption do not equal
earnings. Palling prices and curtailed production
2inevitably result.
"Gentle Deflation," G. D. H. Cole
There are a number of stabilization prob-
lems created by the trend of decreasing costs in in-
dustry. Any change which increases the efficiency of
the factors of production tends to lower the prices
of the particular articles as well as the general
level of prices. In recent years there have been
great technological improvements and the speed with
which improved methods have been introduced is accel-
erating. Such changes are taking place continually
1. A Treatise on Money, John Maynard Keynes, Vol.I,
p. 179.
id. Ibid., pp. 171-184.
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and rapidly. There is, therefore, p constant pres-
sure on prices. If the unit cost of producing an
article falls, the producer can naturally sell the
article at a correspondingly lower price and still
make a profit. If the old price is retained the
producer’s profit is increased by the amount of the
reduction in unit costs. If the total amount of
money end credit remains constant, prices fall, and
the consumer will, theoretically at least, get the
benefit of the improvement. On the other hand, if
the monetary authorities increase the total volume
of money and credit enough to offset the effect of
the tecimological improvements, prices will not fall
and the producer will get the advantage of the higher
price. What the monetary authorities should do about
this tendency toward falling prices is an important
practical question, and there is a wide range of
opinion about it among monetary economists, among
whom there are deflationists, gentle deflationists,
stabilizationists
,
and gentle inflationists.
During the years preceding 1929 there were
unusually great technological advances in industry.
Who profited by the increased efficiency? Fraser,
who is a gold standard deflationist, says that "the
consumer was deprived of the advantage of lower prices
>
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tlirough the inflation’ s keeping up to the level of
prices."^ However, his conclusion does not seem to
be consistent with the facts. Between 1925 and 1929
prices of commodities fell. During the same years
2
money wages rose. Therefore, real wages must have
risen. The advantages of increased efficiency were
passed on to the consumer in the form of a higher
standard of living. G-. D.. H. Cole, who is not so
much in sympathy with the drastic deflationists, and
might more accurately be described as a ^gentle defla-
tionist." believes that the best policy is "to .allow
price levels to fall" slightly, to pertly offset in- •
creasing efficiency in any of the factors of production.
He would, at the same time follow p deliberate policy
of raising wages and taxes. One would be disinclined
to quarrel with the combination of lower prices, higher
wages and higher taxes. In fact, it seems a little
Utopian. However, any deflation, even "gentle deflp-
tion" over a prolonged period, transfers an unfairly
large proportion of the country’s wealth to those
having fixed incomes and to the creditor class, many
of whom are non-producers. Another serious disadvantage
of Cole’s plan is that there would be little incentive
to improve either the product or the method of i)roduc-
tion, if the profit v;ere to be lost in lower prices
1. Greet Britain and the G-old Standard , H. F. Fraser
p"^ 79
. !
2. Gold and Prices, Warren end Pearson, pp . 525-326.
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and higher wages. A third difficulty with the plan
is the fact that when prices are falling buyers hold
back from making purchases, a fact which accoimts for
the depressed conditions that always accompany falling
prices
.
dentle Inflation, Robertson
The history of price fluctuations shows be-
yond dispute that periods of gently rising prices have
been periods of prosperity and usually periods of in-
dustrial peace and good will. On the other hand,
periods of falling prices seem to induce depression
and industrial strife. Even mild deflation dampens
the enthusiasm of business men. What the business
man thinks determines the course of business to a
very greet extent. Prospects of profit motivate ex-
pansion. Taking this fact into considere tion, Mr. D.H
Robertson holds that we should create a spirit of opti
mism among business men by mildly raising prices, a
sort of "gentle inflation." Robertson’s reason for
advocating occasional or "gentle" inflation is not so
simple as the above statement suggests. He argues
that during periods of inflation the capital equip-
ment of the community is increased because wages lag
behind prices, a condition which results in induced
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spving by the community es e whole. Of course the
savings go into the pockets of the entrepreneur class,
a circumstance which does increase the permanent wealth
of the community. During periods of deflation the re-
verse is the case. As Keynes points out, ’‘higher real
wages .... are enjoyed during a slump .... at the ex-
pense of normal capital accumulations.'*^ Keynes is
mildly sympathetic with Robertspn' s view. He concedes
that there is need at times for "rapid transition" (for
exa-mple, in war time) when forced saving and more rapid
capital accumulation are justifiable. Inflation of any
kind involves the transfer of wealth from one class to
another. If the wealth so transferred were recovered
by the comraunity in the form of taxes such a "gentle"
inflation would involve no injustice and needless de-
pressions would be avoided.
100;^ System, Fisher
There is an ultra-conservative proposal
that is being sponsored by a number of economists,
and which is rapidly gaining friends even among
bankers, who are usually a little slow to recognize
the virtue in proposed changes. The plan is to revert
to the very early deposit banking practice of requiring
1. A Treatise on Money, John Maynard Keynes, p. 293.
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100^ reserves. A Currency Commission would furnish the
cssh in exchange for part of the assets of the commer-
cial hanks, which assets would either be sold to the
Currency Commission or deposited as security. In prac-
tice, the plan would be somewhat similar to the pur-
chasing of securities in the open market by the Federal
Reserve banks or probably not unlike the rediscounting
of commercial paper. In any case, the commercial banks
would be required to keep permanently cash reserves of
100^ against demand deposits. This requirement would
virtually convert the banks into warehouses for cash.
The commercial banks would cease to be "private mints,"
but they would continue to carry on a checking business.
Checks would be drawn against actual cash deposits. If
a bank had demand deposits of ^1,000,000 on the books
it would have to have |l, 000, 000 of cash on hand.
The principle of 100^ reserves has been ap-
plied to the gold notes of the United States and par-
tially applied to the notes of the Bank of England.
There is no honest reason why the same rule should not
apply to deposit credit issued by commercial banks.
The practice of lending the same money five or ten
times over, as our commercial banks are doing, is not
conservative, as some suppose. It is the old system
of the goldsmiths, who began lending money that had
r't.
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Mti tufiS: '^Unie I ns .BriJ.’xnablcs add lo
been entrusted to them for s sfe-keeping . Credit that
is not becked by 100^ reserves is fist credit. The
creation of a given amount of credit has an inflationary
effect which is equal to that caused by a comparable
quantity of "wild cat" notes. The right to issue cur-
rency is a prerogative of government and the banks have
usurped this right. Commercial banks should be in the
business of lending money and the "minting" of credit
is not an integral part of the loan function.
The simplicity of the 100,^ system, its funda-
mental soundness, and the ease with which it could be
introduced commend it above a number of less conserva-
tive plans that have been proposed. Currently the banks
are complaining because they are virtually forced to buy
government obligations. The interest-bearing debt of
the United States on August 10, 1938, was $36,777,225,101^
of which about one -third is owed to the banks of the coun-
try. If a Currency Commission were to relieve the banks
of these government debts, giving in exchange government
notes, or Currency Commission notes, the banks Vvould
then have sufficient reserves to go immediately on a
100^ reserve basis.
It ought to be clear that the banks, the pub-
lic, and the government would all benefit by this transfer
1. The ji.nna.list, i?ugust 10, 1938.
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of government securities and a reversion to sound
deposit banking. In the first place, government
obligations do not yield a very high return, and
the banks would be in a position to deal in more
profitable investments. The revenue from the secuT-
ities which the banks would forego would be more then
compensated for by service charges and the degree of
safety that the whole banking system would enjoy.
That the public would benefit by such a reversion to
ultra-conservative deposit banking goes without say-
ing. Runs on banks and bank failures would practically
end. Banking and the monetary system would be simpli-
fied. Inflation, resulting from the creation of bank
deposits out of nothing would cease, and the monetary
authority (the Currency Commission) could, in such a
system, mancige the volimie of currency in such a way
as to prevent deflation and consequent business depres-
sions .
Between 1929 and 1932 the Federal Reserve
banks induced the banks of the country to destroy about
^9,000,000,000 of credit that had previously been cre-
ated by the System. Studies made in recent years of
the ratio of the circulating medium to national income
show that there must be a ratio of about one dollar to
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Economistsabout every three dollars of production.^
understand that there can be ’’bottlenecks” in the
form of shortages of a particular kind of material
which limits the volume of production. This may also
be true of a shortage of transportation. It is not
so widely realized, hov/ever, that there are financial
'‘bottlenecks" as well. A shortage of money limits
capacity and in a rather definite ratio. It takes
about one dollar of credit to support three dollars
of yearly production. If a dollar of credit is des-
troyed, yearly production is limited by about three
dollars. According to Robert H. Hemphill, former
Credit Manager of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, total circulation in 1929, including cash
end credit, amounted to $27,000,000,000. National
income in that year rose to $81,000,000,000, or three
times the amount of the total circulation. By 1932
total circulation had shrunk to fib, 000, 000, 000 and
national income to $48,000,000,000. The ratio of the
circulating medium to total national production was
still the same; three to one. Hemphill finds that
this proportion of circulation to production persists
"with remarkable constancy, under widely varying
p
conditions." It is obvious that the destruction of
1. 100/b Money
,
Irving Fisher, Foreword by Robert H.
Hemphill, p. XX.
2. Ibid.
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$9,000,000,000 of creait by the private banks of the
country cre&ted an artificial monetary "bottleneck"
and reduced national income by $27,000,000,000.
The Retirement of Government Bonds for Notes
/ government bond that, is issued in exchange
for the savings of the people is not inflationary, but
when bonds are issued in exchange for the created
credit of the Federal Reserve banks, as has been done
in recent years, such financing is inflationary. An
issue of bonds in exchange for anything but savings
is just as inflationary as an issue of legal tender
notes. Furthermore, this type of government financ-
ing is more than a little ridiculous. / bond is an
interest-bearing liability, while a government note
or a bank credit is a non-interest-bearing liability.
The bonds of the United States have behind them the
taxing power of the government and all of the prop-
erty and income of the nation. The same is true of
government legal tender notes. The government ex-
changes its interest-bearing liabilities, backed by
the best credit in the world, for the non-interest-
bearing liabilities of the banks. The procedure is
every bit as inflationary as though the government
issued its legal tender notes in the first place.
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Billions of dollars* worth of government ohligetions
have been purchased by the Federal Reserve banks with
checks drawn on credits which had been crested out of
nothing for the purpose of making loans to the govern-
ment, There is no legitimate reason why such bonds
should not be retired immedistely. Sucii retirement
would clear the v/ay for monetary control which would
prevent inflation and place the government in a posi-
tion to insist upon sound banking. There has been a
great deal of mythology written about the evils of
government legal tender. vVell-informed monetary
economists know that if the carefully sponsored
prejudice against government notes could be counter-
acted, much progress toward stabilization could be
accomplished through the retirement of the govern-
ment debt
.
Stabilization, an /ccomplished Fact
The question as to whether or not the price
level can be controlled is no longer a matter of theory.
Monetary authorities in various parts of the world have
actually accomplished their various objectives in the
matter of practically pegging the general level of
prices within predetermined ranges. Yet Mr. Keynes’
"practical bankers,'* with their reasonable doubts and

"carefully fostered" monetary mysteries, are des-
perately concealing and minimizing the facts. They
say that the Swedish stabilization of the price level
was a mere accident. They would have us believe that
the experiment in Australia is Socialism. They over-
look the fact that while Governor Strong lived the
Federal Reserve Board prevented extreme Inflation
and deflation for seven years. Little or nothing is
said about the fact that in 1932, during the last year
of President Hoover’s adninistr ation, extraordinary
things happened to the price level as a result of an
active policy of re-inflation. Probably, the guard-
ians of esoteric monetary mysteries could tell us who
controlled the deflation of 1929-1932.
t
Stabilization in Sweden
The price level does not change in any math-
ematical ratio in response to control, but the history
of money and prices of the past fifteen years proves
beyond dispute that price levels do respond to control
as planned. At times stabilization through monetary
control has been attained under extraordinary diffi-
culties. For example, stabilization was accomplished
in Sweden in spite of the Kreuger collapse which oc-
curred six months after control was attempted. Fur-
thermore, during the early period of Swedish
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st sbilizat ion, world prices were declining with
unusual momentum. This eccomplishment is sn ex-
cellent example of stabilization at a predetermined
price level. As Professor Fisher spys, ”The three
results are precisely what Sweden set out to accom-
plish; namely, halting deflation, preventing infla-
tion, and stabilizing the Krona at home at the level
of September 1931."^ In this remarkable experiment
the Riksbank kept the cost-of-living index within
l.'7% of its predetermined norm, a fact which supports
Professor Fisher’s belief, ®that it is possible to
move price levels about at will." That Sweden did
control the consumption price level, as she set out
to do, a fact formerly declared impossible, may be
seen from the following table;
T^LE VII
VARIOUS COmODITY PRICE INDEXES OF S^VEDEN
(May 1952 to May 1934)
e
' May
1952
May
1934
Rise
All Goods TO^^ 113 4
Exported Goods 109 119 10
Imported Goods 93 95 2
Domestic Goods 110 116 6
a. The Economics of Inflation
,
Willis and Chapman,
Supplementary Essay, Price Reflation by Erik T.H.
Kjellstrom, p. 428.
1. Sizable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 402.

There is great reluctance on the part of
many monetary economists to concede the remarkable
benefits that are accruing to Sweden from the stabil-
iz^ion policy adopted in 1921. In fact, some deny
flatly that Sweden has stcibilized. It is argued that
the apparent stability is an accident resulting from
the fact that one group of commodities happened to go
up just enough to offset another group v/hich happened
to go down. It is true that Swedish monetary experts
were not a little troubled by their early inability
to raise the wholesale price level at the same time
that they were stabilizing the consumption index.
However, subsequent changes in the trends of their,
various price indexes, as computed by Kommerskollegiom,
seem to indicate a somewhat greater degree of success.
If reflation was the purpose of Sweden’s monetary action,
her policy was unsuccessful. However, reflation was not
the primary purpose of Sweden’s policy. The following
quotation shows that the objective in 1931 vie.s stabil-
ity.
"Mainly perhaps to reassure the public
of its intention to prevent inflation, the
Riksbank, upon abandoning gold, announced
(with the agreement of the Swedish govern-
ment) that it intended at least to maintain
the purchasing power of the Krone in the
hands of the consumers. Thus, for the first
time in history, a country, announced that
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its policy would "be that of stabilizing
the currency, not with regard to gold
or with regard to foreign exchange, but
with regsj?d to the internsl purchasing
power of its money.
Sweden is still committed to a policy of
stabilization of the domestic price level as dis-
tinguished from stabilization of exchange. If the
1931 policy viffs not a success, why did not Sweden
fbandon it? This policy was approved by the
Riksbank, the Minister of Finance, and the leading
monetary economists of Sweden. Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that the Swedish policies of 1932 and
1933 have been merely modifications of the policy
of the preceding year, which was not reflation, but
stabilization.
At various times during the past seven
years observers of conditions in Sweden have reported
extraordinary business improvement there. The country
has not only emerged from the slump, but has recovered
to such an extent that the situation is being compared
to the prosperity of pre-depression days. Many of the
export industries have more orders than they can fill.
Since 1933 there has been an unmis-
takable expansion v/hich has carried the
level of economic activity beyond that
1. Stable Money
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Irving Fisher, p. 320.
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i^svcoei 8«.-t 3«<i .quits' eta '«o-ri beg-ieae
'cXno Son set
3-vaqwo »bX0tf «cii«&xi edt »atX anoXxe
<ia ..ov;6 ca
da to v.naa .e^abpoioae'vqeo-oaq to
-{aXtec o.ia oa
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T-ivI-ioj oxraoiioos aO
.OSe . ' , -r:-AeXt'1iaiv^:l t^enoM jg
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of the prosperous yepr 1929. The abso-
lute tot&l of unemployment registered
by the Unemployment Institute diminished
from p maximum of 189,000 at the beginning
of 1933 to 50,000 in the third querter of
1935.-^
More recent reports of conditions in
Sweden show that prosperity has been sust&lned.
Conditions hpve been so good there that Sweden’s
index of industrial production was recently reported
at IbO as compared with an index of 100 in 1928.^
Professor Fisher calls attention to the
remarkable stability of the cost of living index,
which he says the Riksbank undertook to stabilize.
"Starting with 100 in September, 1931,
it never rose higher than 101.7, and never
fell below 98.4, for thirty-five months;
that is, up to Jiugust, 1934. In other words,
it ranged from 1.7^ above, to 1 . below the
chosen par; and usually the deviation from
par was less than 1%.
The decline which occurred in the Swedish |
wholesale commodity price index before /pril 1933 I
Iis not to be compered with the severe deflations
,|
ii
that took place in other countries during those !l
months. Countries that were not following a stabili-
zation policy at that time were victims of e directed I
1. Monetary Policy and Crises
,
Brinley Thomas, pp.220-
222 .
2. Editorial by D. W. Ellsworth, The ?*nnpllst
,
July 1,
p . 2 .
3. Stable Money
,
Irving Fisher, p. 324.
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deflation, tiie purpose of which, according to
Professor Soddy, wps to reduce the w'orkingman
to the subsistence level.
^
Stebilizgtion in Australia
The current stability of l^ustralian prices
is further proof of whpt can be done by planned con-
trol. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia undertook
to stabilize the domestic purchasing power of the
itustralian pound at a level which was predetermined,
but, \mlike the Swedish experiment, the level decided
upon v^as a higher level. In other words, the /'ustr aligns
reflated first and stabilized afterward. fustralia, like
Sweden, is leading the world out of the depression --
leading the world by pointing the way.
Familiar Devices
If the risk of trusting too much to private
bankers were not so great and if the instruments of
stabilization had not been used so recently to demor-
alize jfimerican industry and finance, stabilization
could be accomplished without scrapping the present
system. The P’edercl Reserve System has a number of
very efficient devices which have at times been used
1. The Role of Money, Frederick Soddy, p. 197
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successfully to smooth out the peaks and valleys of
price movements. Most of these devices have a direct
or an indirect effect on the volume of credit. If
these devices ere properly used, it would not be
necessary to temper with gold or with paper money.
Devices such as '*open market" operations, changes of
the rediscount rate, raising or lowering of the re-
serve ratios, and "moral suasion" are expedients that
would probably be used in any practical plan that can
be devised. But it is necessary that these devices be
used to stabilize the price level rather than to un-
settle it.
Rediscount Rates
The most important of the devices ordinarily
used is the rediscount rate, which the central banks
raise to prevent prices from rising excessively, and
lower to encourage borrowing and to raise prices when
there is a tendency for them to decline. Pn advance
in the rate restricts borrowing, as it is not so
profitable to borrow at high rates. The margin of
profit is reduced. On the other hand, borrowing is
stimulated by low rates.
During periods of extreme boom or drastic
slump, demand for loans is inelastic. If 'a real
psychology of boom exists, raising the rate a point
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or two causes little, if eny, curtailment of demand
for lo&ns. In 1920, the discount rate was raised to
l^/o. On the other hand, the inelasticity of demand
for loans is even more baffling during a drastic
slump. Jjuring a depression the demand for loans by
the public seems to be displaced by an unfilled de-
mand for borrowers on the part of the banks. It is
conceivable that interest rates could be dropped to
a negative point or below zero, as Silvio Gesell sug-
gests, but such schemes are as yet considered imprac-
tical.^ Changes in the rate are still limited as they
approach zero. Low rates alone are not as effective
a stimulant to borrowing as high rates are in curbing
a boom. The efficiency of changes in discount rates
in either direction depends on borrowers, and while
borrowers may be discouraged by excessively high rates,
it is not so easy to induce them to borrow under de-
pressed conditions even if money rates are low.
Open Market Operations
It is usually necessary, particularly dur-
ing a period of depression, to supplement the changes
in rates by other devices such as open-market opera-
tions. The banks merely buy or sell in the markets,
just as other buyers or speculators do. Theoretically,
1. The Role of Money, Frederick Soddy, p. 175.
'i’ ^fhw'wxAj- ^ j^^ma
L-' ', 'i7ff5.i^
li'''i0Xrfd’iI B^ziJsiO c'*i^ 'lo
o^ ''i& ,niJ ‘. ;exi4o£.
'•“'’ 7 .vv^. , :;c.-. v.*,
bw'ini^h nO .$S
.
.
'/^,-
‘'‘
••.'
-
'
^^'
,,
- .-.
.
.Ojti^^ i^ git.pTWd' &1X01E «6V« Bl:efl«&I
.f ' i«. '':’^%ll*'-^v -'^ '-
'
' ^'
•
'
'^ '^
yd" a,m.4« X udl b£f«aiei);i &.cfcr^ dpi R86iqi^ w . qtauXsV
.
-
-
- SvlL •-. . , . -,’jf* •»' . - **
^ v>*
.-VjJ
<h:
.
> ‘
..
/i-
«'>i> jbPlXrifUi'it^ \cf beosiqeXb ©d^p? smses olXdi/q e»dj
el .eia/s»d ef£4Oid xto^e^ievtoi^oa ‘lot'^riaa
. .
•
^. . .
*.'. t’f~-
,;
•^:. , ,,
1 >
''"''<V''^#'‘
' " '
Cvf jbsaqadlf ad i>.£doP ?^dd . ©Xw
MBQ&ti oXvXia aii- ,o^s«s woX^d •ip ddl b
.
/'
^'‘
'
'if'"
-os'tqmi JiSdPX/i anoP ©Tj® B©m©iipS''
X
0O ^6Jeft3
sa f>©aiaa.X
pvIffffSt^e fti3' upn 8Sd.:©d woi •bdss doBPxqqs
di 66d»d iStffXitfd'idod od ^Jx^XiuiRlJa »
--- e©4i*‘i dfXj/pp»X6 nX 'io ^odsXoX^I© 6
'
*’ '"
'•
'
r. 'f: 7- •
,*' '
'
^ Lii'i] V?
:
.
oMdsp- dpi4ppd:lD;^d©d4X©^ nl
^
feo.dBd ;4|;i4;..^X©vXe'e-©^
Ttoaipd ,p>t os^ion^fiX dl
'
’
'•-^i
.
'^’ '"^
,
irX* :•>-
-
‘
..-.w
•K
'b ^ • daoi4gd©pQ d©3£dQl£'
•
.
,-A'
.,;,
^
-
.
•
^li
-‘i/jfc TXdftXif'did^q tTStssaeoad •tXX^BJa- a.X
t'-ani “ijidedo deai'iaDi'^xipqo a« 4bjperfS«dliirp'i?^^T^ b&js'I nx
RCBIr. ^ £ ^.rrfN. ««•# riif •*#- r-A:rc.^M Arf^ « lV/^ r ."t
‘pdT .edoXd
'*rs
-
XdP^
_
d id4 'tA^ - «
X
i‘ vr^-
KSi . ^ r '
221
it makes little difference whgt is bought or sold;
notes, bonds, stocks, or commodities. However, in
practice, such purchases and sales are of government
or very high grade securities. The purchase of secur-
ities in the open market has the effect of increasing
the quantity of money or credit in the member banks.
In the United States purchases are made by checks drav/h
on the Federal Reserve banks end these checks represent
Federal Reserve Bank Credit. These operations, there-
fore, have the effect of increasing the credit of mem-
ber banks with the Federal Reserve banks. It can be
seen that open market operations are a somewhat more
direct means of control. The Federal Reserve banks can
take the initiative and control the volume of reserve
credit directly. Open market purchases or sales con-
stitute a powerful aid in making effective changes in
the discount rates.
The Automatic and Progressive Control
of Credit -- Snyder
Carl Snyder, head of the Statistical Department
of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, made a suggestion
which would end some of the discretionary phases of open
market control. He planned to make changes in the dis-
count rate and open market operations a matter of law.
;bl.08 TO hi sofld‘ie‘1‘111) elcl^iX aeifaffi ii
ni ,'iov^^oH .aelJlbomnoi) •so ^SJioo^ e » «J.->nocf .seion
i’dattin'is; voTSk ’Ic^ siif? aeX,»m X>nja Bdeaxio'ix/'j i:oi/a 1 001 ^ 04
*1(1
— i;/o-»3 e&3iio‘.u!q onX . E6i;ti'-Xi/oes dgln \:‘i9v tc
.^nhif^o-xonl lo doolie oiiJ b^M :feii*i^in noqo oriJ ni eel;ll
,
-iocrii^act oriu^ jrd 'IXiioTo to ^onoifi lo srf^f
'
•'^a^/uo o'Xjx eaeQXioTiXtj goiad'S OooInU oii^ nl
a'-ne^sTqan: axof>na 9soxl;t Jbna evaeeeH la'isbo'E ©iXc? no
~‘4'X9Xlct » anoit^B'T^sqo oeadT itXXAS eyTes^'H la'iooo'^
-m^.nr lo 5i:i'>e‘xo -sriy snlBasTonl ‘ic- ;^oa’xls oii:^ even tSio*!
ecf n.*o xfX ,*33inocf ovtoboH XsT©ije''i ©41^ 4jXv^' ejinau n&cf
sTcxrf J’rAxiwsiitor; '-s e*ie enoXJa'xeQC •^©Ji'xniJi nexio vJailJ ases
4LBO 8>4niSCf eTTeaeyi ©ff'i? .loTCfnoo io eiieoa JooTlJb
; cv*ioae*x *io oaniyX^v exic^ Xo*iJnoo x>na exi^ esitjiX
-noo b©Xb'& TO aog.tidoTiiQ jOjlTeiE ciecrO . ’irldoeTiXi cl’lL-^ to
sil aepjudo ©vZJoelle ^nliaaiK nl blj^ X;.lT8woq a e;rn;tl:te
.seiB'X XofiboeiX) Qd:i
ICTinqO avIeeeTgOT'X jbn© oli ainoJnjlit edT
t ~ -T-j-u6s *i0
in«riXT?ji56^ XKoiaal4t;dXb ©biT ‘I© boert ,T©b\:n2 iTaO
nox«Xecs2^x/«5: a eb^m ©VTeeoK IsTebaU :>^tcI we’*t eii3 lo
rieqo lo g^e^iiq "\j^Tiinol^©Toeli> ©xf»s lo ©(ndo bn© bLsJOW ilolilw
~slt- ©iiit nl ©©jfnaiio b©nnaXq ©H .XoTlnoo le^iTani
.taX lo. a aiToili**ioqo leifiem neqo ba& ojbt lonoo
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According to his plan, if the price level chenged hy
8 certein percentage, the discount rpte would plso
chcnge, sutomstically , pt the same time purchases
or sales would be made in the open market. Changes
in both the discount rate and in the holdings of
securities could be made at a progressively increas-
ing rate as the price level deviated from a previously
determined norm. One of the principal criticisms of
the Federal Ressrve Board has been that action in re-
gard to credit control was not timely. If Snyder’s
plan were adopted there would be no need of lengthy
conferences to decide upon a policy, and business men
vtfould know under whst circumsteinces a change in Federal
Reserve bank control was to take place.
The plan might be even more sensitive than
Snyder v/ould have it. Price-level changes are measured
in tenths of one per cent. If the price level dropped
one-tenth of one per cent from the normal level, the
banks might begin daily buying of an insignificant amount,
say ^10,000 worth of government securities. Ps the price
level continued to fall, if it did, the volume of pur-
chases would increase progressively, with each one-tenth
of one per cent. There would then be no sudden and unex-
pected change of open-market policy. Every day a pur-
chase or sale would be made the amount of which would
xd bSv%n<^.iio IgvoI -j 'IX Bid cJ ^u^t'iccoA
osl^ XsXwoi*? cXh'i smootlb eiU. tt
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to 3iTieioIXX*ic Xsqionl'Ui s4l lo bhQ .ri^on iBnisriBleb
-&.% nl qcXXo» XaxtX iS$ad sad ©V‘ita$il' Isiefoe'l eril
IX ,xl^td .^.oa lo^laoD libB’io oX X)-ii#3
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sjBXil BvliUBi^Ba <^qom ixovo - t>d exlT
bsiiisgterro o*r-^ ©agxisrf':) i©voX-t^i>X‘i^ . 'U. ov«d ^'Xbow
leva! sol'in odl II .»taeo ©no lo ad^tno:) tii
edcf tItfvsX iBHrion Bitd iftonl ^nao *iaq ano lo xictnau-eno
o'-nQoXlInslBnX n X lo jini'NjoO' ’^Xlgl) nX^sd Hi^lti: a^Xnad
aoXnq adl b% . aoX ji'iuroaa Xn©mn"ievo;i lo ri^Jnow? 000^01^ \'t*e
-noq lo aim/Icv aflX, vbib IX IX tXX«?,l ol baf/nUnco XevaX
/ riJnad-feno do«e dtX^ ^'^^^©vX,^ea‘xsQ^^‘I aaaeloftX bliscw e^e^^do
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-nqq a x*^b '^navi. .\^oXXoq Xeiinaai-naqo /io ©gnado boJoaq
hli/g’’ rioJt^w lo sJb^m ad JbJjjow ©I-.js *io ae^do
depend upon the deviation from normal. Under the
present system, the sudden sv/eeping chenges, the
"putting on of the brakes, " is more likely to c&use
crises than to prevent them. Carl Snyder’s sugges-
tion is worthy of much consideration, not only be-
cause of his authoritative position, but also because
it would accomplish what many conflicting plans aim
to accomplish. It would take the important function
of control of the general credit situation out of the
hands of politicians and would relieve financiers of
the need of taking a position v/hich is contrary to
the trend of popular sentiment. There is no reason
why the brakes should not be put on at an Incipient
stage of a boom.
The banks are expected to "lead the market."
They have certainly failed to do so. They have been
unwilling'to do the unpopular thing at crucial times
and they have come under the influence of powerful
financiers -- special interests -- v;ho, for private
reasons, objected to changes. The greatest indictment
against the Federal Reserve banks is their failure to
lead the markets out of the very serious slump between
1929 end 1932. Action was postponed until May 1932
and then abandoned a few months later. The public
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has always expected the hanks to do more than merely
stop a crisis or moderate it. The banks can and should
prevent booms from developing. Automatic and progres-
sively higher discount rates combined with progressive
sales of government securities would end the boom phase
of the business cycle; lower rates and purchases of
securities would prevent the depressions.
During the spring and summer of 1952, open
market purchases of ^1,100,000,000 turned the depression
into revival. Stocks tripled in value in a few weeks.
Why this reflationary policy was abandoned is somewhat
of a mystery. Sentiment was so demoralized in the spring
of 1952 that even advocates of the policy were surprised
at its effectiveness. There can be no doubt that the
price level can be raised or lowered to any extent de-
sired by this one device alone. It is merely necessary
to buy enough government securities v;ith nev;ly created
Federal Reserve credit or with government notes. It is
claimed by some that bond buying during depression has
little or no effect on the price level. Experience
with this device under the most depressed conditions
seems to prove that the contrary is the case. If it
were true, as some economists argue, that the purchase
of government bonds during depression does not affect
the price level, then the entire national debt could
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be retired. We ere obliged to conclude that the purchase
of government securities by the Federal Reserve banks is
either inflationary or it is not. If it is not there
would be no harm in retiring the government debt; if it
is inflationary, then it can be used as an effective re-
flstionery or ant i-deflationary device.
The Discovery of “Open Market” Control -- Strong
It was a great calamity that Governor Strong
died. Theorists had advocated open market policies long
before 1921, but he discovered the practical possibilities
and, up to the time of his death, prevented business de-
pression and deflation through this end other credit
controls. In all probability, the great business de-
pression of 1929-195U would not have occurred if he had
lived. In 1921, the Federal Reserve banks tried to in-
crease their earning assets. In order to do so they
bought securities in the open market. To their very
great surprise, the result was the opposite from what
they expected. Their profits were reduced. This was
because the reserves of the member banks were increased
by the open market purchases. This enabled them to
curtail the rediscounting of paper vi/ith the central
banks. ^t first the reason for the further decrease
in profits was not clear to Federal Reserve bank offi-
cials. However, when it became clear that reserves
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could be increased or lowered by open market operations.
Governor Strong organized the Open Market Committee
which, under his guidance, succeeded in stabilizing
the price level until the fall of 1929.
The Open Market Committee was officially
recognized in the spring of 1925. During that year
inflation was prevented by the sale of |)525,000,000
of government securities. The sale of these millions
of government securities had the effect of reducing
the reserves of the member banks, thus forcing them
to rediscount more paper at the central banks. This
forced rediscounting made the banks less inclined to
lend money and the slight deflation of credit brought
the price level down. By 1924 a deflationary trend
developed and the committee reversed its policy. It
bought $510,000,000 of government securities up to
September 1924. At the same time the discount rate
was reduced from 4-f to 3^. Prices rose and by 1925
had reached a peak v/hich necessitated another reversal
of the Federal Reserve Bank’s credit control policy.
In each of the above cases, prompt action by the
Board in making purchases and sales in the open mar-
ket proved successful in curbing incipient inflation
or deflation.
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The Change of Reserve Requirements
There &re other devices which might be used
to supplement changes in the rediscount rptes. Under
the present system reserve requirements can be changed.
A recent doubling of reserve requirements within p few
months reduced excess reserves by enormous amounts.
Short of 100^, reserves could be raised indefinitely.
Manipulation of the reserve requirements in the present
system should not be confused with the proposal of 100^
reserves. The 100^ system would require other important
changes, such as the increase of the cash in the banks.
Within the present system such drastic changes in re-
serve requirements should be very infrequent. The objec-
tives could be attained without so much shock to the
business^w^rld as was experienced in 1937.
"Morel Suasion "
Various appeals by the Federal Reserve Board
for caution have an important psychological effect on
the markets merely because member banks know that these
suggestions are usually followed by action. This is
what is meant by "moral suasion." single bank in the
system knows that it is unsafe to ignore the warning of
the central bank, not only because action will be taken
by the central bank but also because the response of
thousands of banks may leave the one bank in a precarious
financial position. For instance, if thousands of banks
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begin calling loans, as they did in 1920, one bank
which may not have heeded the request of the central
bank, may find some of its loans frozen as a. result
of deflation. "Moral suasion'* has been used by the
Federal Reserve Board in ways that are exceedingly
questionable .
The complete success with which the Federal
Reserve banks upset the stability of prices in 1929
should never be forgotten and never overlooked when
making plans for the future. The success of the Federal
Reserve Board on that occasion demonstrates that another
agency of the governiiient could control the price level
and keep it stable.

CHAPTER IX
STABILIZATION ATTEMPTS THROUGH EASY MONEY^
Probably most important of all recent eco-
nomic innovations and an integral part of governmental
experiments the world over are the changed fiscal pol-
icies, Billions for social security added to the costs
of past wars and present rearmament programs left gov-
ernments with literally unbearable fiscal burdens. One
way of relieving the burden of these expensive social
experiments and a way that treasuries were at first
slow to see is a deliberate policy of easy money. How-
ever, today treasuries are borrowing at phenominally
low rates and apparently intend to continue to do so
into the indefinite future. This forced easy money
policy is not a local practice by any means, but the
accepted common practice of governments. Furthermore,
the policy seems to have the blessing of many brilliant
writers, among them John Maynard Keynes. Keynes con-
ceives *'a somewhat comprehensive socialization of
investment" as a means of securing an approximation to
full employment. In his ”Notes on the Trade Cycle" in
his recent book. The General Theory of Employment ,
Interest, and Money
,
he states his easy money ideas as
follows
:
1. The chapter was written in July 1937. bee footnote
relative to reserve req^uirements
,
p. 250.
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"The remedy for the boom Is not a higher
rate of interest but a lower rate of interest’.
For what may enable the so-called boom to last.
The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to
be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping
us permanently in a quasi- slump; but in abol-
ishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently
in a quasi-boom An increase in the rate
of interest, as a remedy for the state of af-
fairs arising out of a prolonged period of
abnormally heavy new investment, belongs to
the species of remedy which cures the disease
by killing the patient.”^
The Administration’s Dilemma
iunerican monetary authorities have rather
belatedly, but enthusiastically, adopted this phil-
osophy of permanently easy money, the idea that it is
necessary to fight deflation by cheap money, but not
including the old-fashioned notion that it is safe to
fight inflation by firm money. However, in its relig-
ious pursuit of this philosophy the Administration is
experiencing something of a crisis. How to prevent
the price level from rising and at the same time ad-
here to a policy of easy money is indeed* a dilemma.
A bear market in bonds since January 1957, with the
corresponding rise in yields, suggests that this ’’new
era" philosophy of easy money is to become history
like much of the economics of the "New Deal" in
record-breaking time. Indeed, the long-term peak of
the bond market is doubtless history right now.
1. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money, pp. 522-323.
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The Inflation Brakes
If not carried, to extremes, or used as a
cure for all economic ills, reasonably low money rates
have certain great advantages, not only for government
treasuries, but also for the social welfare. Histor-
ically there never has been a business depression that
was not stopped by idle funds. ^ The recent depression
was no exception to this rule. Cheap credit forced on
the country is a positive recipe for revival, nut now
that the reflation has "caught,” now that the debt
burden, both public and private, has been relieved,
now that the general solvency of the nation is assured,
should we use the brakes to avoid a boom, or is this
politically impossible, as many economists have be-
lieved all along? Or is Keynes right? Can we have a
permanent boom? There are many who believe, with
L. E. Pierson, that "a subordinating of most other
considerations of monetary policy to that of main-
taining easy money is likely to bring considerable
difficulties in the long run.'*^
Parties Interested
Pressure for the maintenance of easy money
rates is likely to come from unexpected sources. ¥/ho
1. A Basis for Stability
,
Samuel Crowther, p. 44.
2. Speech at A.B.A. Graduate School of Banking, L.E.
Pierson ^Reported in the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, Vo. 145, No. 3759, July 10, 1957.
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are the interested parties? The Treasury Department
is in the market for funds and refunding. The banks
with heavy investments in bonds are nervous lest a
reversal of easy money policy deflate the value of their
assets before they can be distributed. Commercial banks
hold $12,990,000,000 of the government debt,^ Large
investors in bonds are in a similar position with bond
markets too soft for them to cut down in any volume.
Furthermore, holders of common stocks are well aware
that a stock market that has been rallying for two
years, walking on easy money stilts as it were, is
extremely sensitive to any correction in the bond mar-
ket, Probably Mr, Eccles knows how to keep all of these
groups happy and at the same time prevent the wholesale
price level from soaring as it threatened to do a few
months ago, between November 1, 1936 and December 31,
p
1936, wholesale prices rose 12^.
The President
Maturing obligations of the Government with-
in the next five years will amount to approximately
$13,000,000,000. Furthermore, a balanced budget seems
to be very far around the corner. Income tax revenues
for March-^1937 fell $150,000,000 short of expectations.
The President does not seem disposed as yet to favor a
1. Slump Ahead in Bonds
,
Major L.L.B. #ngas, p. 25.
2. Ibid.
,
p. 42,
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balanced budget, and if he did, doubtless Congress
would override his veto in the matter of lerge ex-
penditures. In spite of all the economy talk.
Congress has appropriated more than !^7, 500, 000, 000
this year, and a deficiency appropriation for unan-
ticipated expenditures must yet be passed. Ipril 1,
the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Morgenthau, an-
nounced that the Treasury vrould support the govern-
ment bond market to the extent of preventing disor-
derly decline. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, Mr. Eccles, has repeatedly expressed a desire
to maintain an easy money policy. It would seem from
the expressed desires of Mr. Eccles and the position
of the Government in the matter of large-scale financ-
ing, that one might certainly expect nothing but an
easy money policy from government sources. If that
were the case one could gamble heavily on it that we
would get easy money. However, Major J^ngas, an analyst
of uncanny foresight, and a friend of the Administration,
suggests that an additional 1% on government conversions
would result in merely an extra $150,000,000 more per
annum on:a budget -vdiich is over $7,000,000,000. Major
Angas believes that this would be a small price to pay
in order to prevent a harmful commodity price inflation.
The Major goes much further end says:
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"Indeed, if Machievelli, insteed of
Mr, Morgantheu, was Manager of the National
Debt, it might almost be said that he,
might become positively anxious for a fell
in the bond market (due to high interest
rates) so that he could buy back the exist-
ing debt at lower levels, out of the proceeds
of taxation or Vvith the income derived from
Social Insurance."^
So, in spite of all that has been said by
our monetary authorities, particularly by Mr. Eccles,
in the matter of easy money, it is not at all certain
that they may not find it to the interest of their
various offices to change their minds.
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board
An apparent conflict between the Treasury
Department and the Federal Reserve Board would arise
if it were not for the abandonment of classical the-
ories of interest rates. Cheap goverrjnent financing
would conflict with what used to be considered a need
for firmer interest rates. As it is now, even the
Interests of the member banks are in some ways in
harmony with the policy of the monetary authorities
and in some ways not, Comir.erclal banks hold
$12,990,000,000 of the government debt, or did, on
June 30, 193b. A rise in interest rates means a de-
cline in the market value of these holdings. On the
other hand, the chief business of the banks is, or
1. Slump /heed in Bonds, Major L.L.B. Angas, p. 18.
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was, not the business of Investing in government debt,
but rather the lending of money and credit. Whether
the banks stand to lose or gain on balance by a change
in the long-term yield on bonds is a matter of arith-
metic. The following table is interesting in this
connection:
T;®LE VIII
Who Holds . the Government Debt ^
(June 50, 1936)
Per Cent
Investors Billions of
Total
Commercial Banks 12.99 38.9
Savings Banks 1.85 5.5
Postal Savings .80 2.5
12 Federal Reserve Banks 2.43 7.2
Government i\gencies 1.48 4.4
49 Life Insurance Companies 5.55 10 .
6
Veteran’s Adjusted Service Bonds .71 2.1
Private Trust Funds and Individuals 9.74 29.0
ToT5
(a) Slump Ahead in Bonds, Major L.L.B. Angas
,
p. 25.
The banks seem to be between the devil and
the deep blue sea. As Major /ngas points out, "the
banks hold about $14,000,000,000 of long-term bonds.
Consequently, a 10^ decline in such bonds (due to a
rise in long-term Interest rates) might imply a depre-
ciation of nearly $1,400,000,000 in assets."^ On the
1. Slump Ahead in Bonds, Major L.L.B. /.ngas, p. 56.
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other hand, unless long-term interest rates do rise
other interest rates certainly will not, and it is doubt-
ful th&t commercial banks can meet the costs of perform-
ing the usual banking services and make a profit, j?re
we undermining the banking structure of the country?
It cannot be overemphasized that local bankers, like
the general public, ere victims of much of the finen-
cial juggling of recent years. Certainly the local
banker whose business was the granting and investigat-
ing of local loans knew little of what was behind the
privately managed credit deflation of 1929-^30-31-32-33.
With the rest of us he has reason to desire the liqui-
dation of giant financial pirates.
However, there is a tendency to assume that
comrriercial banks and other investors all bought secur-
ities at the top of the market and that they are wronged
in some way if anything is done to prevent them from
getting out. No one advances this theory, but it cer-
tainly is implied. Relatively few paid the top price
for either bonds or stocks. Holders of common stocks
are, however, well aware that the two-year rally in
the stock market that ended in March was due to easy
money and that the stock market is bound to be very
sensitive to correction in bond prices and bond yields.
If the Government finds it necessary or expedient to
let the market for government bonds down by easy stages.
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stock prices will certainly resume the downward trend
by somewhat less easy stages. Those who have been bear-
ish on the market for months and who are still standing
by with one eye on Mr. Eccles can be dispassionate about
this. There is a tendency for persons who are long in
the market to be a little bitter about it. Most specu-
lators, and many investors, feel about the social welfare
in the way so admirably expressed by Commodore Vanderbilt;
’’The public be damned.*' In fact, it is very difficult to
think straight on any of these questions unless one is on
the sidelines, and very fev»f are.
The Public
The interests of the public, as represented
by the opinions of their representatives in Congress,
should be mentioned -- merely as a theoretical matter.
The Roosevelt Dynasty has so successfully set aside any
tampering with the administration’s monetary policy that
any interference by Congress, apart from the making of
appropriations, is hardly to be considered as a practi-
cal matter. The Thomas Amendment is an example of what
is likely to happen when Congress takes a direct hand
in such matters. The issuing of $5,000,000,000 of
United States currency was made discretionary with the
President and he merely forgot about it. The measure,
as a mandatory measure, simply could not have been
passed.
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The Shifting of Power from
New York to Yifashington
The responsibility for managing the currency
and credit is very definitely in Washington. It is
comforting to realize that the financial oligarchy
that directed the deflation of 1929-32 is no longer
in control. Nevertheless, unparalleled power has been
concentrated in the hands of a few representatives of
a political party, whose general program has at times
proved hasty and rash. Furthermore, there seems to be
a reluctance to disclose the rules. Forecasting has
become almost wholly a matter of guessing what is in
the minds of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Eccles. Why cannot
the rules be made public? Why not put the cards on the
table? Why keep the nation in the dark as to the fiscal
program? Why all the secrecy about stabilization and
monetary management? A speech by Mr. Eccles is likely
to change values on the Stock Exchange in billions of
dollars. This has actually happened during the past
fev/ months, in the spring of 1937. Yet no one knov;s
the rules.
'^Vhimsical Policy
'While it is knovm that the monetary authority
can, or could, raise the reserve requirements 100^, or
that the twelve Federal Reserve banks can sell the
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1^2,526,190,000^ holdings of government bonds, no one
knows when or under whet conditions these things ere
likely to take place. It is elso known that the monetary
authority has almost unlimited additional powers, but it
is not known under what conditions these financial dic-
tators ere likely to meke some world-shaking decision.
The one thing that v/e are sure of is that inflation or
deflation, in large or small doees, can be turned on
and off at will. Those who realize the importance of
such power hope that it will be used wisely. pn inde-
pendent monetary authority is more important than en
independent judiciary. There is some hope now of re-
teining the latter, but not much hope of attaining the
former.
Passing of the Business Cycle, j^ngas
In spite of the uncertainty engendered by
our whimsical monetary authority there is already some
talk of another "new era," # belief in a perpetuation
of business prosperity through permanent easy money.
Major #ngas, the man who has been consistently right
for a period of ten years, has the following to say:
"I believe that the worst features of
the business -- or rather the bank credit
cycle, will henceforth be eliminated from
the American economy, I believe that the
recent inflation scare is nonsense -- in
view of the existence of the Monetary
Control, I believe that if demand becomes
1, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol . 145,
NoV 3759, July lo, 1937.
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wild, owing to increased velocity, it
will be held in check by the iron hand
of Eccles, despite the opprobrium which
will (foolishly) be heaped on his heed.’' 1
It should be noted that the herd-heeded Msjor J.nges
is not relying on a system or a theory, but on the
iron hand of Mr. Eccles.
i^nelysis of current money problems should
not be prejudiced by mistrust of the Administration.
Even legitimate mistrust of the persons who are im-
portant in government financial circles may lead to
one-sided inquiry. After all, much has been accom-
plished, and many of the fears of the past four years
have proved as yet unfounded. One may overlook either
the dangers on the one hand or some of the factors
which limit the possibilities of inflation.
Social Security and Government Speculation
The Social Security Act provides that the
funds collected under the Old Age Annuity Plan shall
be invested in bonds paying not less than Appar-
ently there will eventually be huge sums of Social
Security Tax money available, exclusively for pur-
chases of government bonds. Is the Government, or
various authorities under the Administration going to
speculate in their own bonds? If the Government profits
1. Slump Ahead in Bonds, Major L.L.B. Angas, p. 57.
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greatly hy e fall in the bond merket, which seems to be
inevitable, it may be due to a sincere policy of stabil-
ization, but there will doubtless be a storm of criti-
cism. Major i\ngas has pointed out in another connection
that a 1^ change- in long-term interest rates means
approximately a 10^ decline in the market value of the
average mixed bond portfolio. It is a certainty that
the average mixed bond portfolio will follow the govern-
ment bond market. One would not want to suggest that
the common people’s government is rigging the bond mar-
ket so as to ensnare the bankers. The fact still remains
that we have had one of the greatest bull markets in
bonds of all time. The Government had a lot to do with
it, and apparently the Government is going to buy in,
through the Social Security J.uthorlty, a lot of those
bonds at lower levels. Doubtless much of the Government
bonds held by the banks and others were purchased far
below peak levels. Much of the New Deal financing has
been through short-term paper and not through long-term
bonds at ell. The picture can be overdrawn.
The Government’s Influence on the Markets
'iWhat will be done about the funds collected
as Social Security Income Taxes? Who will manage these
funds and from whom will bonds be purchased? It is
estimated that by 1950 the reserves will amount to
ecf o;t ame©& rfcinw bnccT eiU nl xia‘i a vcf vlius'xg
"Xxd^vjJB iO &^'30nX© a ocf 6i;ij ocf '.’bai ^JL ^ sXOtjXIV'inX
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$18,500,000,000, pnd by 1980 they will reach an esti-
mated peek of $50,000,000,000.^ The collection of
these funds is defletionery
,
as purchasing power is
reduced by the amount collected. On the other hand,
open market purchases of bonds with the proceeds of
the Social Security Income Tax is inflationary.
Therefore, it would seem that the net inflation-
deflation effect would be zero, ^s yet the funds
collected have not been Invested, probably because
there are no government bonds yielding 3^ available.
Or it may be that officials realize that a decline in
the bond market of a few points may more than offset
any loss of interest incurred by waiting. It would
be better to forego the interest for three years than
to take a loss of ten per cent in the market price of
a bond, and many financial writers have been pointing
out for months that a big decline in the bond market
is almost a certainty -- because of prospective govern-
ment action. As a matter of fact, the average of 40
bonds, according to the Wall Street Journal, July 14,
1937, has declined over 5 points in six months. United
States Government bonds, according to Moody’s index,
declined 5,71 points in three months from January 2,
1937 to ^pril 3, 1937. Naturally, under present meth-
ods of government financing, government authorities
1* Business ^d Government
,
Rohlfind, Carter, and
V/est, p. 56V
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know much more about coming trends in the security
markets than do outside investors. It is probably
not fair to say that government authorities make those
trends to take advantage of the public. However, under
the present setup, the Treasury Department and the
Federal Reserve Board can and probably do determine
the time and extent of movements in the government bond
market and, as a consequence, movements in other markets.
Social Security and "Open Market'* Control
It has been suggested that the credit control
operations of the Federal Open Market Committee will be
nullified by the purchases of the Social Seciirity
authority. ^ Control of the retail price level is the
main objective of open-market control. If the present
plan is carried out, about $1,800,000,000 a year of
continuous purchases by the Social Security «uthority
will so absorb government securities that the Federal
Reserve banks will have no government securities to
sell for price control purposes or for any other
reason. Since open-market control is largely a mat-
ter of buying and selling government securities, end
since eventually there would be no government secur-
ities not held by the Social Security Authority, open-
market control of the price level would have to be
1. Business end Covernment
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through the sale and purchase of non-government secur-
ities, or not at all. Open-market control, when used
properly, has been very effective. However, we can
hardly suppose that an outstanding public debt is a
necessity. There are other methods, many other methods,
of controlling the price level, if monetary authorities
really want to accomplish this.
Probability of Inflation
Inflation, according to many, is a certainty
in about three years. In 1934, inflation was a certainty
in about three years. This reminds one of the periodic
predictions as to the exhaustion of our oil resources,
which seems always to be fifteen years away. But tomor-
row never comes. It may be that real inflation is a
greater danger than at any time since the beginning of
the business revival. However, we hear less about it.
A few years ago Professor Kemmerer and other highly
accredited monetary authorities, forecast inflation of
,
the wildest kind. At a lecture in Woolsey Hell in New
Haven, sponsored by the Crusaders, Professor Kemmerer
compared our Government’s method of raising funds with
that of Germany during the inflation period, and said
that the methods were identical -- that both governments
backed new issues of currency by bonds end that the sky
was the limit. The retail price index of the United
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States Bioreau of Labor Statistics is still thirteen
per cent below the average for recent years, thirteen
per cent below 1926 levels. Professor Kemmerer seems
to have guessed wrong. J5s recently reported. Professor
Kemmerer still believes that there are powerful infla-
tionary forces about which he coimnents as follows;
"V/e hear much about ’controlled’ infla-
tion as if inflationary forces could be turned
on end off by the Government at will. The
world’s experience with inflation, however,
as every student of monetary history knows,
shows that Inflation, when it once gets well
started, is one of the hardest things in the
world to control. There have been many cases
in history in which for substantial periods
of time -- in some cases running into years --
inflation was moderately well controlled as it
is being controlled today in England and
Sweden, but never, so far as I know, has an
inconvertible paper money standard been an
enduring success. Sooner or later it always
breaks down under political pressure and usu-
ally with disastrous results. Certainly con-
ditions in our own country s.reeextremely un-
favorable for the success of grandiose exper-
iments in controlled inflation."^
Excess Reserves
Mathematically it could be shown that an
inflationary pyramid of credit could be built up on
the existing quantity of reserves. Recently, before
steps had been taken partially to correct the situa-
tion, excess reserves amounted to over ^3,000,000,000.
Not only that, but potential reserves that could have
1. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 145,
No. 3758, July 3, 1937, p. 43.
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been built up gave sensitive souls the jitters. It
is necessary merely to mention that member banks had,
gnd still have, the privilege of discounting govern-
ment bonds v.'ith the Federal Reserve banks. That is,
they have the privilege of borrowing 100^ against
government bonds. And the resulting credits with the
Federal Reserve banks would be reserves -- billions
more; That is only part of that story. However, as
.a practical matter, there never has been a time when
these reserves could have been used. There never has
been a time when the huge credits that Professor
Kemmerer imagined a few years ego could have been
built up. And why? Merely that both custom and lew
do not permit banks to impair their capital by too
excessive deposits in relation to their capital struc-
tures. If it were true that reserves on a 10 to 1
basis were the only limiting factor, an inflationary
credit expansion would be almost a certainty. How-
ever, as a matter of common sense, banks have been
careful of their capital-deposit ratios. Some of them
have been ultra-conservative, many holding to a posi-
tion of keeping a capital ratio of about five to one.
Furthermore, if some banks ere not disposed to do so,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requires.
eXoob ovX^iEftea ev-^ need
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in admitting banks to insurance, that no bank shall
be operated without a net sound capital equal to et
least 1.0% of its deposits.^
Capital Ratio
How then is it that bank deposits have in-
creased to an all time peak? How is it that deposits
by 193b were rebuilt by the amount of $16,000,000,000?
/nd to what extent can this trend continue? Professor
Edie points out that at the previous peak banks had
Capital equal to about 14^ of deposits, and that cap-
ital assets today are about $1,600,000,000 below the
previous peak. He points out further that deposits
are over the peak and that consequently capital assets
are about 13^ of deposits, the ratio being more strained
than it ever has been in the past. It seems to me that
persons who are bullish on the various markets because
of supposed inflationary possibilities might well ponder
the following quotation from "Easy Money:"
"By 1936, at the end of the rebuilding
process, the capital ratio was stretched as
far as it should be. It is a very different
matter to build on another $16,000,000,000
of deposits. The first stage was one of re-
construction. That stage has been completed.
The capital ratio is at the saturation point.
It did not restrain the rebuilding process,
but it will restrain future expansion.
1. Easy Money, Lionel D. Edie, p. 99. (adapted)
2. ibid., p. 102.
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Character of Bank /Assets
In this connection it should be noted
that the character of bank assets, being to a much
larger extent than formerly, investments, there may
be a desire on the part of bankers to shift to shorter
term investments. This may be a slow process at times,
and, at others, a rather rapid adjustment. This kind
of liquidation is not likely to have an inflationary
effect on the security markets. There have been long
bear markets in the face of above-normal business con-
ditions in the pest, and it can happen again. Many
feel that the bearish tendency in the market for some
months past is of secondary importance. However, the
movement has about it the important characteristic of
major bear markets in stocks. There is a congestion
of securities in the hands of a group of bankers who
need to sell. Will the market be marked up in the face
of this condition or will it be allowed to fall of its
own weight?
Long-term Probability of Inflation
Few financial writers expect inflation in
the near future. What may happen if the Government
does not successfully cut down the huge public debt
before the next depression comes, is a somewhat longer
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time question than most writers care to wrestle with.
The Roosevelt edministration has succeeded in reflat-
ing credit. By the injection of hank credit, borrowed
from, and created by the banks, into public circulation,
spent in the form of public works, etc., the administra-
tion has crested plentiful credit. Gold stocks, reserves,
and demand deposits, all increased enormously. Current
Increases in deposits are due to conventional granting
of loans; that is, real demand, rather than the govern-
ment’s financing of budget deficits. This is further
evidence that the reflation has "caught." Until recent-
ly, however, confidence, as indicated by the velocity
of turnover of bank deposits outside New York, was slow
to recover. With an incipient revival of velocity,
which began to appear lest year, the great qu^^ntlties
of bank deposits became a potential danger. This po-
tential danger doubtless caused needless worry.
Deflationary Measures
During the past year the Government has pro-
gressively taken steps to prevent the inflation which
seemed to be about to take place as a result of the
reflationary measures of the preceding four years.
The rapid rise in the wholesale commodity index in
the latter half of 1956 was the warning that the brakes
had to be applied if the incipient boom was to be
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controlled. By the middle of March, 1937, there hed
been a continuous two-year rally in the common stock
market and, to Jenu&ry 1937, there was also the greatest
bull market in bonds of all time. The current correc-
tions in the security markets are obviously a direct
result of the steps taken by the Government to prevent
a rise in commodity prices.
Some of the controls available to the
iidministration under existing law were used. Federal
Reserve requirements were increased 50^ in August 1936,
There was another increase of 33 l/3^, one-half to be-
come effective March 1, 1937, and the other half May 1,
1937, Now required reserve ratios are 26^, 20^, and
14^, for demand deposits,^ With these Increases the
i?drainlstration has reached the limit permissible under
the law, and there are still excess reserves which con-
tinue to grow. July 7, 1937, excess reserves had again
risen to |880,000,000. Raising the reserve requirements
had the effect of warning the financial world of a dis-
position on the part of the Government to take steps of
an entl-inflatlonary nature. Markets responded accord-
ingly and for the present at least immediate fears of
inflation are allayed. The reduction of excess reserves
was not merely a psychological factor in the financial
picture, however. In order to meet the new reserve
1. bince this chapter was written in July 1937 there
has been a reversal of policy and a reduction of
reserve requirements, bee pp. 277-278.
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requirement, "bgiiks were compelled to sell bonds and
other investments. The financial and psychological
effect of the steps taken by the Government has been
adequate for the present. There should be no doubt
as to the powers of the Government, either of an in-
flationary or a deflationary nature. For instance,
open-market sale of about one-third of the
$2,526,190,000 government debt held by the Federal
Reserve banks would reduce excess reserves to zero.
There are many other things that the
Government could do. For example, the ildministration
could obtain from Congress additional legal powers for
increases of the reserve requirements. If there is
the great danger in excess reserves that some seem to
think, why leave the required reserves at 26^, 20^,
and 14^? There is a lot of room for improvement short
of the 100^ reserves desired by Professor Fisher,
A Balanced Budget
Eventually the Government should cease
borrowing from the banks. Borrowing from the public
is not inflationary. In time, nevertheless, the
federal budget will be balanced. Mr. Eccles coura-
geously suggested a few months ago that taxes should
be increased. Texes are deflationary, and government
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expenditures financed by taxes sre not inflationary.
When business revival and prosperity are a little
more assured, the Government will, or should, begin
to retire the government debt. The nation cannot
feel secure until this process of debt reduction
begins. There is a great deal of faith among respon-
sible forecasters that there is going to be great im-
provement, that the national income is going to rise.
If they are right it should not be difficult for the
nation to raise the sums necessary to retire the debt.
Furthermore, this will be anti-inflationary in a very
healthy way. Also, it will place the nation in condi-
tion to borrow safely when and if another depression
comes. If it becomes politically impossible to reduce
the debt, future emergency spending will inevitable
cause inflation of a very grave nature.
The Flow of Gold to the United States
Meanwhile, a continuous flow of gold to the
United States has added to the woes of the monetary
authorities. The causes of this unusual movement are
traceable to the devaluation of the dollar, which re-
sulted in releases from Indian hoards and mercantile
gold, the Impounding of gold here, the Soviet shipments,
the dehoarding of European gold and large foreign in-
vestments in Mierican securities. /'ll of which leaves
Soa &vl» a«xe:^ hfioa&nll es^^^ibneqx©
a ©*i?i '^i^l:‘^i©qeo‘iq >^xis lav^lvei eesnleiicf non^
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our government holding monetary stocks of gold on
July 10, 1937, of |12, 376,000,000,^ which is well
over half of the world’s monetary supply. This amount
represents an increase of over $5,000,000,000 in three
years and an increase of $1,754,000,000 in the past
year. In order partially to offset the inflationary
effect of this steady inflow of gold, the Government
is currently absorbing all fresh receipts in its
"inactive” gold fund which now is running toward the
$1,200,000,000 mark. The Treasury borrows the money
vrfith which to purchase the gold, thus preventing an
increase in member bank reserves. This is, however,
only a partial "sterilization" as there is still an
2increase in member bank deposits. The settlement
of the gold question is not of particular urgency in
the United States at the present time. The difficul-
ties of France in maintaining her stock of gold is not
so important as an international matter as is sometimes
feared. France holds rather a minor position in inter-
national commodity markets. Our local question, the
matter of "sterilization" of gold through borrowed
money, does seem needless and other anti-inflatlonery
measures might be used but the expense of the present
1, New York Times
,
July 11, 1937.
2. Slump Ahead in Bonds, Major L.L.B. i^ngas, p. 25.
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procediire is not so greet with the present low rates
paid hy oiar Government for short-term loans. It may
he just as well to let this gold question wait until
8 more certain course can he decided upon. §s the
Secretary of the Treasury suggests: ”We may lose our
shirts . "
Meanwhile, the inactive gold fund constitutes
an excellent buffer in case foreign investors decide to
withdraw investment funds or if much of the gold funds
sent from France prove to he hut temporary deposits
here. It is estimated that foreign Investors hold
about $5,000,000,000 of ionerican securities, $2,000,000,000
of which are in common stocks. The Inactive gold fund
could take care of a withdrawal of over twenty per cent
of this without effecting hank reserves at all. So it
would seem that American investment markets are in some
ways rather well Insulated from shock. Whether over a
billion dollars moves out of the "inactive" fund, or
remains, is not of vital concern to anyone here.
Foreign Investors
The possible decision on the part of foreign
investors to cut down Investments in American securi-
ties may he speeded by some action taken by our govern-
ment. The jfinnual Report of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, submitted to Congress
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June 25, 1937, indicetes that action Is being consid-
ered in the form of an increase in the withholding tax
on incomes received by non-resident aliens from
American investments. The purpose of this tax, if
applied, is only incidentally for revenue. Its main
purpose is as a deterrent to the embarrassing inflow
of capital. As the Board of Governors pointed out:
’’During the six weeks from the latter
part of September until the middle of
November foreign investments in American
securities were at four or five times the
rate prevailing in the first quarters of
the year. Announcement in November that
measures v/ere being considered which would
make American investment less attractive
to foreigners, together with a slov;ing dovm
of the stock market advance, contributed to
a decrease in the movement, but at the end
of the year foreign purchases of American
securities were proceeding on or about the
same scale as during the first nine months
of 1936.
French Financial Crisis
As yet the Pk^ench financial crisis has
caused hardly a ripple in American financial circles.
Trends are undisturbed. However, the franc, the
pound, and the dollar have been allowed to find a
level around their previous parity. This fact coupled
with the lack of disturbance in the recent French
1
.
Annual Report of Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve Systelii^ submitted to Congress June 23,
1937; cited in Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, Vol. 144-2, June 26, 1937.
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adjustments may be interpreted as indicating important
understandings between our government and the French
and English. governments . Recently t200,000,000 was
added to the British stabilization fund. A^ain, how-
ever, we are very much in the dark. Except for a few
brief statements as to the equalization funds nothing
is said as to the more fundamental objectives. Doubt-
less we ere moving toward international stabilization
as well as stabilization of the domestic price level.
It Wes hoped that the French devaluation would reverse
the flow of gold and that funds would return to France.
At the time of the 1928 stabilization of the franc the
gold flow was reversed. It may be a little early to
draw conclusions, but in the week ending July 10, gold
shipments (imports) in New York amounted to $28,557,100,
Indicating renewed nervousness in France, apparently due
to. heavy increases in taxation.
Dehoarding
The problem of embarrassment of gold may be
partially corrected in another way. That dehoarding
is likely to slow down is clear from the following
analysis of the situation made by the National City
Bank of New York:
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"How much gold dissppeered Into private
holdings in Western Europe during the depres-
sion can be ascertained only in round figures
because of fragmentary Information on certain
gold movements, particularly the holdings of
the various stabilization funds, and on the
supply of old gold. However, a simple month-
to-month comparison of available information
on the supply and demand for gold betv/een the
end of 1950 and the end of September, 1936,
indicates that nearly |53, 000, 000, 000 disap-
peared or was unaccounted for during that
period. The rapid movement of this gold back
into monetary stocks dates from the revalua-
tion of the gold bloc currencies last September,
The disclosed gold reserves of 52 central banks
and governments Increased by f2, 261,000, 000
during the past nine months. Is only
$937,000,000 of this increase can be accounted
for by newly-mined gold, outside of the Soviet
Union, and by the shipments from the Soviet
Union and the Far East, it follows that the
gold received from undisclosed sources has
exceeded $1,300,000,000. The amount still
held in private hands is therefore but a small
fraction of the total formerly unaccounted for
and doubtless well under $500,000,000. Thus
at the present rate the dehoarding movement
will soon expend itself."^
Panic in the Gold Market
Recently a panic developed in the gold mar-
kets abroad due to a rumor that the /American Government
was going to revalue gold. Events more recently and
pronouncements of /merlcan monetary authorities seem
to indicate that no such revaluation is to take place.
The belief prevails, that while gold at $35.00 an ounce
is priced too high, that the adjustments necessary
should be accomplished by some other means. It is
feared that the international panic which might result
1. Bulletin of the National City Bank of New York,
July 1937.
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from another revaluation would do more harm than any
local “benefit could offset.
Rising costs of producing gold are likely
to reduce the quantities that are being mined. Fur-
thermore, other countries than the United States and
Great Britain may begin to absorb gold in the near
future. It is still a rather acceptable commodity.
There is a great deal of mystery about the
huge quantities of gold that came from Soviet Russia.
Mining engineers pointed out that such quantities could
not have been produced from new mines. One guess is that
the gold came from Madrid by way of Moscow.
There has been much talk, very foolish talk,
about the complete "sterilization” of gold, and the pro-
hibition of gold imports. Fortunately, there is little
or no likelihood that this will be done. Such a move
might so upset foreign exchange markets as to materially
retard world recovery not to mention difficulties that
would be created in the matter of arriving at any agree-
ment in international stabilization. Furthermore, it is
not entirely against the rules to inject a little sports-
manship into our international deadlngs. Under present
circumstances a rich nation like the United States can
well afford to pay the relatively small amount that it
is costing to absorb the gold that is flowing in. And
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gold is not such a bad commodity to have sround.
Until recently the world was crying for it. It is
still the most widely acceptable commodity in the
world. It is to be hoped that our liberal-spending
Administration will not get picayune in this matter.
Administration Committed to ”Eesy ^^^oney ”
We may summarize by saying that we are
definitely committed to an easy-money policy in a
managed currency system, whether we like it or not;
that we are sure to get ”easy money'* only Insofar
as our present highly concentrated money authority
Can accomplish this without permitting a rise in
the price level; that we are likely to be kept in
the dark about important coming changes in policy,
both of a national and international nature; that
inflation is not to be expected in the near future,
but may be an Important consideration in the long
run, if budget deficits are not corrected before
the next depression; that there are many^ means of
control available to the Administration; and that
the current gold inflow is not of vital concern.
The far-reaching power of the Administration in
the matter of monetary management should work out
to the best interests of the country in the short
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run, but over a longer period monetery authority
independent of both the banks and the iidministration
is more vital to the nation than is an independent
Supreme Court.

CH^iPTER X
summary
There are no problems more widely or more
vehemently debated todey that those of monetary sta-
bilization and the relation of stabilization to
scarcity. Scores of the leading economists, bankers,
and statesmen of every important country in the world
have made these twin problems their principal concerns.
Even scientists,^ have dropped their science to take
up the fight. A former Chancellor of the British
Exchequer (McKenna), Ministers of Finance (Havenga and
others), presidents of great banking houses of London
and New York (Vanderlip and McKenna)
,
world-famous
statisticians (Hawtry and Snyder), statesmen (Lord
Vernon and Viscount D’Abernon), a labor leader (Meeker),
manufacturers (Ford and Rand), a merchant (Filene), an
engineer (Kit son), a gold miner (Sir Henry Strakosch),
senators (Owen and others), historians (Wells and DelMar),
university commissions, and a hundred British leaders
in various fields, have all made notable contributions
to the literature of stable money. As a result, unprec-
edented monetary and economic changes are taking place,
and may ultimately bring about a fundamental transition
to more honest banking.
1. Soddy, Nobel Laureate for Chemistry (1921).
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The Futility of Mon-monetary Reform
For over a century every political and
economic reform designed to insure economic security
has proved futile because the most vital fingnciel
problem of modem times -- the stabilization of the
monetary unit -- has not been solved. It is no exag-
geration to say that other economic reforms are utterly
useless until the condition of the instability of money
is corrected. Consider, for instance, the futility of
the struggle for increased wages, when the wage earner
is subtly robbed of his job and his wages by a system-
atic unsettling of the price level. The worker would
do better to stop deluding himself and to accept some
form of wage slavery with more grace. He might at
least enjoy a philosophical peace with an Oriental
fatalism. One thing is certain: the future holds, for
a growing population, no hope other than that of recur-
ring periods of misery and social insecurity, tinless
and until prosperity is no longer sabotaged by artifi-
cial restrictions of the quantity of money and credit.
On the other hand, if an honest and scientific money
system is created, little else in the way of govern-
ment control will be needed. Some professional poli-
ticians might lose their ^jobs, but ordinary citizens
would be free to follow their chosen employment without
concerning themselves excessively with a meddlesome
government
.
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Socigl Science vs. Physicsl Science
The scientist and the engineer are doing
their part in solving the physical problems of pro-
duction. The social scientist, on the other hand,
hcs not been successful in dealing with these matters.
No system has been invented which makes it possible
to pass on to the public the benefits of astounding
technical improvements in industry. Social scientists
point out that economic systems involve human beings
and, since people cannot be treated like guinea pigs,
social experimentation cannot progress rapidly. But
economic systems also involve inhuman beings -- vested
interests which obstruct the most desirable reforms.
Such interests are those which profit by scarcity,
which see nothing alarming in the fall of construction,
for example, to 20^ of capacity, while a large segment
of our youthful population seeks shelter in "jungles”
or under fish piers. But, as the socialists point out,
those in control of our capitalistic society, are con-
cerned with making money, not with making goods.
Their experiments are concerned with the creation of
vast concentrations of wealth and with the acquisition
of far-reaching financial power. Primitive society
produced goods nearly to the limit of capacity, a trick
we might not find so difficult if we could eliminate
the inhuman beings.
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A hundred and fifty years ego scercity was
unders tendehle. Men, with little more than his hand
labor, was obliged to struggle with the forces of
nature to enjoy life and liberty, while in pursuit of
a bare subsistence. However, with the possibilities
of abundance existing today, and the experience of the
years preceding 1929, it will take more than oratory
replete with references to ’’sound money” and ’’rugged
individualism” to convince the Mmericsn people that
they cannot produce enough to feed, clothe, and shel->-
ter the nation in 1958.
The United States, with about 6% of the
world’s area and having about 1% of the world’s popu-
lation, possesses over |14, 000, 000, 000 in gold. In
addition to this enormous hoard, which is over half
of the world’s monetary gold, the United States pro-
duces over 50^ of several important world commodities.
Commenting on this ’’bulging economy,” the London
Sphere observed that ’’responsible leadership which
cannot translate it into assured prosperity is desti-
tute of capacity.”^
Poverty and Spiritual Welfare
It is a great mistake to assume that opin-
ions unanimously desire increased productive income.
1. Sphere, London; quoted in 12,000 Tons of Gold!
Howard H. Preston, Credit and Financial
Management
,
August 1938, p. 10, Vol. 40, No. 8.
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There ere persons, rich and powerful, who believe
that "proper monkeying" with the monetary media is
necessary for the spiritual vjelfare of the working
people. Furthermore, the workingman is more tract-
able if he is not quite sure where his next meal is
coming from. It is well recognized that workingmen
become too independent during periods of prosperity
and that during depressions they work harder to keep
their jobs. A quotation from Business Week of
October 22, 1950, will serve to throw some light on
this:
"'Mien a Governor of a Federal Reserve
bank can stand up before a convention of
investment bankers, condemn the American
people for using automobiles, electric re-
frigerators, and radios, and proclaim that
he does not agree with those who say that
there must be no retrogression from present
standards in this country, we need no further
sign of the arrogant self-assurance of the
night-riders of defeatism."
These lofty sentiments were w^ell supported
with action. In the United States bankers directed
a deflation of over $9,000,000,000. Bankers are cer-
tainly entitled to their opinions, but v;hether or not
they are entitled to a monopoly of credit is, at
least, a controversial matter. Other people, further-
more, are entitled to an opinion and, under the circum-
stances, bankers can hardly complain if other thinking
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people become less unsympathetic with direct-action
Marxi sm.
An Irreconcilable Clash of Interests
The primary duty of a country’s economic
system should be to provide the necessities and com-
forts of life, but the primary concern of those who
control the country’s finance is to create scarcity.
There is therefore an irreconcilable clash of inter-
ests. "From the standpoint of the professional money-
lender, and from his alone, prosperity is a curse.
During war times we can safely produce at capacity
for destructive purposes. But it is not good busi-
ness, although it might be wise sociology, to produce
at near capacity for consumption purposes in times of
peace. Any sane man, ignoring human greed, could work
out an economic system that would work better on paper
than the one with which we are now handicapped. It is,
however, futile to call our economics of scarcity.
Insanity. There is nothing insane about it. In fact,
from the point of view of financiers who profit by it,
it is ingenious.
1 . The Role of Money, Frederick Soddy, p. 118.
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Cooperation with Moscow
Since shortly after the World War It has
been the hope and the expectation of the Soviets that
the end of capitalistic civilization Is only a matter
of time. They have done much during the intervening
years to speed the ’’happy" dey. No one will deny that
they have been remarkably successful. The spread of
International coraraunism Is one of the most amazing
political phenomena of our times. Not only have com-
munists gained control of Important governments, but
they have also gained a fearsome political influence
in every important democracy in the world, i. few years
ago the Third International adopted the so-called
’’united front tactics’’ and for a time, at least, and
in carefully chosen places, abandoned their more
aggressive direct action policies. Very likely, well-
posted leaders of world communism have decided that
individualistic capitalism will destroy itself, as
Marx forecast. If we wish to cooperate with Moscow
and our financiers in the speedy destruction of
American institutions, we can find no better way than
to permit the periodic unsettling of the price level
and the creation of artificial scarcity.
Scarcity alone does not make men better.
There is probably no place in the world where men are
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more resigned to conditions of want than in Chins,
where there h«i.ve been serious famines every year for
the past two thousand years. It is scarcity, with
abundance all around, that embitters men. It is
asking too much of a hungry man to love the society
that lets him starve while granaries are full of food.
dfl Financial Miracle
Since 1931, o\xr number-one enemy, Germany,
has made remarkable progress. Industrial production
has risen over 130,^. Nevertheless, the price level
has remained stable.^ During 1938 production has been
stabilized at a high level. For several months there
has been a condition approximating full employment;
in fact, the German government has found it necessary
to import thousands of laborers from Italy and other
neighboring states. It is comforting to realize that
the alleged financial wizardry was performed by a
world-famous financier, who is not in sympathy with
Hitler -- Goering -- Goebbel’s madness. The fact that
Germany has become a dangerous power of the first class
is not due to anything so frail as Hitler’s ranting,
but rather to the amazing increased productivity of
Germany. The increased productivity was made possible
through the creation of government credit, under the
1. The i&nnalist, December 21, 1938, p. 821, Vol. 52,
No. 1353.
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careful management of Dr. Schacht, who has long been
an advocate of managed currency and who belongs to
the same school of monetary thought as Professor
Irving Fisher. Dr. Schacht has demonstrated what he
and other members of the managed currency school have
claimed all along -- that it is possible to increase
productivity, without a rise in the price level, through
the creation of government credit.
Since ispril, 1938, Germany is no longer
financing with government credit. Production is main-
taining itself at a high level and it is now possible
for the Reich to pay current expenses out of taxes placed
upon the increased output. As Dr, Schacht put it;
"Spring, 1938, brought a change in our
finance policy, because at that time Germany
had reached a stage of full employment. As
soon as an economy has made use of all avail-
able labor end materials, any further credit
expansion is not only senseless but actually
harmful. For then newly created money can no
longer effect a further increase in goods pro-
duction, but Cci-n only bring about competition
for the available labor and raw materials; and
such a competition must necessarily lead to an
increase in prices and wages, despite all
measures of State control The numerous
measures which were undertaken were in
every case aimed at control of the credit ex-
pansion, prevention of a disparity between the
money side and the goods side.^
1. The Annalist, December 21, 1938, p. 829, Vol. 52,
No. 1353.
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The financial power that is preventing democratic
society from accomplishing the same thing that Germany
has accomplished since 1951, is the power that will
yet ruin democratic society.
The Guiding Hand
The most formidable opposition to stabiliza-
tion has come from bankers; that is, from the officials
of central banks and from powerful private banking
houses which have invisible connections with central
banks. These private banking houses fight in the dark.
Monetary legislation designed to effect greatly needed
reform is defeated by their agents who are sometimes
members of legislatures. Their magazines and news-
papers pay the highest prices to the cleverest colum-
nists, and their banks quietly bring pressure at crit-
ical times upon business and government until they have
their way. In the United States the Federal Reserve
banks are private banks. The capital stock is owned
by the member banks. This ownership of stock in the
central banks gives private bankers another means of
accomplishing their extra-official Influence on mone-
tary and credit management. Powerful financiers who
remain in the background actually own the central
banks of the nation. Furthermore, bankers feel that
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they alone should be allowed to write all banking
legislation. Why, we might ask, should not whiskey
dealers write all legislation pertaining to their
industry? The resulting demoralization of society
would hardly compare with that resulting from modern
laissez-faire financialism. Bankers are the last
people in the world to trust with the writing of
monetary legislation.
Demagogues
There is doubtless some honest fear among
bankers of outside meddling. Regulation, however,
is necessary if democratic institutions are to sur-
vive. ,^ble thinkers of the past and of the present
foresee the collapse of our society, built as it is
upon financial liberalism. Pope Pius IX and Karl
Marx agreed on this and both pointed out that this
breakdown was inevitable. Today, when all the evils
of such a system are coming to a heed, is no time for
calling names. If one happens to disagree with Mr.
Montague Norman in England or with Senator Carter Class,
in the United States, he is labeled ’•demagogue.” ilmong
these "demagogues” in England are to be found such
names as the Right Hon. Reginald P. McKenna, former
Chancellor of the British Exchequer, Mr. R. G. Hawtrey,
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probably the greatest living authority on prices,
and Mr. John Maynard Keynes, whose “demagogue” fore-
casts in 1925, when Great Britain returned to the
gold standard, proved only too true. In the United
States, Professor George F. Warren, and other recog-
nized authorities on money and prices, gave similar
warnings of the collapse that was to be expected from
the scramble for gold.^-
in 1921, conducted extensive investigations in monetary
economics to find the reason why great advances in
science and technology are not passed on to the work-
ing class. His researches, as well as those of other
/
independent monetary economists, led to the conclusion
that there is a sinister oligarchy determined to retain
power through private control of our monetary and credit
media.
is illustrated by the experience of Senator Owen, who
tried to have mandatory stabilization provisions writ-
ten into the original Federal Reserve jgct. The opposi-
tion, the source of which,, he did not at that time
tion. Carter G!
, ^ . tory
Professor Soddy, Nobel Laureate for Chemistry
The sinister influence of private bankers
recognize, was opposi-
1. Gold and Prices, Warren and Pearson, pp. 107-116.
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provision was stricken out by Glass, who was advised
by another sinister figure in banking affairs, the late
H. Parker Willis. Willis' books suggest what Soddy
meant by "supposed impartial students of money"^ end
contain the most flagrant misstatements of fact. For
example, in a book published in 193b, Willis wrote:
"During the years after 1923 the Federal Reserve
System undertook several extensive operations Intended
to bring about an advance in commodity values but had
O
no success in its undertaking." This is but one of
many misstatements of which his book contains scores.
The extensive operations to which Willis refers are the
purchase of ^510,000,000 of government securities prior
to September 1924, and the lowering of the rediscount
rate in that year, Willis' statement that these
operations met with no success in bringing about an
advance in commodity values is a misstatement of fact
that can easily be checked. By March 1925, the general
price level had risen 11^, and agricultural prices
had increased 20^. These facts can easily be verified
by examining any one of numerous commodity price Indexes
Whether or not the general price level can be raised is
a vital question. Willis must have known the real facts
and the private bankers, whose interests are at stake,
know the facts. The thievery of modern deposit banking
1. The Role of Money
,
Frederick Soddy, p. 197.
2. The Theory and Practice of Central Banking
,
p. 300.
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is accomplisiied through dishonest accounting, and the
defenders of this trickery are accessories every bit
as culpable as their principals.
Power without Responsibility
Members of the Federal Reserve Board refuse
to admit that they have managed credit, yet it has
been during the life of the Federal Reserve System
that gold has been sterilized and that the volume of
credit has been controlled with utter disregard for
the alleged automatic qu^ilities of the gold standard.
Credit was controlled in accordance with the ’'needs of
trade,” and the "needs of trade" were determined by the
Federal Reserve Board. Such control involved occasional
wholesale destruction of the nation’s media of exchange.
Since there were no rules, the destruction took place
at the arbitrary whims of the Board.
Responsibility and authority should go to-
gether. While tenaciously retaining the authority and
the power to change the price level, the Federal Reserve
Board has disclaimed ell responsibility for stabiliza-
tion. JlLt times members of the Board have claimed that
the Board had no such powers; at other times certain
members of the Board ecinitted that they had, but they
always insisted that control of the price level should
be a matter of administration. The Board was to be
orfd- ^.^nl'^nsjoooB a^j^cixi:? b&dRXlq:aoooB el
!jild y^&VQ tsid? *lo l&b
.alBqXonViq ii-jrlJ ta oldBqluo ea
'
^isodtiv i9woq
sai/le*x i)'i/?o5 ev^ezoK la'iJ^Jba*^ E‘^ieo''jic»M
8>id vJl cJsY deganart ©vad ^ litiba
ia&c^av^, ev'isasH ieioJbel *10 e*!!! gnJ/uib need,
lo sifujiov 9d^ XBtii bcm /j^sXXi'isie aascf e^d blog :^»di
aol b'lase^'xelb 'la^JJj:; di/iw beXXo'ici-fioo noed asd dlbeio
.b^8bn*i^8 Jblog edd lo eei;?ili.irp olda-'So.nriS b&asllfi edit
abe&n” edd ddlw co^nabioooa nl bsiloadnoo sbw jJibsiDi
arid vd benij2^.©d^b ©'lew **ebo*zd lo sbesn*' edcJ- bni*- ‘\©ba'T3'
lanoleaooo baylovdX loddnc© iidJ/a ov'ies&H I-3'jeb©q
. 93/isdox© Ito slbssi ft ^noldBn ©/Id nold^^irXwBdb
oculq 3lood noXdoJa'idftsb ©dd ^s&Xu’i on ©^ew' ©'laaor ©oxiiS
,bn&o(i ©iid ‘J.c hmidw '‘^a'sdXdis ©iid da
~oi cs bXi/ode Y^X^ioddjj© b/xe Y^XIlofiedoqaeH
boB YdX*ioriduB sdd gnlalBd©*! YX«i/oXosn©d elXdW .mridag
avd©a©Ji laiebe'^ ©rid ,IevoI ©oi^rq ©rid ©soBrio od ^©woq eild
-BsIXldBde *xo1: Y^XXXriteaoqee'i XXa boioiftloeXb eari biBoS
darid baoilalo ©vari b*i«oa ©rid lo e^isdinsfii gsurld dA *aoXd
alad'ieo-. aectld »ieridc da ?e'xswoq ri©t/e on bsri bnaoS ©rid
verid di^'cf ^bari Y^rid darid b^ddXiob© b-iaoH ©rid lo saadmaiH
blx/orlR I©veX ©©iiq ©rid lo Xoncdnoo darid bodftlani ex^'ula
od od eaw bnaoQ ©rfT .noXdandeXnXxabs lo ‘leadsci a ©ri
4< .•.•ft,. . .' .l.-t - *.«•
allowed to decide when the price level was to be raised
when it was to be lowered, and when it was to be stabil
ized. That is a great deal of power to concede to a
Board that disclaims any such capacity. Nevertheless,
the Board did control, but in such a way that for the
past twenty years price indexes look like roller coast-
ers. Without any fundamental policy, and rarely taking
into consideration the public’s interest in a stable
price level, the Federal Reserve Board moved the price
level around in a range wider than at any time during
the past one hundred fifty years.
There was no reason for a business depres-
sion from 1930 to 1956 in the United States other than
that of misdirected credit control of the Federal
Reserve Board. The "deflationists" were in the saddle.
They took upon themselves, without any mandate from the
public, the right to deflate everything -- including
the Republican Party.
Private or Political Dictators
Of course there must be price-level manage-
ment, but where is the far-reaching power of manage-
ment to be placed? Those who control the price level
are actual dictators. As Professor Edie says:
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group of institutions that can
determine the price level of the world
has a greater power over the economic
fortunes of mankind than do all the
Parliaments and Congresses combined.
pre we going to take these dictatorial
powers from the banks and hand them to self-seeking
politicians who are little better than racketeers?
We have done something of the sort during this admin
'istration. The tieup between the government and the
banks is such that inflation end deflation are now
initiated in Washington. Before the Pujo investiga-
tion the power was in Wall Street. Since 1913, it
has been hard to locate the ultimate source of con-
trol, but the Federal Reserve Board did the work.
Since 1933 the White House is the responsible source
which, incidentally, makes our President the most
powerful ruler in the world. On October 23, 1935,
at Charleston, South Carolina, the President said:
*’We are on our way back -- not by mere
chance. We are coming back more soundly
than ever before because we planned it that
way, and don’t let anybody tell you differ-
ently. ”
The President’s inflation-deflation moods
have been highly volatile. The whipsawing of the
1. Dollars, Lionel D. Edie, p. 200.
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markets is a little more exciting since 1953; the
moves are a little more obvious, but it is the seme
game. It is to be hoped that the President will not
develop a passion for liquidity before 1940, However
disconcerting the jerky monetary moves* of the present
administration are, they constitute additional proof
of what monetary economists have held all along: the
trade cycle can be reversed by the monetary authorities.
This was proved when monetary management was subject to
Wall Street control. It was proved again between 1921
and 1929. Now, the moves are a little more obvious.
First, the administration orders full steam ahead;
then, the brakes are applied so hard that the economic
machine stalls. In 1937 the engine was stalled; in
1938, the order was: "full steam ahead; there’s an
important election in the fall." Inflation and defla-
tion are being timed to election requirements instead
of to the business cycle.
Political observers believe that the heavy
government expenditiires of 1938 were timed about eight
weeks too late to bring the election results that New
Deal statesmen expected at the polls, Hov/ever, the
financial adequacy, if not the timing of New Deal
election preparations, was excellent. In a single
week in i^pril, more than two billion dollars of Inactive
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cesh. W8S released. The United States Treasury de-
sterlllzed one billion four hundred million dollars
of inactive gold. During the same week, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System lov/ered
reserve requirements of member banks, thereby making
an additional three-fourths of a billion dollars
available as a basis for credit expansion.^ From
July 31, 1938, to November 30, 1938, the public debt
increased by f408,000,000 a month. This monthly in-
crease in the federal debt was nearly double the in-
crease of any other month in history, except for June
1936, the month in which the adjusted service certif-
2icates were cashed. Now that the election emergency
is pest federal expenditures are "tapering off." In
the Nev; Deal lexicography "tapering off" means sudden
curtailment of expenditures by hundreds of millions
of dollars a month.
In general, political control is worse than
private control. Politicians are constantly under the
influence of pressure groups and of wealthy constitu-
ents with very dull axes to grind. They are dependent
for their jobs on the endorsement of their local polit
ical machines which have never been famous for their
1. 12,000 Tons of Gold, Credit and Financial
Management
,
Howard H. Preston, August 1, 1938, p.6
2. The ji^nnalist, December 7, 1928, p. 753.
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social ethics. It will be regrettable if any political
party arrogates to itself the right to control credit
and consequently the price level. Eventual dictator-
ship would be the inevitable result. Indeed, such a
situation is a virtual financial dictatorship.
4 Monetary **Supr erne Court”
Proposals have been made to take the control
of money out of politics and also out of private hands.
Such plans provide for some kind of a commission that
would be independent of political parties and of the
banks. The commission would coordinate the various
activities of the Treasury end the Federal Reserve
Board. It would also have control over the volume of
money and credit that would be issued, i^dvocates of
this scheme describe it as a *' Supreme Court" of money.
Its governors would be appointed for long periods of
time and would be expected to be disinterested public
servants, as the members of our Supreme Court are,
theoretically.
Unfortunately, whether financiers or poli-
ticians, or some other group of greater dignity is
placed in control of money and credit, society will
still have to contend with the human element. There
is a greet deal at stake. Where there are greet sums
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of money involved there will always he tricksters.
Experience with various political systems during the
past century should have taught us that the solution
is not to he found in systems, which the greedy will
find some way to circumvent. The law must he definite.
The representatives of all the people, Congress, should
make the rules mandatory. Let us put the cards on the
table. There has heen altogether too much dealing under
the table. To no man or group of men should be delegated
the administrative responsibility or power to decide such
vital matters as the increase or decrease of the quantity
of the media of exchange, the control of the price level,
or inflation and deflation, An election year, the for-
tunes of a political party, foreign interests, or the
financial position of a particular group, should have
no weight in the determination of the degree of prosper-
ity to be enjoyed by the nation.
Numerous Stabilization Proposals Feasible
It is sometimes claimed that the stabiliza-
tionists themselves cannot agree as to how price levels
should be stabilized. This view of the situation is
greatly exaggerated; the differences of opinion are
limited as to method only. Among advocates of stable
money there is much agreement and only good natured
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difference of opinion as to details. On the other
hand, there can he no cordial difference of opinion
between s tsbilizationists and the opposition which,
in reality, is sponsoring a fraudulent system of bank
accounting. There can be no compromise with dishon-
esty. Why merely e.rgue with a group who are feather-
ing their own nests at the expense of society, while
constitutional democracy is in danger of perishing?
Stabilization is not merely a gentleman’s debate.
Why pussyfoot about it? The situation has, and should
have, all of the enthusiasm of a civil war.
There are numerous stabilization proposals
which, though widely different in method, would bring
about the desired degree of stabilization. For the
same reason that inflation can occur in countries
using paper, gold, silver, or credit, stable money
can undoubtedly be attained in systems using any com-
bination of the media of exchange.
Stabilization without Gold
What the future of gold will be in the money
world is problematical. However, it is still an ideal
material for the settlement of international foreign
trade balances, and because of its intrinsic qualities
will always serve that purpose well. In spite of the
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fact that prectically every country in the world has
gone off gold, it is still the most universally
acceptable commodity. Except in France and other
countries in the gold bloc, gold in physical form
has practically ceased to be used for currency, and
leading bankers are beginning to realize that it is
not necessary for reserves. If gold were divorced
from domestic currencies, the nervousness that has
characterized the capital markets in recent years --
the abrupt shifting of gold balances -- would not have
the upsetting effect on domestic economies that is the
case when gold reserves are considered essential.
When too closely related to circulating
currencies gold has been used as an instrument of
international tyranny and domestic oppression. Far
from encouraging the stabilization of price levels,
it has been the fundamental cause of deflation and
of business depressions for over a century. It is
mainly responsible for internal unrest and for most
of the great wars since the industrial revolution.
It lacks the elastic qualities necessary for a good
money and it lends Itself to the worst kind of mis-
management, In the past it has been exclusively a
fair-weather standard. In recent years, because of
vicious mismanagement and greed, it has not been
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possible for nations to stay on the gold standard
even in peace times. Ji.ttempts will be made to de-
vise ingenious schemes to retain many of the objec-
tionable features of the traditional gold standard,
but the world is becoming less and less tolerant of
monetary trickery. The virtuous fatalism of our
fathers in these matters is history. Too many are
aware that most deflations are not the result of
'"natural" causes, and that the idea that they are is
a carefully sponsored deception. Large-scale discon-
tent among those who do not recognize the underlying
monetary cause of deflation has brought on irrational
revolutions in some parts of the world, a fact which
should be a warning to those responsible for defla-
tion here.
The world rejoiced when Great Britain and
other countries returned to the gold standard in 1925,
but the great advantages of that much desired blessing
proved rather obscure. It is needless to reckon with
the prospect of another return to the traditional
nineteenth century gold standard. The economic and
banking world could not possibly find a way to make
it work. The gold standard was considered equally as
radical at the time of its inception as are the newer
money proposals of today. In a few decades, our
b'tt?.hn&-3 n^ blo'^ fudd rro o-’t aijox^wn .lol ^Idbazoq
-efc ccf ei5i?m ecJ ajqracsu ctA ,e©mi:J eoasq nX isev-s
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present stabilization theories may have become the
conservative practice.
Nations need not mourn the passing of the
traditional gold standard as the passing of a vener-
able or worthy institution. It is neither very
ancient nor very honorable. It was constructed
originally in England shortly after the Napoleonic
Vrfars, and was sponsored by the type of money lender
that '‘lent Napoleon E5, 000, 000 off the London money
market to fight the Battle of Waterloo.”^ In the large
perspective of world history, the years since the
Napoleonic Wars are but a short period. «t various
times during those years England and other countries
found it impossible to adhere to the gold standard,
and the few short intervals during which it has worked,
ajid, rather badly, at best, hardly entitle it to vener-
ation either for its age or its efficiency, /s an epi-
sode in the monetary history of the world, the gold
standard era will be looked upon as the classical exam-
ple of unsound finance. It is unthinkable that such a
standard should be restored.
1. The Breakdown of Money
,
Christopher Hollis, p. 14.
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Mandatory Stabilization
The domestic price level should he controlled
without regard to the value of gold. ^s James Harvey
Rogers pointed out in 1936:
"V/ithout exception, recovery has pro-
gressed to a very greet distance in the
countries that have reduced conservatively
the values of their currencies. On the
contrary, you will find that in not one
single other country (except those engaged
in extreme military preparations) has re-
covery even started.'*^
If there is to be any connection between
domestic currency and gold, the price of the monetary
unit should be subject to change in accordance with
rules that have been established by law, and not de-
termined by the arbitrary whims of some administrator.
These rules should provide for rather infrequent changes
depending upon the action of the price level. The present
price of gold established by the government may be too
high or too low. The supply and demand relationships
for gold may prove to be different from those our gov-
ernment expects, in which case the price should be
changed and our monetary authorities should be required
by law to make the change promptly.
1 . The Annals of the j^mericsn jScademy of Political
and Social Science, July 1936, Vol. 186, p. 37.
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A Concession to Silver Producers
There is a little monetary resson why silver
should constitute any part of a domestic currency.
However, like gold, it can be used in international
trade in dealing with countries that are on a silver
standard and, like gold, it can be hoarded by govern-
ments as a war chest. During the World War the United
States government sold silver dollars amounting to
:|260,000, 000 to India at a price which was above the
gold parity of silver dollars.^ The purchase of hoards
of silver by our government is admittedly a concession
to silver producing senators. It is also an important
part of our so-called “good neighbor’* policy with
Mexico, The purchase of silver for silver certificates
increases the quantity of this kind of paper in circu-
lation and probably does no harm. There are so few
things that the United States will accept in exchange
for a chronically favorable trade balance that the im-
portation of silver helps to correct the balance. Of
course the purchase of domestic silver at a premium is
a welcome subsidy to the stock holders of the few very
large silver mining companies.
1. Money and Banking, John Thom Holdsworth, p. 57.
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Control of Credit
There should he some preference for plans
that would not alter existing monetary institutions
needlessly. Over 90;^ of our business is done vvrith
credit. Therefore, in the United States, stabilization
plans should emphasize the control of credit, preferably
through automatic and progressive changes of the redis-
count rate and open market operations. However, some
important changes must be made in the institutions that
control credit and in the laws which guide control.
Nationalization of Central Banks
One of the great hindrances to proper manage-
ment of credit is the fact that twenty-four private
banks, which control about a third of the banking re-
sources of the nation, also dominate the Federal Reserve
banks. ^ It is highly desirable, in the Interests of the
smaller banks and of the whole country that the twelve
Federal Reserve banks should be nationalized and freed
from the Influence of the pov/erful twenty-four. 1 bill
providing for government ownership of the Federal
Reserve banks was sponsored by one hundred fifty mem-
bers of the House of Representatives.^ However, the
^erican Bankers’ Association fought the bill. It
1. Congressional Record
,
November 17, 1957, p. 76.
Vol . 82, 75th Congress, 2d Session Appendix.
2. Ibid.
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appears that the officials of the twenty-four great
banks dominate the /^jnericen Bankers’ Association as
well as the central banks. It would probably be
suicidal for a small bank to . ant agonize these power-
ful financiers. Because of the nature of banking, the
concentration of power in the hands of a few banking
houses constitutes a virtual monopoly.
While government ownership of the central
banks is urgently needed, the nationalization of banks
in general is to be avoided at all costs. Beyond the
control of monetary policy, the volume of currency and
the price level, the government should stay out of the
banking business. Furthermore, Federal agencies should,
as quickly as possible, go out of the small credit busi-
ness, Government financing of mortgages and other
government ventures into the loan business is to be
deplored. Commercial banking cannot possibly be car-
ried on efficiently from Washington. If the government
creates a condition in which the banks can operate
soundly and without fear of recurring monetary deflation,
there will be no need of the government’s selling mort-
gages on $3,000 homes.
The Minting and ” Unminting” of Credit
Whether or not central banks are national-
ized, the private creation and destruction of credit
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should ceese. This does not mean that the business
of making loans should be taken away from commercial
bankers. Local bankers are obviously best quelified
to pass judgment on the financial integrity of indi-
vidual borrowers. It is deflation of the total quan-
tity of credit that constitutes the most vicious
injustice of modern deposit banking. If the Federal
Reserve banks were to collect all of the government
and bank notes that have been Issued, place them in
a pile and burn them, we would all understand better
the relation between contractions of the media of ex-
change and business depressions. Between 1929 and
1935 something of the sort actually happened. The
banks destroyed the deposit currency, $9,000,000,000
of it, an amount greater than the total note issue
outstanding. Through the celling of loans and the
refusal of the banks to make new loans, synthetic
bank credit shrank almost continuously until 1933.
The requirement of 100^ reserves would correct once
and for all this evil of minting and "unminting” our
money supply. Eventually bankers themselves may see
the wisdom of keeping 100^ reserves. The existence
of actual money behind their loans would free them
from the "moral suasion" which gives them no choice
but to ruin their customers by calling legitimate
loans when the "guiding hand" cracks the whip.
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Year to Year Orowth
Experience has demonstrated that there is
a growth of business volume per capita from year to
year, and since the increased volume of business re-
quires an increased volume of currency to prevent a
fall in prices, monetary authorities should provide
steadily increasing volume of credit, an increase of
about Zio per year.
Balancing the Budget
On December 18, 1957, Representative Ludlow,
a member of the Appropriations Committee, pledged his
support to the President’s program to hold appropria-
tions dovm to the budget estimates and argued that the
country needed "a government economy tonic .... to
rekindle confidence and to start America humming.'*^
Naturally the budget will have to be balanced some-
time. We can’t go on forever spending borrowed money
without repaying it. Hov^ever, the important budget
question is not whether the budget should be balanced
sometime, but when and how it should be balanced.
Unfortunately, the "economy tonic" of 1957 started
a trend which the unkind described as "a Roosevelt
depression" -- one that we did not "plan that way."
1. Congressional Record
,
December 18, 1957, Vol. 82,
Part 5, Appendix, 75th Congress, 2d Session, p. 607.
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The balejicing of the budget is desirable
but not urgent, and it certainly should not be bal-
anced in the way that some of our supposedly conserva-
tive financiers propose. In estimating the debt biirden
we must take into consideration the wealth and income
possibilities of the debtor. The claim that the coun-
try’s credit is impaired is not only not the truth; it
is the reverse of the truth. Instead of there being a
flight from the dollar, as many predicted, billions of
dollars of gold are being sent to the United States --
evidence of a flight to the dollar. Our dollar is not
too weak; it is too strong. The problem of balancing
the budget in the United States is not as difficult as
is the problem in most European countries. For example,
there are, in all the financial capitals of the world,
the recurring periods of anxiety over the almost chronic
French financial crises. Basically, this is a budget
problem. With a total national income of
250,000,000,000 francs per year France is supporting
a budget of over 85,000,000,000 francs, a sum which
is over a third of the total national income.^
The claim that the more the government bor-
rows, the higher taxes will be, also seems to be the
reverse of the truth under certain circimis tances
.
1 Foreign Affairs
,
July 1938, pp. 501-611; Vol. 16,
No. 4, Charles Rist, The Financial Situation in
France.
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Taxes ere proportionste to netional income. The in-
creese of netional income which eccompenies government
deficit financing may be so Isrge that the percentage
of national income taken in taxes is actually reduced.
Friends of the /.dministration point out that a netional
income of $65,000,000,000 in 1937, compered with a
$40,000,000,000 income in 1933, more than warrants the
claim that the percentage of taxation has been reduced.
This point of view is even more understandable if the
profits of individual corporations are compared for
Various years during the years of depression end re-
vival'. One corporation is reported to have increased
its profit from $161,000 in 1931, to $190,000,000 in
1936 .^
Common Sense Deficit Financing
Nevertheless, it is needless to saddle the
country with a large interest-bearing debt. The debt
should have been non-interest bearing. The credit of
the United States should have been used instead of
borrowing bank credit. The credit of the United States
is greater than that of the banks and the government
should use its own credit, without paying interest, up
to the point where the price level is restored. Pay-
ments for government spending with money or credit
1. Congressional Record
,
February 14, 1938, Vol. 83,
Part 9, Jippendix, V5th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 610.
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raised through bond issues is even more inflationary
than if payment is made with legal tender notes,
because of the interest on the bonds. The most
direct way is the best way. When prices are below
normal government bills should be paid with green-
backs; when prices are normal the budget should be
balanced through taxes; when prices are above normal,
taxes in excess of current expenditures should be
levied to retire the national debt.
Not only was the Government’s deficit financ-
ing improperly managed, but it was stopped before a
stable self-sustaining recovery of business began.
According to the Cleveland Trust Bulletin, receipts
from taxes were so great by the end of 1957 that the
Government was taking from purchasing power as much
as it contributed.^
Whenever possible, governments should take
advantage of falling prices to retire government bonds.
Legal tender notes should be issued in sufficient quan-
tities to restore prices to a just level and to sustain
them at that level. Congressmen Burdick asks: ”If the
Government’s name is good on ^55,000,000,000 of bonds,
where is the man who can say that the Government’s name
p
on currency certificates would not be equally as good?”
1. The Cleveland Trust Bulletin, March 15, 1958.
2. Congressional Record
,
March 12, 1957, Vol. 81,
Part 9, Appendix, 75th Congress, 1st Session, p. 557.
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Progressive Inflation Taxes
Progressive taxes on Incomes and an Inflation
tax would effectively prevent an undue rise In prices.
Tax the profits from an excessive rise In stocks, grain,
etc. Why ruin prosperity merely because the stock mar-
ket or the commodity markets have gotten out of hand?
A tax on the Inflation profits of any and all markets
would effectively end the fear of either general Infla-
tion, or of Inflation In any particular market. The
profit from an incipient inflation of any kind would
then go to the Government to retire the national debt.
Politically, placing a tax on inflation might not be so
easy. It was unpopular in 1929. However, if stock
market profits, or better still, stock prices had been
taxed progressively in 1929, Federal Reserve bankers
would not have found it necessary to create a major
depression to end the insanity of that year. Any tax,
’ including our existing progressive income tax, is
deflationary. Therefore, it is hard to imagine how a
general inflation of any proportions could occur in
the United States for some time to come, since the
national debt would be retired through our present
income tax before the inflation got beyond the initial
stages. As profits began to rise, rising income tax
receipts would have an anti-inflationary effect.
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The Trade Cycle -- A Monetary Phenomens
Messrs. Foster and C Etchings quote R. G-.
Hewtry as concluding "that the trade cycle is purely
a monetary phenomenon.**^ Therefore, those who would
understand the business cycle must understand money.
But, unfortunately, money as it is managed, or rather,
mismanaged in our modern pecuniary economy, becomes a
highly complex mystery, quite as mysterious as the
faker’s wheel, and for the same reason -- because the
manipulator is dishonest. It is hard to keep up to
date with changes in monetary and banking practices.
The banking act of last year becomes history in a
surprisingly short time.
Not only is this a serious social matter, but
it is also a practical business consideration. What
the business man should know and know well is MONEY.
A desire to remain in business should be accompanied
by a willingness to do the necessary research. to keep
up-to-date in financial matters that may seem entirely
unrelated to an individual’s partlculsT business. Some
business men think that they and their business friends
have a monopoly of horse sense and that monetary theo-
rists have the kind of sense that is commonly attributed
to the horse’s cousin. These self-satisfied gentlemen
1. Money
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will probably mind their own business and the internal
economics of their business. They will let the Federal
Reserve Bankers mind their own business -- the shady,
stealthy business of inflation and deflation -- and
these business men, for all of their common sense, will
presently be out of business.
Liberty and Abundance
There is considerable debate as to the most
efficient devices for attaining all the advantages of
advancing technology and at the same time the advan-
tages of individualistic capitalism with its profit
system. However, there can be no doubt that we can
enjoy these advantages together. If it were not for
the "false accoimtancy"^ of the banking world (namely,
the creating of deposits when loans ere made), these
advantages would be brought about in somewhat the fol-
lowing manner: advances in industrial science would
reduce costs and would therefore have a depressing ef-
feet on the price level.- The price level would be con-
trolled and sustained by year to year increases in the
monetary media. A combination of the two, decreasing
costs and a controlled price level, would increase' pros-
pects of profit. Now, prospects of profit are known to
have a cumulative effeeV-on business revival. Cumulative
business revival has always brought competitive bidding for
more competent workers and has consequently raised wages.
!• The Role of Money, Frederick Soddy, p. 197.*
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